I. Articles

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FROM TAXONOMY TO COGNITIVISM:
ON VARIANTS OF THE LEXICOGRAPHIC DEFINITION*

Abstract. The study compares two methods of defining concepts, proposed by Anna Wierzbicka and Jerzy Bartmiński. Two variants of the maximal definition are identified: the extended variant, where the definition assumes the form of a narrative explication (Bartmiński), and the synthetic variant, with condensed content of the full definition (Wierzbicka, Bartmiński). Similarities and differences in the approaches of the two scholars to the problem of defining are discussed. The similarities include: the idea that a full understanding of a concept should be accounted for, the proposal that all linguistically, culturally, and communicatively relevant features be reconstructed, that the definition contain a facet-based ordering of the defining sentences, as well as the recognition of the importance of linguistic evidence. The differences are identified in: the style of defining, the use being made of the data, the approach to the stability of features in the concept being defined, the ultimate shape (static or dynamic) of the reconstructed image.

Key words: maximal definition, cognitive definition, Anna Wierzbicka, Jerzy Bartmiński

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Words are a society’s most basic cultural artefacts, and – properly understood – they provide the best key to a culture’s values and assumptions. But to avoid misinterpretation, definitions are needed that are free of ethnocentric bias; that is, definitions couched in terms of universal, culture-free, primitive concepts. (Wierzbicka 1996: 237)

Words resemble crystals that reflect worldview and focus on its selected aspects; together with other words, artefacts, people, as well as elements of our personal histories, or the history of a given speech community, they form a lexical network. It is therefore true that investigating the lexicon of a given language provides insight into the wealth of the culture of that community. (Bartmiński 1986: 18)

1. Towards new paradigms in linguistic description

Within the last fifty years, goals, methods, and objects of defining concepts, have become key issues, especially when traditional structuralist paradigms giving way to cognitive, anthropological, and cultural approaches to definitions.

In 1993, Yuriy Apresyan summed up recent changes in contemporary linguistics and pointed out three major approaches to research on systemic lexicography: (1) the reconstruction of the naïve worldview, or conceptual patterns that underlie lexical and grammatical meanings of a given language; (2) recognition of the so-called “linguistic macrocosm” that serves as the background to lexicographic types and bigger units of linguistic and textual organization; (3) recognition of “linguistic microcosm” and the so-called “lexicographic portrayals”, i.e. separate senses of a given word with all linguistically relevant properties (Apresjan 1993: 10).

A reconstruction of the “lexicographic portrayal” assumes detachment from the traditional dictionary entry in several ways. Firstly, the lexicographic definition should not be confined to necessary and sufficient elements, but should offer an exhaustive characterization of all linguistically relevant properties of a lexeme. Secondly, in terms of organizing the content of the definition, it should offer an integrated linguistic description instead of enumerating separate word senses. Thirdly, the definition should depart from a typical single-layer dictionary structure, where components of meaning

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1 The notion of “lexicographic portrayal” was first proposed by Zholkovski (1964) and was defined by Apresyan as “comprehensive characteristics of all linguistically relevant properties of a given lexeme, organised into a unified and integrated lexicographic and grammatical description” (Apresjan 1993: 16).
have equal status, but have a complex structure with distinct layers of presuppositions, assertions, or modal and referential frames.

In theoretical semantics, two distinct approaches to defining concepts have competed with each other with regard to such parameters as the object, aims, and the methods of defining. Some authors advocate maximal definitions, i.e. semantic and cultural explications, the aim of which is to provide all positive, linguistically, communicatively, and culturally relevant characteristics of a given object (Bartmiński 1980c, 1984, 1988; Wierzbicka 1985, 1993) – this, to a great extent, converges with Apresyan’s postulates. However, others stand by traditional definitions, based on syntactic and semantic principles, where the content is limited to necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of the denotated meaning, which renders that definition fully taxonomic (see e.g. Grochowski 1982, 1993a, b).  

Allowing for new proposals in the methodology of defining concepts, a new approach that aims at the reconstruction of “the naïve worldview” (Apresyan 1992 [1974]), provisionally called the “extended” definition (which includes connotations) was proposed by Jerzy Bartmiński with reference to the research on the language of folklore (Bartmiński 1980a,b). The Lublin linguist openly declares:

From a linguist’s point of view, the reduction of the number of distinctive features in the entity being defined to a few necessary ones, sufficient in a classical (taxonomic) definition, is [...] unacceptable. (Bartmiński 1980c: 25–26; cf. also Bartmiński 1984: 19)

Bartmiński also emphasizes that a reduced (scientific) definition has a diminished descriptive value:

I see no reason why lexicographic explication should be bereft of all positive elements that pertain to the meaning of a given word and that are relevant from the perspective of its use in linguistic texts as well as its use with reference to other words in a given language. (Bartmiński 1984: 19)

Bartmiński’s approach to defining concepts, thoroughly argued in his 1984 article, is regarded as a breakthrough in a traditional approach to defining concepts and a new trend in metalexicography (Żmigrodzki 2010: 39). It was initially assessed as radical in the Polish linguistic milieu in the 1980s, too bold to meet the expectations of semantic investigation at the time.  

2 Types of definition and approaches to defining concepts are thoroughly discussed by Krzyżanowski (1993).

3 Hołówka (1986) and Wierzbicka (1993) calls it a “person-in-the-street” perception; Bartmiński (1988) refers to it as “common sense”.

4 Andrzej Maria Lewicki, in his review of the preliminary installment of The Dictionary of Folk Stereotypes notes that “the proposed dictionary is an attempt to develop a new
A solid theoretical background and arguments for a new maximal method of defining concepts was postulated a year later by Anna Wierzbicka in her seminal monograph *Lexicography and Conceptual Analysis* (1985), as well as in other publications (Wierzbicka 1984, 1993, 2013). Wierzbicka’s theoretical basis of a new methodology of lexicographic description is also recalled in Bartmiński (1988), where he introduces the notion of the cognitive definition understood as a tool of describing connotation (more on this issue in section 3). Bartmiński’s model is also called “open definition” (Bartmiński and Tokarski 1993).

