I. Articles

DOI: 10.17951/et.2018.30.69

Dorota Filar
ORCID: 0000-0003-4692-8894
(UMCS, Lublin, Poland)

Przemysław Łozowski
ORCID: 0000-0001-6685-9713
(UMCS, Lublin, Poland)

ON COGNITIVE EQUIVALENCE:
GRAMMATICALISATION AND LEXICALISATION
IN THE LINGUO-CULTURAL WORLDVIEW*

Abstract. Cognitive equivalence is posited between grammaticalisation and lexicalisation as two equivalent ways, or two counterpart cognitive mechanisms, of expressing conceptualisations in language. It is assumed that grammar and lexicon constitute a continuum of symbolic structures, contracting specific correspondences with each other and showing varying degrees of equivalence. In the analytical part, the paradigm of the linguo-cultural worldview (Polish: językowy obraz świata, or JOS) comes to the fore, and it is within that framework that the research question of how futurity happens to be conceptualised in selected languages is attempted. The examples come from English, Polish, and several other European languages.

Key words: grammaticalisation; lexicalisation; cognitive equivalence; linguo-cultural worldview; linguistic worldview

In the present study, it is assumed that grammatical conceptualisation (grammaticalisation) and lexical conceptualisation (lexicalisation) are the two equivalent ways, or two counterpart cognitive mechanisms, of expressing

* The present article is a revised and updated translation of its Polish original, published in Polish as “Gramatykalizacja i leksykalizacja pojęć a językowy obraz świata. Szkic o ekwiwalencji kognitywnej” in Etnolingwistyka 30. The present English translation has been financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, project titled “English edition of the journal Etnolingwistyka. Problemy języka i kultury in electronic form” (no. 3bH 15 0204 83). What is novel are references to some of the latest publications on the role of grammatical data in the worldview research (mainly Section 1), a proposal of a threefold, rather than twofold, functional equivalence of grammatical and lexical expressions (Section 2), and a general change in tone, from being apologetic, as we evidently are in our Polish original, about positing the notion of a cognitive equivalence, towards a more assertive and conclusive stand. This latter point explains why the original Section 2 is not here included.
“mindsets” in language. In other words, lexicon and grammar are, as we claim below, equivalent to each other in specific ways, which invites the image of a continuum as a means of grasping the possibility, or capacity, of coining elements of one and the same worldview in terms of lexical and/or grammatical expressions.

We thus side with those linguistic conceptions which posit that grammar and lexicon constitute a continuum of symbolic structures. As Langacker (2016: 76) suggests: “language serves the general function of symbolic expression for purposes of interaction, communication, and thought”. Indeed, what makes human language symbolic, interpretative, explanatory is that the symbols, interpretations, and explanations that can be found in/behind linguistic expressions, be they lexically- or grammatically-expressed, are grounded in and project from the human conceptual world:

[Language not only enables communication, but also reflects mankind’s conceptual world. The conceptual world consists, amongst others, of conceptual categories, which are far richer than the system of linguistic signs. A great many, but by no means all, of the conceptual categories give rise to linguistic categories. Linguistic categories not only enable us to communicate, but also impose a certain way of understanding the world. (Dirven and Verspoor 2004: 1]

According to this reading, no matter whether lexical or grammatical, linguistic categories appear to constitute a unique “road map” for reconstructing the conceptualisations that build up our worldview. Or, to paraphrase Dirven and Verspoor’s words, if a given language discloses the mentality of its users, this is so because this mentality is reflected as much in the grammar as in the lexicon of that language. So, reconstructing one’s worldview, at least within the methodology of the linguo-cultural worldview research (henceforth: JOS)\(^1\) consists in, say, “getting the message” behind the available linguistic data of whichever kind.\(^2\)

1. Lexical and grammatical resources in reconstructing JOS

Nevertheless, of the two traditionally-recognised resources of language, it is usually content (lexical) expressions, rather than function (grammatical)

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\(^1\) As we set our argumentation in the context of and in relation to the research methodology known in Polish as \textit{językowo-kulturowy obraz świata} (or JOS for short, the linguo-cultural worldview) and practised by the Lublin-based School of Cognitive Ethnolinguistics, we will use the JOS acronym as a reference term.

\(^2\) Naturally, this does not mean that while reconstructing the JOS, one can unmistakably arrive at all possible linguistic narrations which have motivated grammatical elements of a language, especially if this motivation is a matter of remote past. Still, an attempt to identify and explain conceptual grounding of grammar is certainly tempting and worth pursuing. For the conception of language as “grand narration”, see Filar 2013.
ones, that are found worth examining for the sake of reconstructing JOS. As Pajdzińska (2001: 247) makes it plain:

> [although] cognitive linguistics has once and for all questioned the validity of the grammar-lexicon separation, thus positing that language is a continuum of symbolic structures, in practice while doing a linguistic reconstruction of extra-linguistic objects, i.e. as they happen to be recognised, conceptualised, categorised and what values they are ascribed with in language (...), it is typically the lexical kind of data that is subject to scrutiny.\(^3\)

This is not to say that grammatical considerations have been utterly ignored by the Polish researchers of JOS. For example, Grzegorczykowa (1990: 43) would emphasise the role of “grammatical features (morphological categories) in reflecting the living conditions of a given speaking community and, thus, in shaping the worldview of the users of a given language”. Anusiewicz et al. (2000: 31) would go as far as to claim, after Humboldt, evidently, that “grammar, rather than lexicon, is closer to the spirit of its nation”. Accordingly, their JOS-oriented research programme is said to involve inflexion, grammatical gender, word-formation processes and other grammatical categories (ibid., p. 31). Libura (2000: 125) seems to adhere to both Whorf’s and Halliday’s perspectives when she writes that it is not lexicon but grammar, as a coherent system, that may provide us with a much more systematised insight on how a given community sees the world (Whorf) and that grammar can be regarded as “a metaphorical model of the perceived world” because grammar keeps on evolving proportionately to the evolution of the corresponding community (Halliday).

A further indication as to the place and role of grammar in the Polish JOS research can be found in the definitions of JOS itself. While JOS had once a clearly lexical bias, the essence of research being “the lexicon (...) as a component of a given culture, with linguistic substance, not linguistic forms, coming to the fore” (Bartmiński 1980: 10), it has since then been given a lexical-grammatical dimension:

> What lies at the heart of ethnolinguistics and what delimits its scope of research is the notion of the linguistic worldview, this view being naïve in nature, fundamental for structuring language, and encoded in grammatical structures and word meanings as well as in structures and meanings of texts. (Bartmiński 1988: 5, in the first issue of the journal *Etnolingwistyka*\(^4\))

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\(^3\) Most recently, Pajdzińska seems to have ascribed this relative precedence of lexicon over grammar in reconstructing JOS also to the fact that “an average language user is typically unaware of any distinction between a given language’s grammatical system and its vocabulary, which makes him/her think that it is exclusively lexical items that can be meaning carriers” (Pajdzińska, this volume).

\(^4\) A similar lexical-grammatical conception of JOS stems from Tokarski (2001: 366;
Of the most recent attempts at including grammatical considerations into the JOS description, Wierzbicka (this volume) discusses an English-specific sense of entitlement, as in *my breakfast, my newspaper, my dinner* etc. Whenever the sense of entitlement is involved in these expressions, its linguistic marker is not *my* as a lexical element, but *my* as a grammatical one. That is why this “grammatical” *my* has a limited distribution and scope of application, and it relates specifically to, as Wierzbicka puts it, “Anglo ‘rules of the game’ [which] include (...) personal routines, especially common daily routines (...)” (ibid.).

Pajdzińska (this volume) examines the category of grammatical gender in order to illustrate the claim that “the grammar of a given language (...) encodes a specific inventory of meanings characteristic of that language”, and, more specifically, that “grammatical gender partially determines metaphorical correspondences and curtails metaphorical possibilities”.

The category of number, yet another phenomenon which is traditionally-recognised as purely grammatical, has been examined by Nowosad-Bakalarczyk (this volume). Her research accords rather closely with our argumentation below in the sense that assuming the gramaticalisation-lexicalisation continuum, she seems to favour the from-lexicalisation-to-grammaticalisation orientation, with her research questions being “what substance has happened to be expressed in language, how this substance is encoded in language, what linguistic forms it has been given, and what has motivated these processes” (ibid.).

That one and the same substance may well be expressed grammatically as much as lexically projects from Szadura’s (2017) monographic account of the category of time in Polish. Assuming that time has a linguo-cultural dimension, Szadura shows that various aspects of time, such as past, present, future, antecedence etc., happen to be given both lexical and grammatical expression. In her methodological premises, she follows cognitive linguistics and, thus, assumes that language is a way of understanding the world and examines grammar and lexicon in terms of a semantic continuum.

This brings us to our pivotal notion here, the one of *cognitive equivalence*, or, to grasp the dynamicity of the process, of *cognitive “equivalentisation”*.  

emphasis added): “[JOS is] a set of regularities encoded in categorical relations of grammar (such as inflexion, word-formation, syntax) as well as in semantic structures of the lexicon, this all, first, disclosing language-specific ways of how respective components of the world are perceived and, second, reflecting a more general understanding of how the world is structured (...)”).
2. Cognitive equivalence: in-between lexicalisation and grammaticalisation

Our argumentation so far amounts to the observation that humans evidently cherish the prospect of expressing their conceptual world in the language they use (see Section 1). This process (of linguistic conceptualisation) may be given two basic orientations, depending on what kind of linguistic forms it is that concepts are expressed with. There is, then, (i) lexical conceptualisation if it is lexical expressions that our thoughts are “translated” into, and (ii) grammatical conceptualisation if our thinking is “rendered” by means of grammatical expressions. Figure 1 attempts to illustrate this functional equivalence of (i) and (ii): lexical and grammatical expressions are equivalent, first, in the sense that they are linguistic renderings of the respective elements of the conceptual world and, second, in the sense that they may as well be equivalent to each other. The latter case involves a situation when one and the same conceptual substance may be expressed lexically as much as grammatically.\(^5\)

\[\text{conceptual world} \quad \Downarrow \quad \text{linguistic conceptualisation} \]

\[\begin{align*}
\text{(i) lexical exponents} & \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \text{(ii) grammatical exponents} \\
\end{align*}\]

\text{Figure 1. Lexical and grammatical orientations of linguistic conceptualisation}

Moreover, the process of expressing thoughts in language does not stop once concepts have been given their lexical or grammatical equivalents, but it may linger on to the effect that (iii) hitherto lexical units acquire some grammatical function, and (iv) hitherto grammatical units develop some lexical status, as shown in Figure 2.