Let us now present two maximal definitions: those of the Polish concepts of **KOŃ ‘horse’** and **ROWER ‘bicycle’** as proposed by the two linguists.

Bartmiński (1980a) proposes an extended 16-page definition of **KOŃ** in colloquial and folk Polish. It embraces such aspects as ETYMOLOGY, HYPERONYMS, HYponYMS, SYNONYMS, CO-HYponYMS as well as such “semantic subcategories” (facets) as: COLLECTIONS, PARTIVITY, ATTRIBUTES, QUANTIFIERS, AGENCY, SUBJECT, STATOR, PROCESS, PROVENIENCE, OBJECT, ADDRESSEE, INSTRUMENT, LOCATION, SIMILARITIES, OPPOSITIONS. A condensed description of **KOŃ** goes as follows:

A domestic animal, an element of the livestock, big, strong, valuable; wise and faithful. It helps people and fears the death of its owner; it is used as a saddle-horse or as a draught-horse (i.e. with a cart and a plough); it occupies the highest position in the livestock hierarchy, is considered to be the attribute of men (a farmer, a cavalryman, a soldier) as opposed to the cow, considered to be the attribute of women. Being owner of a horse symbolized wealth and was the epitome of pride. The horse was also associated with such features as vibrancy and ghoulishness. (Bartmiński 1980b: 119)

The definition of **ROWER ‘bicycle’** as proposed by Wierzbicka (1985) is presented in the following way:

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5 The assumptions of Wierzbicka’s and Bartmiński’s definition (open definition vs. cognitive definition, respectively) have many convergent points, although they have developed independently. Those convergences, however, are the major focus of this chapter. In one of my recent publications, I point out that the choice of the terminology is largely arbitrary because the crux of the matter is that which is defined (in this respect, the meaning of a word is always open-structured) rather than the openness of the definition itself. As a result, all analytical research leads to somewhat “closed” definitions, while the proposed set of characteristic features ascribed to a given object always remains open and dependent on the proposed types of rationality, the data, intentions and various viewpoints assumed by researchers and language speakers alike (Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2017).
A KIND OF THING MADE BY PEOPLE

it is made for one person to be able to go by means of it from one place to another [FUNCTION]

faster than by walking and with less effort

being able to take more things than one could carry without effort

being able to sit

and to cause it to move by the movements of one’s legs

Being able to cause it to go anywhere where there is a stretch of flat firm ground and being able to lift it over a place where the ground is not flat or firm

it has two wheels attached to a thin frame one after the other [CONSTRUCTION AND so that when it moves both wheels come into contact with MODE OF OPERATION]

the ground in the same places, one after the other

it has a part for the person to sit on

which is attached to the frame near the top and it has two parts for the person’s feet which are attached to the frame near the bottom and which are connected with the wheels so that by pushing these parts with one’s feet one can cause the wheels to turn at one end of the frame there is a thin movable part which sticks out on both sides of the frame to support one’s hands so that by turning this part to one side with one’s hands one can cause the whole thing to turn to that side

the part to sit on is not too high for a person to be able to sit on it with one foot near the ground so that one can raise one’s bottom onto it with one foot touching the ground [SIZE]

but not too low for the person sitting on it to be able to straighten one leg after the other without touching the ground

the part to put one’s hands on is close enough to put the hands on the part for the hands but not too close for the arms to be able to move freely when one turns with the hands supported on them

the wheels are as narrow as they can be without breaking easily and without being too weak to support a person

the part to sit on is as narrow as it can be without being too narrow for a person to be able to sit on it

the parts for the feet are as small as they can be without being too small to support a person’s feet

they are as close to the frame as they can be without being too close to it for a person’s legs to be able to move freely with the feet supported on them

the part for putting the hands on sticks out on both sides far apart enough for the arms to be able to move freely when one turns with the hands supported on them

all the parts are as thin and as light as they can be without breaking easily and without being too weak to support a person and to move things than one could carry without effort

This kind of extended definition was criticized by Maciej Grochowski (1993a). Referring to Wierzbicka’s explications of ROWER and SAMOCHÓD ‘car’, the author says:
I cannot accept these explications. Apart from their valuable semantic characteristics, both definitions offer detailed descriptions of the objects being defined (e.g. the description of a saddle related to the height of a person riding a bike), typical behaviour of people cycling or driving, or, finally, subjective feelings that come with those activities. [...] In my opinion, subjectivity transpires through the following elements: people cover the distance by riding a bike “with less effort” than by walking; people, by riding a bike or driving a car, can take more things than they could carry without effort; driving a car is fast and comfortable, without having to make any bodily effort; driving a car gives the possibility to see the places people go through; cars protect from the weather and from the contact with the things outside. (Grochowski 1993a: 72–73)

Grochowski’s critical attitude towards extended definitions results from his traditional approach to the description of meaning, where the definition meets the conditions of semantic representation as specified in structural semantics. Thus, Grochowski favours a taxonomic definition, where only categorical “essential” features that appear “in each use of a word are taken into account”, while the features described as “connotative”, “unnecessary”, or “irrelevant” are disregarded. In such “minimal” definitions as those, rower is defined as a vehicle on two wheels, propelled by the movement of one’s legs (Grochowski 1993a: 73).

However, the boundary between essential and connotative features is fuzzy here and in fact impossible to demarcate precisely. Therefore, maximal definitions have been proposed by Wierzbicka and Bartmiński, independently, as a counterbalance to the classical lexicographic definition that Grochowski advocates so ardently.

2. Wierzbicka’s explications

The semantic analyses proposed by Wierzbicka are twofold and lead to more or less thoroughly developed forms of definition.