\(^5\) Take Polish (and other inflectional languages) where the speaking subject can be identified with either a personal pronoun or an inflectionally-marked verb-form. Both of these, the lexeme and the inflectional morpheme, prove to be linguistic equivalents of the same conceptual substance and also appear functionally equivalent to each other. (Cf. GWJP-M 1984: 143–146.)
This gives cognitive equivalence yet another (third) dimension, resulting ultimately in three idealisations: with regard to each other, lexical and grammatical units may be

- parallel (conceptual content > lexical expressions or grammatical expressions),
- crisscrossing (conceptual content > lexical expressions and grammatical expressions), and
- reversible and bidirectional (lexical expressions >< conceptual content >< grammatical expressions).\(^6\)

It is this latter reading of grammatical conceptualisation, or grammaticalisation for short (see (i > iii) in Figure 2), and of lexical conceptualisation, or lexicalisation for short (see (ii > iv) in Figure 2) that is of primary importance in the present contribution. As processes of linguistic re-conceptualisation, a change which is both linguistic as much as conceptual, the two take place once concepts have found their original linguistic equivalents.

Why should we attempt to relate grammaticalisation and lexicalisation in terms of cognitive equivalence/equivalentisation? First of all, equivalence here is not restricted to fidelity-versus-naturalness correspondences between respective elements of related texts, as in translation studies (cf. Tabakowska 1993), or to synonymy-calibrated sense relations between lexemes, as in lexical semantics (cf. Bogusławski 1988: 64), or as (partial) structural and semantic identity between segments, or elements, of a given text, as in an ethnolinguistically-oriented analysis of oral texts patterns (cf. Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2007: 362). As signalled already above, on our

\(^6\) For the moment we shall consider it remains open to debate whether concepts can be grounded in their grammatical equivalents in a direct and unmediated way as they appear to be in the case of lexical expressions. The question mark on the side of grammatical conceptualisation (see (ii) in Figure 2) is meant to represent our agnostic position in that respect.
reading, equivalence is given a wider perspective of universal cognitive and cultural grounding, thus amounting to an all-embracing property of the mind and capturing the human capacity to express coherent world judgements by means of, among other things, parallel, crisscrossing, and/or reversible linguistic means, two of them being grammaticalisation and lexicalisation. For some (experiential) reasons, language users find it necessary and useful not only to voice their conceptualisations in grammatical constructions and in lexical units, but also to re-conceptualise the conceptual content of either of the two for one to become the other. In this sense, lexicon is an equivalent of grammar, and grammar is an equivalent of lexicon. It seems that equivalence here has to do with some propensity and predilection of the human mind to search for, identify, and bring together diverse entities for their conceptual content to be given a better, or a more adequate, expression of the underlying mentalities.

Let us now comment briefly on how we understand grammaticalisation and lexicalisation.

2.1. Grammaticalisation

Our understanding of grammaticalisation follows Kuryłowicz’s (1975 [1965]: 52) original conception of the phenomenon:

Grammaticalisation consists in the increase of the range of a morpheme advancing from a lexical to a grammatical or from a less grammatical to a more grammatical status, e.g. from a derivational (...) formant to an inflectional one.

On close reading, Kuryłowicz distinguishes two specific cases of grammaticalisation, both aiming at diminishing lexical and increasing grammatical contents of forms, yet to varying degrees.

By means of illustrating these two cases, here is a brief note on the origin of the English articles. The present-day English indefinite article *a/an*, as in *a boy* and *an apple*, goes back to the Old English (OE) numeral *an /aːn/ ‘one’ (cf. Traugott and Trousdale 2013: 32), whereas the definite article *the*, as in *the boy* and *the apple*, derives from the Old English neuter indicative pronoun and gender marker *þæt* (rel. to Pol. *to* (*dziecko*) and Germ. *das* (*Kind*) ‘this child’). So, in these two examples, we have a change, respectively, of a numeral into an article (OE *an > a/an*) and of a pronoun/gender marker into an article (OE *þæt > the*).

Now, trying to identify which of Kuryłowicz’s two cases of grammaticalisation (i.e. lexical > grammatical and less grammatical > more grammatical) should be paired with which of our examples may be a daunting task, as this ultimately depends on how we define grammar and lexicon. Yet, the
difference in the more-or-less grammatical status of the source and the target forms seems to be relatively evident. Namely, unlike the target category (articles), both of the source categories (numeral and pronoun/gender marker) remain in a defined relation with one’s tangible or physical experience, or, in other words, with direct designating and naming objects in the world. In this sense, one in one boy and this/that in this/that boy point to physically-delimited and experientially-real objects. Moreover, although their meanings do not seem to be context-free, one and this/that do not depend on the actual structural configuration of a given expression as much as the articles do. Without a context, the English articles a/an and the must be said either to have no independent (lexical) meaning at all, or to be significantly less independent than their historical antecedents, an and þæt. To conclude, in comparison to their OE source categories, articles are more grammatical, or more grammaticalised. Numerals and (demonstrative) pronouns, in turn, prove to be less grammatical, or less grammaticalised, if not just lexical, in their categorial status than the articles.

Nevertheless, as we attempt a continuum interpretation of the lexicalisation-grammaticalisation cognitive equivalence, the most important point here is not structurally-delimited source-target parameters of what changes into what, but conceptual factors that motivate that which eventually emerges as changes in forms and meanings. And thus, the cognitive inference behind bringing the OE numeral for ‘one’ to the position of the indefinite article for ‘some, any’ is this: “if a given object is referred to as one of a set of similar or same objects, that means that the reference is indefinite (because vague, general, indeterminate etc.)”. The cognitive inference behind developing the definite article for ‘defined, identified’ out of the demonstrative form for ‘this, that’ can, in turn, be phrased as follows: “if a given object is referred to in terms of pointing to, or indexing, or other means of highlighting, that means that the reference is definite (because clear, specific, determinate etc.)”. As in visual perception, cognitive equivalence binds the indistinct with the indefinite by virtue of ‘some/any’ conceptualisation (e.g. I can see some ...), and the distinct with the definite by virtue of ‘this/that’ conceptualisation (I can see this ...).

2.2. Lexicalisation

As to lexicalisation, we take it to stand for any change, mechanism, or process, that results in a novel lexical element, the target being a lexical expression (i) or (iv), as in Figure 2. Yet, as we specifically focus here on the changes (i) > (iii) and (ii) > (iv), by analogy to Kuryłowicz’s
grammaticalisation, lexicalisation is taken to involve a change consisting in a relative increase of the lexical status of a given linguistic element, that is either grammatical > lexical or less lexical > more lexical.

This seems to accord with, or at least correspond to, Doroszewski’s idea of lexicalisation as derived from lexical formations from syntactic structures so that the novel (lexical) element finds its origin in some syntactic (grammatical) structure, as, for example, *pływak* ‘swimmer’ derives from the construction ‘the one that/who swims’ (cf. Lewicki 2001: 639). A similar syntactic > lexical change can be found in generative linguists’ claim that lexicalisation “is a particular kind of transformational process” (Lyons 1977: 114), where several original deep structure “sense-components” turn into a lexeme, as in \( \text{CAUSE} + \text{BECOME} + \text{NOT} + \text{ALIVE} \rightarrow \text{KILL} \). Naturally, neither Doroszewski nor generativists would allow for cultural and conceptual considerations to play their role in motivating the Polish *pływak* or the English *kill*, both being outcomes of intralinguistic and systemic forces, but what matters here is that for their proponents both positions present lexicalisation as a shift from the grammatical to the lexical.\(^7\)

An example comes with the Polish *-izm* formant (Eng. *-ism*, Span. *-ismo*). A suffix and a bound morpheme, *-izm* is one of the formal exponents of the *nomen essendi* category involving names of distinctive doctrines, practices, philosophical systems, political ideologies, such as *rasizm* ‘racism’, *mistycyzm* ‘mysticism’, *naturalizm* ‘naturalism’, *marksizm* ‘Marxism’ etc. However, despite its originally purely grammatical status, *-izm* has recently been perceived to have so much of lexical substance that it may well be used as a lexeme, or at least as an independent component of a text. Take this example in Polish:

\(^7\) This understanding of lexicalisation departs from the (prevailing) one that presents it in terms of a form-substance split, or “loosening the relations between the morphological structure of a word-form and its meaning” (cf. *Słownik terminów gramatycznych*). So, lexicalisation can be claimed whenever language users can no longer perceive the original motivation behind given lexical formations, as in *piwnica* ‘cellar, basement’ originally related to *piwo* ‘beer’, *górnik* ‘(coal) miner’ to *góry* ‘mountains’, *wątek* ‘plot/storyline’ to *tkać* ‘to weave’, or *wątroba* ‘liver’ to *wnętrze* ‘interior’. These cases may well be metaphorical extensions or elaborations and in that sense illustrate cognitive equivalence – that is, language users perceive some conceptual similarity, or common conceptual basis, between what is already named (*góry*) and what is to be named (*górnik*) and they elaborate on or extend the given (*góry*) for the sake of the emergent (*górnik*), yet none of them is an example of lexicalisation as long as they – lexical expressions, no doubt – do not derive from grammatical expressions, or at least, from expressions of a less lexical status than themselves.
Na początku nadrealizm oznaczał sprzeciw wobec zastanych konwencji w sztuce, a dokładniej wobec pięciu „izmów”: klasycyzmu, realizmu, empiryzmu, racjonalizmu, utylitaryzmu (http://dwudziestolecie-miedzywojenne.klp.pl/a–8708.html).