The first type of Wierzbicka’s lexicographic analysis is when she seeks the “core” of basic, universal meanings and their annotation using the rigorous methods of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM, cf. Wierzbicka 1996).

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6 Despite rigorous rules for the minimal definition according to which only “unquestionable properties of semantic expressions” should be allowed, Grochowski claims that it is still obligatory to recall the concept of rails while defining both train and tram, the concept of ice while referring to skates, the concept of snow with reference to sledge or skis, or the movement of legs in the definitions of bicycle, skates, or skis.

7 Similar aspects are recalled while defining other means of transport: train/tram: a vehicle that runs along a rail track to transport passengers from one place to another; skates: metal blades attached underfoot to move quickly on ice; sledge: an object used for travelling over snow; skis: flat narrow pieces of wood that resemble planks and are fastened to boots, so that people, making movements with their legs, can move over snow (Grochowski 1993a: 73).
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Such an explication is based on Leibnitz’s conception of “an alphabet of human thought” as well as on Andrzej Bogusławski’s idea of linguistic “elementary semantic units” (the so-called *indefinibilia*).

Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) is a radical approach based on the evidence that there is a small collection of basic universal meanings: 14 semantic primes as presented in Wierzbicka (1972), through a proposed set of 37 primes, only to reach the total number of 64 primes\(^8\) in a recent version. All these primes are essential for explicating the meanings of other words. For Wierzbicka, they have become the key to rigorous and meticulous descriptions of meanings:

Without the set of primitives, all descriptions of meaning are actually or potentially circular (as when, for example, *to demand* is defined as ‘to request firmly’, and *to request* as to demand gently’ […]). Any set of primitives is better than none, because without some such set semantic description is inherently circular, and, ultimately, untenable. This doesn’t mean, however, that it is a matter of indifference what set of primitives one is operating with as long as one has some such set. Far from it: the best semantic descriptions are worth only as much as the set of primitives on which they are based. For this reason, for a semanticist the pursuit of the optimal set of primitives must be a matter of first importance. “‘Optimal’ from what point of view”? the skeptics ask. From the point of view of understanding. (Wierzbicka 1996: 11).

Understanding semantics as understanding linguistic phrases is a key factor in creating the list of semantic primitives: “to understand anything, we must reduce the unknown to the known, the obscure to the clear, the abstruse to the self-explanatory” (Wierzbicka 1996: 27). Below is the list of semantic universals from Wierzbicka (2011: 18):

| I, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE, SOMETHING/THING, BODY | Substantives |
| KIND, PART | Relational Substantives |
| THIS, THE SAME, OTHER ELSE ANOTHER | Determiners |
| ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MUCH/MANY, LITTLE/FEW | Quantifiers |
| GOOD, BAD | Evaluators |
| BIG, SMALL | Descriptors |
| THINK, KNOW, WANT, DON’T WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR | Mental Predicates |
| SAY, WORDS, TRUE | Speech |
| DO, HAPPEN, MOVE, TOUCH | Action, events, movements |
| BE (SOMEBWHERE), THERE IS, BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING), (IS) MINE | Existence, possession |
| LIVE, DIE | Life and death |
| WHEN/TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT | Time |
| WHERE/PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE, TOUCH (CONTACT) | Space |

\(^8\) Such is the number empirically attested primes.
Semantic primes are specific lexical universals which can be expressed through such lexical means as words, bound morphemes, or phrases. All those may be morphologically complex, they may also have various morpho-semantic properties (they may belong to different parts of speech, appear in various combinations, and, finally, they may also have clearly defined sets of syntactic properties; cf. Wierzbicka 2011: 19).

According to the linguist, *indefinibilia* – a small set of universal semantic primes – allow us to compare meanings of words from different languages, as well as discover cross-linguistic similarities and differences. Wierzbicka (1989) also notes that because various configurations of primes may be expressed by paraphrases in each natural language, they may be checked against our intuition.

As examples of explications based on semantic primitives, consider those of MOTHER and SUN:

**MOTHER**

\[ X \text{ is } Y\text{'s mother. } = \]

(a) before \( Y \) was a person \( Y \) was inside \( X \) and was like a part of \( X \)

(b) because of this one would think that \( X \) would think this:

'I want to do good things for \( Y \)

I don't want bad things to happen to \( Y \)' (Wierzbicka 1999: 34)

**SUN**

People in a place can sometimes see it above this place

At some times during the day, people can see this something in some places on the other side of the sky

People may think: at some times during the day, people can see this something in some places on one side of the sky

People can see other things because of it

Sometimes they can feel something good in their bodies because of it (Wierzbicka 1993: 251)

With time, it appeared that the model of semantic primes as proposed the NSM was too restricted. The necessity not only to broaden the number of the *indefinibilia* but also to move beyond the very conception was postulated by Wierzbicka herself: “it is desirable […], and perhaps necessary, that our definitions of concrete concepts such as names of body parts or names of different parts or aspects of the natural environment should include semantic

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9 Each definition should also include, apart from biological components, the social and psychological component. As noticed by Wierzbicka, such components have to be “formulated in terms of expectations (thoughts), not in terms of actual events; by contrast, the biological components [… ] have to be formulated as actual” (Wierzbicka 1996: 155).
‘molecules’ as well as semantic ‘atoms’” (Wierzbicka 1996: 221). Molecules were used in the explication of ROWER ‘bicycle’ (see above) and other vehicles, as well as those for mugs, cups, cats and dogs, fruit and vegetables. In Wierzbicka (1993), the author further enriched her explications with new types of data (standard texts, comics), as well as novel collections of semantic molecules. Below is the explication of the colloquial English concept of MOUSE in colloquial English:

MOUSE

**Kind of an animal**

**People call them ‘mice’**

**They are all of the same kind**

Because they come from creatures of the same kind

**People could say the following things about them:**

**They live in places or near places where people live**

Because they want to eat things

Which people keep in those places for eating

people do not want them to live there

(some animals of this kind live in the fields

but in order to imagine an animal of this kind
people imagine it as living

near places where people live)

Someone can easily hold it in one’s hand

(most people do not want to hold it in hands)

They are greyish or brownish

They cannot be seen easily

Some animals of this kind are white

Some people use them when they want to know

What happens to them when people do various things to them

Some people keep them at home or near home

Because they want to watch them and take care of them

But in order to imagine such animals

People would imagine them as greyish or brownish animals

They have short legs

This is why the legs cannot be seen when they move quickly

One has the impression that their whole body touches the ground

For this reason they can easily squeeze into small holes in the ground

They are soft

For this reason they can easily squeeze into very narrow holes

Their head looks as if it were not a separate part of the body

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10 The list of ca. 200 semantic molecules understood as selected culture-specific units that relate to historical experiences of speech communities is presented in Goddard (2011).

11 The layout of Wierzbicka’s definition as proposed above is very much in line with Bartmiński’s definitions that were proposed at approximately the same time (see below).
The whole body looks as a small thing with a long thin and hairless tail
The front part of their head is moved forward
And has a few hard hairs poking at the sides
There are also two round ears placed at both sides of the top of the head
They have got small sharp teeth to bite things
They do not want to be close to people or other animals

BEHAVIOUR
When people or other animals are nearby, they do not produce any sounds
They hide for fear of people and animals
In places where people and animals cannot find them
Animals of other kinds which live in places where people live (cats) want to chase and
kill animals of this kind
People set special things (traps) in their houses or near their houses
To catch animals of this kind and kill them
When they are caught they produce sounds
Which resemble the sound produced by thin things
It sounds as if they wanted to say that something wrong is happening to them

They move in places where people live and try to find something to eat
They can move very quickly
They can move without producing sounds
Sometimes, when they move, quiet sounds can be heard
It sounds as if something light and hard
Was moving on a hard surface
Sometimes very small, dark and roundish pieces of something (excrement) can be seen in
places visited by these animals

ATTITUDE TO PEOPLE
People think this of these animals:
They are tiny creatures,
They are quiet,
They do not want people or other animals to be near them,
They can do bad things in places where people live
They like eating a hard yellow substance of a certain kind (cheese) which is eaten by
people (Wierzbicka 1993: 254–256)

 Portions of information are arranged in “packets” in the definition’s structure; these “packets” in Wierzbicka’s terminology are facets (in the case of MOUSE, the facets are: CATEGORY, NAME, “ESSENCE”, ORIGIN, HABITAT, SIZE, APPEARANCE, BEHAVIOUR, and ATTITUDE TO PEOPLE). The choice and arrangement of facets is designed to represent the cognitive structure of meaning (Wierzbicka 1985: 132). A good definition should embrace all significant components of meaning but not in the sense of all available knowledge about the thing defined: that knowledge should only be included if it is a part of the concept’s semantic structure. Therefore, the definition of MOUSE includes information concerning the animal’s appearance, ways of moving, the sounds it produces, or attitude towards people and other animals. The definition neglects such features as in what geographical regions mice can be found, the pregnancy period, the maximal number of mice in
a litter, etc.: encyclopedic knowledge of this kind, i.e. specialized knowledge, is not taken into account (Wierzbicka 1993: 258).  
According to Wierzbicka, all features recalled in the definition should be supported with relevant linguistic evidence: lexical (words and phrases), conventional metaphors, proverbs and sayings, literature (poetry in particular). The scholar also accepts non-linguistic evidence, such as comics, sketches and drawings, information retrieved from questionnaires carried out among average speakers and from conversations with them. The explication itself should not leave “any room for choice” on the part of the lexicographer because, while analyzing common meanings in natural language, the task of the researcher is not to ponder what is to be included in the definition but rather to “discover the meaning in all its essence” (Wierzbicka 1993: 263). Therefore, compiling a definition of this kind can be compared to “the work of a sculptor who with their chisel attempts to uncover the statue hidden in a cement block” (Wierzbicka 1993: 263).

3. Bartmiński’s cognitive definition

Wierzbicka’s model of definition largely converges with that proposed by Bartmiński in his preliminary installment of The Dictionary of Folk Stereotypes (1980a,b,c). The intention was to construct a way of defining (Bartmiński 1988 calls it a “cognitive definition”) that reflects the view an entity entertained by speakers of a given language. That view is based on socially established knowledge of the world verbalized in the form of judgements concerning people, artefacts, events, as well as in the form of categorisation and valuation (Bartmiński 1988: 169–170). In short, its goal

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12 According to the author, while defining MUGS and CUPS, “no facts […] that only potters would know should be included in the definition […]”, and no facts that only zoologists would know should be included in the definition of tiger” (Wierzbicka 1985: 41). If possible, a full portrait of a given concept should also include contrasts. For instance, it is justifiable to refer to horses in the definition of zebra (e.g. “a kind of animal that looks like a striped horse”). At the same time, it would be unjustified to define the concept of horse as “a kind of animal that looks like a stripeless zebra” although, as pointed out by Wierzbicka, “in Hottentot or Zulu the word for horses should be defined partly in terms of a stripeless zebra” (Wierzbicka 1985: 39). By analogy, when defining tigers, one should note that “they are similar to cats” but the reverse would be totally unjustified (Wierzbicka 1985: 39).

13 Therefore, an adequate definition has nothing in common with the metaphor of a “portrait” proposed by Zholkovskiy (1964; cf. also Apresyan 1993). A good explication is more like a passport photograph “which instead of showing a face in its uniqueness would merely record the differences between this face and the faces of the person’s friends and relatives” (Wierzbicka 1985: 39).
is to show how the speakers of a given language understand the meaning of X. The attempt to retrieve all stabilized features in the linguistic and cultural view of X converges with the claim that there are no clear-cut boundaries between linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge whenever one tries to reconstruct the nature of the so-called “mental object” (see Muszyński 1988). To meet this aim, the linguist should take into account not only the language system but also texts (including questionnaires, i.e. texts that have been elicited from speakers), as well as the so-called “co-linguistic” data, i.e. records of beliefs and ritualized practices. Also vital are pragmatic and extralinguistic components, as well as what structural semantics classified as contextual features. When criticized for mixing systemic with contextual features, Bartmiński said: “all features, including systemic ones (e.g. “mother” is ‘a woman that bears children’) are always expressed against and in a given context” (Bartmiński 1984: 10).

The aim of the cognitive definition thus formulated was additionally enhanced by the postulate of content adequacy, i.e. the requirement that folk knowledge be incorporated into the definition. Of equal importance is structural adequacy: this is to ensure that the cognitive structure of meaning reflects linguistic awareness (Bartmiński 1980a,b,c, 1984, 1988). Such an extended definition, equipped with two types of adequacy, becomes a text that “narrates” the surrounding world and its fragments (cf. Bartmiński 1987; Bartmiński 2014). Textual narration arises from judgements that inform the hearer what X is doing at a given moment, how he feels, where he is, who he interacts with, etc. Judgements about the object that have basic “certifications” (Bartmiński 2015: 21) are presented in the form of “stereotypical motifs”, and next grouped into categories called “facets” (following Wierzbicka). Facets differ depending on the object being defined. Therefore, the specific motifs and arrangements of facets actually bring the “text” of the definition into being: such definitions reflect subjective conceptualizations of the potion of reality with X in its centre. Therefore, assuming that definitions express socially established patterns and encode people’s experience of reality, its conceptualisation and verbalisation in

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14 On the notion of motif and its various functions, see Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2007: 49–75.

15 Renata Przybylska (2003) compares the cognitive definition with other types of lexicographic definition discussed in the introduction to The Dictionary of the Polish Language (SJPĐor 1962), i.e. the “real-meaning” definition, the structural-semantic definition, the scope definition, the synonymic definition, and the grammatical definition. The author claims that those latter definitions focus mainly on the “objective and factual” content within the concept being defined, while the cognitive definition in its very essence makes room for content that depends on and is relativized to the speaking subject.
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a given linguacultural community, it is justified to treat them as texts of culture (Bartmiński 2011).\(^\text{16}\)

The first attempts to apply the cognitive definition were the descriptions of **koń** ‘horse’ (Bartmiński 1980a, see above) and **słońce** ‘sun’ (Bartmiński 1980b). A thorough description of the latter concept comprises the following elements: hyperonyms, hyponyms, co-hyponyms, collections, parts, attributes, quantitative characteristics, actions, feelings, states, processes, origin, driving forces, influence on people’s feelings, object, addressee, tool, location, similarities, comparisons, metaphors, symbols, and oppositions. The concise version says: the sun (**słońce**) is “the brightest light in the sky that illuminates and heats the earth, the driving force behind life on earth, which moves and thus measures time” (Bartmiński 1980b: 205).\(^\text{17}\)

The best examples of maximal and precisely structured definitions, modelled on the cognitive definition and following a faceted arrangement of content, are those of **strzygoń** ‘ghost, spectre’ and **deszcz** ‘rain’ (Bartmiński 1988: 174; cf. Bartmiński 2009: 69–72). A synthetic representation of the folk image of demon called **strzygoń**, reconstructed on the basis of dialectological, folk and ethnographic data, assumes the following form:

**STRZYGOŃ** ‘a ghost’ a spectre assuming various forms’

SUPERORDINATE CATEGORY: **strzygoń** is an evil spirit, a bogy

APPEARANCE: it looks like a phantom, ghost or nightmare; has double teeth, a pale face, blue marks on the back, blood behind the fingernails, closed eyes […]

CHARACTERISTICS: it is silent, malicious, importunate

ACTION: it gets up at midnight; wanders about the earth; steals apples from the orchard at night; eats wax candles from the altar; frightens, strangles, beats, bites and eats people

TIME OF ACTION: it appears at night, midnight; disappears after midnight, when the cock crows

PLACE OF ACTION: it stays in a coffin, in a tomb, underground; is active in the church, in the orchard, at home, in the barn

ORIGIN: a person born with two souls who received only one name at baptism

MEANS OF NEUTRALISATION: for a **strzygoń** to stop frightening people, one must: put the dead body with its back up or cut its head and put it between the legs, or drive a nail into its head, or put a piece of paper with the name of Jesus under its tongue, or ask for the Holy Mass to be celebrated

\(^{16}\) The notion of text of culture is discussed in The Dictionary of Literary Terms (STL 1998: 575) and in Bartmiński and Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska (2009: 72–73).

\(^{17}\) Cf. the definition of **słońce** ‘sun’ in The Dictionary of the Polish Language (SJPDor 1962): “the star nearest to Earth, the central star in the Solar System, a big ball of gas of very high temperature that emits energy, thanks to which life on Earth is possible’. The fact that the cognitive definition is longer is secondary; of crucial importance is its anthropocentric orientation.
Similarly schematized definitions that also include the most stabilized linguistic evidence pertain to the image of BOCIAN ‘stork’ and ZŁOTO ‘gold’ (Bartmiński 2015: 22). Consider the first of those, based on faceted arrangement and stabilized expressions in defining sentences:

**STORK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[categorisation]</th>
<th>bird</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[size]</td>
<td>big</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[appearance – colour]</td>
<td>black and white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[appearance – build]</td>
<td>with long red beak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long neck</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long (bocian ‘a stork’ also refers to a long-legged man) red legs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[behaviour]</td>
<td>arrives in spring, departs in autumn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(‘a migrant’; arrival and departure of storks; migration of storks)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trains in flocks flies in V formation (klucz)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produces bill-clattering sound (klekot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wades in water (brodzi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can stand on one leg (stać jak bocian na gnieździe ‘to stand as a stork in a stick nest’) (in folk tradition) brings babies (bocianówka ‘folk scarf’; wierzyć w bociany ‘to believe in storks’)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[feeding]</td>
<td>feeds on frogs, thus clearing the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[location]</td>
<td>inhabits marshy wetlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>builds large stick nests on buildings, chimneys and poles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Definitions that assume a more textual form (also known as “natural narrations”) are offered for such concepts as MATKA ‘mother’ and RÓWNOŚĆ ‘equality’, as well as for all entries in the Dictionary of Folk Stereotypes and Symbols (SSSL 1996–) and the Axiological Lexicon of Slavs and their Neighbours (LASiS).