‘At the beginning surrealism meant a dissent against the existing conventions in art, specifically against the five “isms”: classicism, realism, empiricism, rationalism, and utilitarianism.’

As it appears, in this particular illustration, the lexical independence if -izm seems to be only partial. If it were complete, the expression would not be given in quotation marks and, possibly, would not be followed by a meticulous enumeration of the five corresponding terms. This means that the author does not recognise fully the lexemic status of izm, but, rather, treats it as part of the wordplay that consists in an agreed-on, or contextually negotiated, conventional character of izm. Still, the fact remains that izmy is here given its genitive plural form (izmów) as if it was a regular Polish noun.

What, then, is the status of -izm in present-day Polish? As Jadacka (2001) observes, the highly productive morpheme -izm is now frequently used to form surnames-based derivatives, the surnames being those of politicians, artists etc. According to her, “the collision of the ‘intellectual’ suffix with the every-day reality symbolised with a given topical surname gives the whole structure some depreciating, or jocular, colloquial character” (ibid., p. 83). This may be parallel to the changes in the meaning of the word doktryna ‘doctrine’ which seems to serve as a kind of underlying conceptual base for the izm-marked derivatives. Doktryna has recently developed a semantic nuance of “a word used disapprovingly”, similarly to the related adjective doktrynalny and the adverb doktryналnie: “What can be called doktryna is one’s unfounded or experience-discordant views and claims used to legitimise something” (ISJP Bańko 2000). If so, the noun doktryna can be said to have been partially reconceptualised as a result of the Polish language users’ attempts at finding a more expressive equivalent for that part of the import of the noun that implies negative connotations. The resulting noun izm has become a carrier of contextually-acquired meanings which disclose an attitude of jocularity, irony, or irreverence with regard to one’s ideas and beliefs.8

8 Take this humorous ditty by Apolinary Polek: “Biega, krzyczę pani Magda: / ‘Gdzie jest obiektywna prawda?’ / Szuka w jodze i w buddyzmie, / W jednym izmie, w drugim izmie. [...]]” (apolinary.pl/wiersze/; Eng. “Maggie’s shouting all around / ‘Where can truth be found?’ / Is this yoga, is this Buddhism? / It’s this ism, or another ism?”). The jocular status seems to be recognised also in the English noun ism. In some of the EFL dictionaries, ism is labelled “humorous” (CALD online) or “derogatory” (OALD online), and defined in terms of beliefs, “especially ones that you disapprove of” (CALD online) or “especially when you think that they are not sensible or practical” (LDCE online).
Dictionaries of contemporary Polish have evidently recognised the lexical autonomy of *izm*, so that having shifted from a purely grammatical position of a morphological suffix, it can now be given a fully-fledged nominal definition, as in *ISJP Bańko* (2000): “a jocular designation of some doctrine, theory, art movement etc.” (cf. also *SWJP Dun*). To sum up, in the process of partial reconceptualisation, *izm*, originally a morphological equivalent of some conceptual substance, has gradually assumed the status of a lexical equivalent of both its grammatical exponency of the *nomen essendi* category as well as of the sarcastic overtones of *doktryna*.

One way or another, however reconceptualised and lexicalised, *-izm* has not lost its word-formation capacity and still functions as a highly productive suffix, which brings us to more complex examples of the lexicalisation-grammaticalisation continuum.

### 2.3. Grammaticalisation and lexicalisation: in search of a continuum

Indeed, while the English articles appear to be a straightforward illustration of grammaticalisation in the sense that *a/an* and *the* can hardly be presented to have any lexical substance in present-day English at all, the *izm* example shows some bifurcation effect at the moment, exemplifying both lexical and grammatical dimensions in specific contexts. In their respective terms, both examples do illustrate not only that grammaticalisation and lexicalisation result in linguistic equivalents of the corresponding conceptual substance, or that the two can be equivalent to each other, but also that this cognitive equivalence constitutes a continuum. Let us now explore these findings with some further evidence from English.

The present-day English *always* ‘every time, all the time’ is a historical continuation of OE *ealneweg* ‘app. all (the) way’ supplied at the beginning of the 15th c. with the genitive marker -s, whereas *already* ‘before/earlier than the time in question’ goes back to the Middle English (MidE) contraction of *all* and *ready* (cf. Chaucer’s *alredi*), meaning literally ‘fully ready’, that is ‘being prepared’, as of a horse available for riding. Both of these two adverbs may be regarded as examples of lexicalisation because no matter which word-formation process(es) we actually agree upon as the mechanism behind their origins (compounding and/or derivation), English no doubt did acquire two novel lexemes, *always* and *already*.