Consider the explication of MATKA ‘mother’, in narrative form:

MATKA ‘mother’ (1) is a woman; (2) has a child; (3) raises the child; (4) feeds the child; (5) the child has a strong bond with the mother; (6) is gentle and warm-hearted towards the child; (7) the child is warm-hearted towards the mother; (8) the mother has a high social status; (9) the child should be obedient to the mother; (10) the mother is loved by the child; (11) the mother is able to recognize her child in the most difficult of situations; (12) the mother understands the child; (13) is busy and hardworking; (14) good; (15) emotional; (16) devoted to her children and family; (17) is a person to follow/imitate; (18) offers help; (19) punishes and beats her children; (20) is irreplaceable for her children; (21) the child inherits features from the mother; (22) the mother accepts the child without any reservation; (23) the mother is supportive and disinterested;

in folk culture the mother is presented as follows: (24) she rules the house; (25) gives advice to her children; (26) teaches the daughter to work; (27) marries daughters off; (28) as the ruler in the house the mother gives orders, makes children work, scolds, and beats them; (29) the mother is very strict, she holds a stick and is ready to beat with it; gives advice to her son; helps her daughter-in-law; (30) is wise. (Bartmiński 1998: 2005)
The multi-faceted image of MOTHER as presented above undergoes permanent modification in real communication, in its variable narrations. Types of texts and discourse offer various profiles of MOTHER. These profiles are usually configurations of biological, psychological, social, existential, and ethical aspects (Bartmiskiy 2005), where the mother may be perceived as the leader of the hearth and home, a victim of the patriarchal regime, a bad mother, or the ‘supermother’. These conceptualizations are in concord, respectively, with axiological connotations found in religious and patriotic discourse, liberal-feminist discourse, ultra-left discourse, or marketing discourse (cf. Bielińska-Gardziel 2009).

4. Variants of the maximal definition

As results from selected examples presented above, there are two variants of the maximal definition: (1) the analytic variant, where the explication is more developed and resembles narration with features at various levels of stability; (2) the synthetic variant, which offers the basic cognitive structure of meaning and the documentation of most strongly stabilized features.

The analytic variant is consistently applied in the Dictionary of Folk Symbols and Stereotypes (SSSSL 1996-), where the entry for SŁOŃCE ‘sun’ takes 38 pages, for GWIAZDY ‘stars’ and KSIĘŻYC ‘moon’, 17 and 28 pages, respectively, for WODA ‘water’ and ZIEMIA ‘earth’, 82 and 39, respectively, for ŚWIAT ‘world’ 65 pages, for ŻYTO ‘rye’ 65 pages, for PSZENICA ‘wheat’ 39 pages, etc. The definition additionally contains numerous texts arranged by genre, which illustrate contextual uses of the word (concept). The analytic variant of defining is also applied publications that pertain to REGION ‘region’ (Żywicka 2007), RODZINA ‘family’ (Bielińska-Gardziel 2009), EUROPA ‘Europe’ (Żuk 2010), or DEMOKRACJA ‘democracy’ (Grzeszczak 2015).

The synthetic, or “core” variant of the explication assumes various forms,\(^\text{18}\) which differ in terms of:

a) length – definitions can be short (see, e.g. Wierzbicka’a MATKA ‘mother’) or long (Bartmiński’s definition of MYSZ ‘mouse’ or STRZYGOŃ ‘an evil spirit’);

b) linguistic form – some definitions rely on indefinibilia (e.g. Wierzbicka’s KOŃ ‘horse’ and SŁOŃCE ‘sun’), while others operate with colloquial language (Bartmiński’s KOŃ ‘horse’ and SŁOŃCE ‘sun’, MYSZ ‘mouse’, STRZYGOŃ ‘an evil spirit’, BOCIAN ‘stork’);

\(^{18}\) Apart from those presented above, cf. Bartmiński (2015) for an explication of ZŁOTO ‘gold’. 
c) type of defining sentences – with the use of a metalanguage proposed by the researcher (Wierzbicka’s MATKA ‘mother’, Bartmiński’s SŁOŃCE ‘sun’, KOŃ ‘horse’, MYSZ ‘mouse’) or with fixed textual expressions (STRZYGOŃ ‘an evil spirit’);

d) arrangement of judgements referring to the object defined – with the use of categories or facets (as in the definitions of MYSZ ‘mouse’, STRZYGOŃ ‘an evil spirit’, BOCIAN ‘stork’) or without them (see Wierzbicka’s MATKA ‘mother’, KOŃ ‘horse’, and Bartmiński’s SŁOŃCE ‘sun’);

e) the use of linguistic evidence in defining sentences (BOCIAN ‘stork’) or not (Wierzbicka’s MATKA ‘mother’, KOŃ ‘horse’, Bartmiński’s SŁOŃCE ‘sun’).

Despite the fact that all synthetic variants of definitions are diversified, they all share the characteristics of the maximal definition. Therefore, they should be viewed as instances of various conventions proposed for the condensed content of the definition, nevertheless still realized in the of the maximal definition (see e.g. the range of information proposed for MATKA ‘mother’ (W), KOŃ ‘horse’ and SŁOŃCE ‘sun’ (B), MYSZ ‘mouse’ (W), STRZYGOŃ ‘an evil spirit’ (B), or BOCIAN ‘stork’ (B+NB), as well as other definitions used in the Dictionary of Folk Symbols and Stereotypes (SSSL) and the Axiological Lexicon of Slavs and their Neighbours (LASiS). Whichever convention is followed, these definitions contrast with the minimal definition (as proposed by Grochowski), so frequently applied in lexicographic practice.

Regardless of “the degree of maximalisation” of all synthetic variants of the maximal definition proposed here, all of them can be elaborated on to create a basic set of features of the concepts being reconstructed. A more developed variant, assuming the form of essayistic or narrative explication, is applicable to the presentation of the entire conceptual content, allowing for both strongly stabilised features and occasional ones, coherent and contradictory elements, those characteristics that are ascribed to X by speakers who differ in social status, age, sex, viewpoint, or ideology, and, finally, the features encoded in text diversified with regard to genre and discourse type.

The body of characteristics that encompass those aspects that are, firstly, shared, based on common sense, and parts of the same cultural ground (in the sense of Teun van Dijk, e.g. 1998), and, secondly, those that function as characteristic traits for a given section of the speech community (for liberals and Catholics, adults and children, city or country dwellers, women and men, etc.). Such perceptions of the concept are categorised as its profiles, determined by specific subjective viewpoints.

An illustration of what constitutes the basic perception of the concept and what is the result of its profiling is offered by Bartmiński and Żuk
(2007) in their holistic explication of RÓWNOSĆ ‘equality’. The same system of explication was applied in the Axiological Lexicon of Slavs and their Neighbours (LASiS). Wojciech Chlebda (2016) also argues in favour of it:

Exploration of meaning (or, more broadly, concepts) should be preceded by collecting appropriate linguistic data as the resource base for further explications. That base must be made up of systemic data (including dictionaries), manually-excerpted and corpus-based textual data, as well as survey data retrieved from questionnaires and public opinion polls. Each type imposes a viewpoint on linguistic evidence and contributes to a preliminary profiling of a given concept. Nevertheless, the definition in general and its synthetic variant in particular, are not the best forum for presenting such profiles: the basis of each definition should be holistic. It should function as a preliminary synthesis of the data retrieved from various sources. (Chlebda 2016: 328)

As indicated above, Chlebda distinguishes the synthetic definition from cognitive, context-induced and taxonomic definitions. However, as assumed in this paper, the synthetic character of the definition is a type of the cognitive definition, as it contains cognitive elements that refer to socially important and common-sense knowledge, all within the worldview of an average speaker. Therefore, it seems justified to propose such synthetic variants of the cognitive definition that are not longer than traditional lexicographic solutions. A variant of this kind can be successfully applied in dictionaries, its main advantage being a combination of an extensive lexical description with a practical requirement of “how to combine completeness with a reasonable size” (Wierzbicka 1996: 258).

Let us now summarize all the observations concerning the defining practice as postulated by Anna Wierzbicka and Jerzy Bartmiński. In her discussion of perspectives and methodologies assumed in Lublin-based cognitive ethnolinguists and her own research school in Canberra, Wierzbicka points out that the two approaches are “complementary” and have “convergent” goals (2013: 137). That convergence is manifested in the holistic approach to defining, with a place for linguistically, culturally, and communicatively relevant features. Also vital is a faceted arrangement of the defining sentences. Both definition types strive for an anthropologically-oriented and colloquial shape of the explications, as well as postulating that complex meanings are reduced to simpler ones. A common feature of the two approaches is also application of certain solutions from componential analysis, such as the use of tabulated presentations.

A careful consideration of those definitions also allows us to trace the differences between Wierzbicka’s and Bartmiński’s approaches. The

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differences mainly pertain to the style of the definition, the source materials used, a focus (or lack thereof) on the concept’s stabilized features, and the ultimate shape of the definition.

An advocate of universal semantics, Wierzbicka uses non-analyzable “atoms of human thought”, also known as indefinibilia, or larger components called “semantic molecules”. A characteristic feature of her explications are also simple (and universal) syntactic structures. Bartmiński remains at a level higher than indefinibilia: his definitions are written in colloquial style, which the author considers the most appropriate choice for the purpose. However, ever since Wierzbicka began using semantic molecules, i.e. units semantically more complex than semantic primes, the two approaches have become more convergent.

While constructing their definitions, both researchers use similar data: both linguistic and co-linguistic. However, they use data differently. Wierzbicka stresses the importance of the language system as well as opting for a moderate character of definitions. She also stresses the researcher’s introspection, while other types of data, such as texts, drawings, or comics are rarely used. Jerzy Bartmiński, in contrast, places texts on a par with the language system: texts are its manifestations. Bartmiński opts for stereotyped, formulaic texts and pays much attention to co-linguistic data (beliefs, practices, and rituals) that verify and complement linguistic data. Also, Bartmiński stresses the importance of questionnaires, which, in his opinion,

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20 Colloquial style has an anthropological and cultural basis (see Bartmiński 1993a).
21 In his introductory essay on Anna Wierzbicka, Igor Melchuk (Mielczuk 1999: 19) points out that introspection is a fundamental tool in linguistic research. Wierzbicka also stresses its importance in the following observations:

In fact, after a group of people have seriously explored their own consciousness, either thorough individual study or through group discussion, the final uniformity of their semantic judgements can be very striking. Having repeatedly witnessed this emergent uniformity in lexicographic seminars one comes to realize that, in semantics, the road to intersubjective agreement leads not through a wide net of interviews involving many informants but through a deep exploration of the individual consciousness. Chasing the phantom of “objectivity” through supposedly scientific methods one loses the only firm ground there is in semantics: the terra firma of one’s own deep intuitions. (Wierzbicka 1985: 43)

It must be stressed, however, that shared knowledge includes tacit knowledge, knowledge which is not immediately available to the speaker but which can be dredged to the surface of the consciousness by sustained effort. For example, not every speaker of English when asked about the meaning of “cup” would be able to think immediately of a table, or of saucers, and few would be able to state quickly and effortlessly the standard which determines the prototypical size of a cup, and the range of possible variation in size. Nonetheless all this is, I would maintain, shared knowledge, knowledge that all speakers can find in their own heads if they dig hard enough. (Wierzbicka 1985: 41)
allow access to linguistic norms that reside between the language system and language use. Questionnaires have little significance in Wierzbicka’s idea of defining and, as such, are treated by her with caution.  