Still, there is a grammaticalisation part in all this as well. The morphological and typological issues aside, what comes to the fore on our reading of the lexicalisation-grammaticalisation cognitive equivalence is experiential...
motivation which seems to have facilitated the diagnosed changes. Most generally, the historical developments that we find in always and already are based on inferencing about time from what is experientially known about space. Specifically, what seems to have led the speakers of English to coin the adverbs always and already, as we use them today, is the respective experiential inferences: “if something happens on ‘all the ways’ in the sense of ‘everywhere’, that means that it happens at all times” (always), and “if something or somebody is nothing but ‘all ready’ in the sense of being completely prepared, that means that something or somebody is prepared to act before the time expected”. At the simplest, living in and experiencing space invites and permits making conjectures about what living in and experiencing time might be like.9

In other words, equivalence here consists in expressing the concepts of, say, ‘all-presence’ and ‘all-readiness’ by means of reconceptualising the available lexical resources in the domain of space into the emergent grammatical resources in the domain of time. Whatever happens is some kind of cognitive equivalentisation: in human subjective and relative experience, grammar and lexicon prove to be equivalent to each other as much as space and time do. This is to say that the linguistic expressions bearing witness to the space-time continuum, the grammar-lexicon continuum, and the lexicalisation-grammaticalisation continuum are all products of one and the same mental capacity of the human mind which, as Heine and Kuteva (2002: 5) once called it, is “a strategy of linguistic processing whereby more abstract functions are expressed in terms of forms for concrete concepts”. The whole idea behind from-the-lexical-to-the-grammatical orientation of cognitive equivalence, as in always and already, is that once we are in need of conceptualising what is unknown, remote, or, simply, escapes our concrete (somatic, physical, unmediated) experience (here: time), we rely on what is known, close and available to us (here: space). Temporal expressions are, on the whole, more abstract and, thus, more grammatical(ised) than the spatial ones, whereas spatial expressions are more concrete and, thus, more lexical(ised) than the temporal ones.

What is worth emphasising is that always and already present the co- cognitive equivalence of the grammaticalisation orientation as much as the English articles do, and of the lexical orientation as much as the case of izm/ism does, which makes them less clear-cut in their respective developments. On the one hand, they can still be analysable in purely lexical

9 Naturally, expressing temporal experience in terms of spatial experience is a very well recognised cognitive mechanism, for which see, in the first place, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and, for Polish or in Polish, Szadura (2017) and Łozowski (2018).
terms, as, respectively, *all+ways* and *all+ready*, yet, on the other hand, their adverbial status must be recognised as, again, purely grammatical. In short, neither has their original lexical conceptualisation utterly “bleached”, nor their present-day grammatical conceptualisation completely “coloured”. One needs to be prepared, then, for more or less of grammaticalisation and lexicalisation in the way cognitive equivalence works, which we take to be a true and expected characteristic of any continuum.

In the analytical part now, we attempt to exemplify all of our theoretical considerations with how futurity happens to be conceptualised in selected languages. As intended, the developments discussed below are meant to illustrate the role of grammaticalisation in the overall scheme of cognitive equivalentisation, and to offer generalisations as to the “grammatical tools” that linguistic reconceptualisation consists in for the expression of futurity.

3. Futurity as a collectively-driven grammaticalisation of lexical resources

As Szadura (2017: 107) asserts, for the conceptualiser, the present is tangible, clearly situated in awareness, and available to sensory experience: “‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ constitute a triad of the sensory-based fundamental concepts”. It is then the present that in most languages serves the purposes of a self-evident, natural, egocentric starting point for conceptualising time. With regard to the present, the future is already an abstract notion elusive of any “here and now” experience. Instead, thinking in terms of the future employs imagination, requires making inferences and projections, while verbalising futurity involves complex mental operations which allow for expressing all of that in words. The reason why we scrutinise linguistic expressions of futurity, to be remembered, is that this is believed to reveal some of the *re*-conceptualisation mechanisms of cognitive equivalence to the benefit of conceptualising what goes beyond one’s direct sensory experience, i.e. the future, in terms of what projects from one’s direct sensory experience, e.g., the present.

3.1. Expressing futurity in English and Polish

One notable example of this present-future correlation is English, where there are just two grammatical tenses, that is, two morphologically-marked ways of making time references: the present and the past. In practice, then, whatever verb-form we may consider, it can never indicate any future
reference by the form itself. For example, none of the available forms of the strong (irregular) verb *to write* – write, writes, wrote, writing, written – indicates any futurity, the first two forms grounding an action in the present, the third – in the past, and the latter two being timeless participles. Similarly, the available forms of the weak (regular) verb *to love* – love, loves, loved, loving – can mark either the present, or the future, or make no time reference at all. Instead of a morphologically-marked future tense, English makes use of a number of analytical constructions, the *to be going to* construction and the *will* construction serving a vast majority of future references.

These two constructions illustrate the process of grammaticalisation; the elements that provide the formal and the substantive basis for both of them, i.e. *will* and *go*, used to be purely lexical elements, that is, verbs having their concrete lexically-definable senses, ‘want, desire, intend’ and ‘move from one place to another’, respectively, and being conjugated, thus subject to grammatical calibration as to the tense, number, and person. So, by means of experimenting, if we were to reconstruct the original import in *I will read a book tomorrow* and *I am going to read a book tomorrow*, we would need to understand that the former means ‘I want/intend to read a book tomorrow’ and the latter, literally, ‘I am just moving (or: I am in the process of moving/leaving) in order to read a book tomorrow’.

Naturally, both *will* and *go* have retained some traces of their original meanings, which is why the *will* construction as well as the *to be going to* construction are constrained semantically, syntactically, and contextually. After all, it is only in their respective future-oriented constructions that *will* and *go* have their grammatical function which they do not show anywhere else. Yet, the lexical meanings are here “bleached” to such a degree that one can safely assume that *will* and *go* are nothing but grammaticalised.

Now, can we at all identify any cross-generational experiential inferences at work behind the grammaticalisation of *will* and *go*, as in their future-marking constructions? Even if this is merely hypothetical or cannot be falsified in rigid terms, it is quite plausible to assume that what led to the grammaticalisation of *will* is experiencing desire, intention, determination, or just willpower in terms of the expected outcomes and effects. Experientially, then, desiring something means placing the object of desire already in the space of futurity, as if determination alone could project the course of coming events. Needless to say, the present-day speakers of English are not really

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10 The same holds true for the imperfective aspect, as in *I will be reading a book tomorrow* and *I am going to be reading a book tomorrow*. Here again, the historical sense behind one and the other is that of one’s present, immediate, or “here and now”, being in the process of intending something and moving somewhere, respectively.
aware of that, historically, their *will construction does not project any future event, but simply expresses one’s overwhelming and irresistible desire for this event to happen.\footnote{The element of volition is still salient in some of the *will-based derivations: *willing, *willing to, *willingness, *willingly.} Projecting futurity as intention from experiencing the immediate present lies at the root of the grammaticalisation of *go in the *to be going to construction as well. Yet, this time the experiential inference is not a matter of desire, but seems to have to do, first, with space-based conceptualisation of time. More specifically, the cognitively-oriented moving ego model for time (cf. Evans 2007: 64) may be called to play its role: an image of the conceptualiser moving through the space of time, from the present to the future, frames “a temporal reference [in order] ‘to locate’ events by virtue of their relationship to the subjective experience of now or the present” (ibid.). Second, what matters here is, as Hopper and Traugott (2003: 3) assert, making “inference of futurity from purposiveness”: if one is physically and literally going (in the sense of moving in space) with the purpose, or intention, of doing something, then this purpose must be not only settled, specific, and definite, but also fixed and immediate. Evidently, the conceptualiser is so much purpose-focused in his/her intentions that the directed purpose itself projects futurity.

To sum up, the linguistic view of futurity in English which emerges from the grammaticalisation developments of the *will and the *to be going to constructions is this: the future is the present desire, intention, goal-directed, purposeful activity, projected as oncoming events. Despite their completely unrelated lexical sources, the two constructions are thus brought together by the operation of cognitive equivalence as expressions of one and the same panchronic drive at inferencing about an opportunity window for future events from how they are experienced, or, rather, what they are experienced like, as present events. However cognitively equivalent, these constructions are not synonymous or identical (inasmuch as the present and the future are not synonymous or identical). Although intention is the most underlying aspect of both constructions, the “intended” future of the *will kind is what one wishes for, whereas the “intended” future of the *to be going to kind is what is already on its way. The former future is merely conceived, and the latter is already emerging. That is why Hopper and Traugott (2003: 1-3) allow for *If interest rates are going to climb, we’ll have to change our plans, but not for *If interest rates will climb, we’ll have to change our plans.

As to Polish, there are many analytical constructions serving futurity as well, some of which seem to be akin to the English *to be going to, as in *iść...
**coś zrobić** ‘to be going in order to do something’. For example, Idę odrobić lekcje ‘I am going to do my homework’ means that one is leaving/departing from one’s actual location with the immediate intention of doing something.

Unlike English, however, Polish has a morphologically-marked composite future tense which is composed of two elements, the auxiliary być ‘be’ and the main verb. The auxiliary is given a future form marked for the person and the number (będę / będziesz / będzie / będziemy / będzieszcie / będą, all corresponding to the invariant will be in English) and “bleached” of its lexical meaning ‘exist’ which it shows otherwise as a main verb, its function being that of a grammatical marker of futurity. The other element of the Polish composite future tense, i.e. the main verb, can appear either in its infinitival or its past participle forms, as in – for the 3rd person masculine singular – będzie pisać and będzie pisał, both meaning ‘he will write/be writing’. According to Rospond (1962: 85), these two alternative forms have been available “in Polish since the earliest times”.

Again, as in English, we can attempt some collective and cross-generational mentality as an account of how futurity has happened to be conceptualised in Polish. Yet, the inference behind the grammaticalisation of the Polish być ‘to be’ as an auxiliary is not motivated by volition, as in will, or by a metaphor of traveling in time pictured as bodily approximating some point in space, as in to be going to. Polish seems to have recorded an idea of an event being time-shifted, this event being an entity that will “be”, or will “exist”, so that somebody or something will physically be placed in future, or will literally exist in future, performing an activity some time from now. This is a kind of translocation, as in the English to be going to, but there is no mention of an action being in any progress, or of future being approximated anyhow. Futurity here is simply the present me/you/us etc. time-shifted into the future, or, in other words, an asserted projection of what something or somebody is (doing) now, which – without taking it too far – presents the future as a projected representation of the present. That is why, as we claim, unlike the English constructions, the Polish composite future tense captures futurity in terms of an unmediated shift in time.