The use of various types of data for defining concepts has an impact on how scholars address the issue of stable features of the concept being defined. For instance, Janusz Anusiewicz (1995), notes the indistinctness and gradation of semantic components, as well as pointing out the various stages at which linguistic units are stabilized:

All cognitive processes that aim to identify a typical object [...] are important for both Bartmiński and Wierzbicka. However, contrary to other researchers, it is Bartmiński who stresses the importance of linguistic analysis, description, and presentation of such complex linguistic units as topoi, formulae, or idioms. In searching for the topoi hidden in the expressions “a beautiful horse” or “a fluffy cat”, scholars commit themselves to certain methodological solutions with regard to the stabilization of such units: in the case of the cognitive definition the boundaries are open. The features being presented remain fuzzy and display various degrees of gradation. Such an attitude is highly innovative: it is based on the assumptions proposed by cognitive linguists and stands in opposition to Wierzbicka’s model of concept defining. Both Bartmiński’s approach and cognitive linguistics seek to identify the semantic components that can appear in the definition and that have the lexical potency to be stabilized, thus becoming the basis for creating more complex linguistic units, especially phraseological units. The fuzziness and gradation of semantic components often results from the fuzziness at the very first stage of meaning stabilization. Consider the following question: Is the semantic fusion of words puszysty ‘fluffy’ and kot ‘cat’ stabilized enough to be categorized as a complex linguistic unit? In many such cases this is a matter of degree. Those are visibly convergent points in Bartmiński’s approach and the Western cognitivist tradition. (Anusiewicz 1995: 106–107)

The most important difference that can be observed between Wierzbicka’s and Bartmiński’s approaches to concept defining pertains to the framework of the definition: Wierzbicka’s explications are monolithic and static, while Bartmiński’s include both static images of a given concept (as in the Dictionary of Folk Symbols and Stereotypes (SSSL)) and its dynamic versions (e.g. in the Axiological Lexicon of Slavs and their Neighbours (LASiS)). The difference can be illustrated with the concept OJCZYZNA ‘homeland’, defined by Wierzbicka as a unified conceptual entity grounded in the 19th-c. Romantic tradition, and by Bartmiński’s as a heterogeneous entity that functions in a few variants. Wierzbicka proposes what follows (1997: 190–191):

OJCZYZNA (homeland)

(1) a country
(2) I was born in this country
(3) I am like a part of this country

22 On ethnolinguistically relevant data, see Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2018.
I can't be like a part of any other country when I think about this country, I feel something good if I didn't, this would be very bad I think something like this when I think about this country: this country is not like any other country many bad things happened to this country I don't want bad things to happen to this country this country did many good things to me like a mother does good things for her children I want to do good things to this country if I feel something bad because of this I don't want to do these things because of this many other people think the same when they think about this country many people feel something good when they think about this country these people are like one thing I am like a part of this thing these people say things in the same way these people do many things in the same way these people think about many things in the same way these people often feel in the same way when I think about these people, I feel something good these people are like a part of this country before this time, for a long time many other people were like a part of this country I am like a part of all these people in many ways, I am like these people

While defining the same concept, Bartmiński (1993b) emphasizes its semantic plasticity and constructs a set of configurations of three dimensions: spatial, social, and axiological. It is those configurations that amount to a thorough understanding of the concept. The spatial dimension has a radial shape and involves “circles of identity”, from one’s home, through neighbourhood, hometown, region, country, Europe, to the world array. This aligns with (i) the key notions that one takes as frames of reference in identity construction: family, house, neighbours, tribe, nation, humankind; and (ii) the values of closeness to another person, being and feeling at home, security, freedom and independence, but also peace and solidarity.

This linguacultural image of OJCYZNA has two variants: besides the dominant national-patriotic profile, there also exist the so-called “little homeland”, local or regional, as well as the European and global homeland. Whichever variant is selected, it is fully integrated with the values that are ascribed to it. Bartmiński views the concepts of OJCYZNA as dynamic and evokes the ROAD metaphor:
In the overall semantic dynamicity, the basic meaning has an axiological nature. Values act as a stimulus for the dynamics in space and in communal life: they determine choice within each and contribute to ideologically profiled configurations. Values also build hierarchies. It is thanks to its values that homeland may be conceptualized as a road. For an average person, Poland, Europe, the world (including heaven) as well as one’s country, region, neighbourhood, or family home may be their homeland, for each every person assumes responsibility. (Bartmiński 2002: 47)

One more difference between Wierzbicka’s and Bartmiński’s models of definition lies in their respective approaches to language. As Anusiewicz (1995: 98) points out, Wierzbicka mainly focuses on the language system and linguistic competence, rather than on communication and communicative competence, as it is postulated in cognitive and cultural linguistics. It appears that her model is mainly based on the de Saussurean distinction between system and usage (langue vs. parole). In contrast, Bartmiński’s framework, which includes the communicative component (texts, questionnaires), adheres to the tri-partite model of system-norm-usage, as proposed by Louis Hjelmslev and Eugenio Coşeriu.

Translated by Agnieszka Mierzwińska-Hajnos

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