Naturally, this all invites further questions: are the inferences identified for English and Polish specifically limited to these two respective languages, or can they be generalised as some transnational heritage? By means of attempting these and related issues, in what follows we examine briefly ways of expressing futurity in some other languages and offer what we hope can be working hypotheses about how cognitive equivalence in general and the lexicalisation-grammaticalisation interface in specific find their expression in language.
3.2. Futurity as an implementation of desire and intention

Jakubowicz (2014) describes forms of the analytically-constructed future tense in the languages identified historically with the Balkan League, that is Bulgarian, Macedonian, Albanian, Romanian, and Greek. To a considerable degree, their future tenses are based on the grammaticalisation of the form that used to mean ‘want’. So, as much as in English, the original meaning was bleached of its lexical attributes and started to serve the grammatical function of marking futurity. The forms in question involve the following: šte < chošte orig. ‘want’ in Bulgarian (e.g., azštepiša ‘I will write’), the same with the particle k’e in Macedonian (e.g., jask’epišam ‘I will write’), tha as a shortened form of thelo ‘I want’ in Greek (e.g., ego tha agrafo ‘I will write’), and do < duaj ‘want’ in Albanian (e.g., unë do të shkruaj ‘I will write’). Similarly, in Serbian and Croatian the particle ću < hoću ‘want’ is typically used to form the future tense.

3.3. Futurity as a movement towards an oncoming events

Neither is the English to be going to construction unparalleled in other languages, as a way of expressing futurity. The moving ego model for time and the related grammaticalised meanings of the verb to go can be found, for example, in French. One of the means of forming the future tense (futur proche) in French consists in the analytical construction that has resulted from a partial “bleaching” of the lexical meaning of the verb aller ‘to go’ calibrated for person and number and accompanied with the infinitive, as in Je vais ecrire ‘I will write’. A similar situation can be identified in other Romance languages. For example, the Spanish Presente de Indicativo involves a periphrastic future tense construction which combines a finite form of the grammaticalised verb ir ‘to go’, the preposition a, and the main verb in its infinitival form, as in voy a escribir ‘I will write’. (Compare this with the analogous vou escrever ‘I will write’ in Portuguese.)

3.4. Futurity as where we will once be, or what we will once become

As in Polish, in most of the other Slavic languages, the analytical future tense is formed by means of finite forms of the grammaticalised verb for

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12 All the examples from the Balkan languages are quoted after Jakubowicz.
13 We are also familiar with the claim that in some contexts the French Je vais ecrire should be understood more literally as ‘I am going to write’, vais showing the lexical dimension of a physical movement.
‘to be’ followed by the main verb. For example, *Ja budu písať* in Russian, *Budem písať* in Slovak, or *Budu psát* in Czech, correspond closely to *Będę pisać* in Polish ‘I will write’. A similar mechanism can be found in German, but the grammaticalised verb means ‘to become’, or ‘to come into existence’ (*werden*), rather than ‘to be’, as in *Ich werde schreiben* ‘I will write’. This presents the German-engrained futurity as what one will once come to be, rather than where one will once be.

4. Concluding remarks

The objective in this contribution has been to present the role of, respectively, grammar and lexicon in the JOS research, that is, what grammatical and lexical constructs can reveal about how language users understand the world. This aim has brought us to the prospect of treating grammar and lexicon as functionally-equivalent exponents of linguistic conceptualisation, which has been attempted here with regard to selected examples of the grammaticalisation-lexicalisation continuum, borderline or transition cases included. However tentative our proposal may be at the moment, it is safe to assume that grammatical conceptualisation proves to be as promising a source of the worldview knowledge as the lexical one. Indeed, our analytical part on the means of expressing futurity in selected European languages seems to justify the prospect of a comparative study of grammatical categories as overt expressions of conceptualisation. The starting point for such a study could be a detailed typology of world languages (cf. Majewicz 1989), with the end point being hypotheses about cognitive inferences which respective linguo-cultural communities have come to make in order to express their mentalities. The operational mechanism in all that, as we propose, should be cognitive equivalence, that is, a never-ending process of giving appropriate grammatical and/or lexical equivalents of how humans conceptualise, or understand, the world they live in. The notion of cognitive equivalence has merely been sketched here and needs further elaboration, yet we think it provides a novel and intriguing perspective on language.

*Translated by Przemysław Łozowski*

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14 Czech uses perfective-imperfective forms like most Slavic languages to distinguish between present activities and future actions. However, if *napišu* means ‘I’ll write, I’m going to write’, *budu psat* means ‘I will be in the process of writing’ and is therefore used much less.
On cognitive equivalence...

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