
When Metaphor Becomes Flesh: Reconceptualizing Synaesthetic Metaphors in *Becoming Animal**

Kiedy metafora staje się ciałem: rekonceptualizacja
metafor synestetycznych w *Becoming Animal*

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Abstract. This paper explores David Abram’s non-fiction work *Becoming Animal*, highlighting, how his extensive use of metaphorical language reveals and enacts the embodied character of human experience. The physical dimension of metaphor invites the reader to sense the protagonist’s carnality as resonating within their own body, and through this heightened bodily awareness, to experience a reciprocal exchange with the world – a process frequently conveyed in the text through synaesthetic metaphors. This article argues that our very embodiment enables a natural union of the senses, thereby challenging the Aristotelian model of five distinct senses and calling into question the status of so-called synaesthetic metaphors – since, grounded in lived experience, they may no longer be either strictly “synaesthetic” or merely “metaphorical.” The paper employs conceptual metaphor theory as its primary framework, complemented by phenomenological insights from Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Keywords: David Abram, synaesthetic metaphor, embodiment, reciprocity, union of the senses

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Abstrakt. Artykuł analizuje utwór Davida Abrama *Becoming Animal*, podkreślając, jak użycie języka metaforycznego ujawnia i ucieleśnia charakter ludzkiego doświadczenia. Fizyczny wymiar metafory zachęca czytelnika do odczuwania cielesności bohatera jako rezonującej z jego własnym ciałem, a poprzez tę wzmożoną świadomość cielesną, do doświadczenia wzajemnej wymiany ze światem – procesu często przekazywanego w tekście za pomocą metafor synestetycznych. Autorka artykułu dowodzi, że samo nasze ucieleśnienie umożliwia naturalne zjednoczenie zmysłów, kwestionując tym samym Arystotelesowski model pięciu odrębnych zmysłów i podważając status tzw. metafor synestetycznych – ponieważ, osadzone w doświadczeniu życiowym, mogą one nie być już ani ściśle „synestetyczne”, ani jedynie „metaforyczne”. Artykuł wykorzystuje teorię metafory konceptualnej, uzupełnioną fenomenologicznymi spostrzeżeniami Maurice’a Merleau-Ponty’ego.

Słowa kluczowe: David Abram, metafora synestetyczna, ucieleśnienie, wzajemność, zjednoczenie zmysłów

METAPHOR AS MEDIUM: SYNAESTHETIC LANGUAGE AND EMBODIED PERCEPTION IN ABRAM’S *BECOMING ANIMAL*

David Abram, an American cultural ecologist and philosopher, has made a substantial contribution to eco-phenomenological literature through his non-fiction works and numerous essays, which offer a fresh perspective on what it means to merge with nature.¹ General to his project is the call to cultivate perceptual sensitivity and to recognize body’s vast potential to weave us into the terrain which we corporally inhabit. He reminds us as well that the mind is not an individual possession, but belongs to the earthly biosphere; strictly speaking, we do not possess an autonomous consciousness, but rather participate in a shared awareness into which we are embedded (*Waking Our Animal Senses* 1997, *The Air Aware* 2009).

Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology (2010) exemplifies environmental non-fiction – specifically, a hybrid form at the intersection of fiction and non-fiction – that seeks to restore our animal sensibility and reforge the bonds between the human and the more-than-human world. Told in the first-person by a homodiegetic narrator who is also the sole human protagonist, the text abounds with the descriptions of the narrator’s inner states alongside reflections on how the external world acts and reveals itself. By occupying the dual role of narrator and protagonist, the text actively engages the reader, blurring narrative boundaries through direct address, instruction, questioning, and invitation to self-observation and co-experience.

¹ Drawing from the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, or Emmanuel Levinas, phenomenologists intention is to turn “to the things themselves” (Husserl), i.e. to the world as we experience it. Eco-phenomenology then demonstrates merging of the phenomenological method with the issues of contemporary environmental thought. Its primary presumption is that nature has value and demands an appropriate treatment from humans, therefore we are supposed to *experience* our anchorage in nature.

At the same time, it negotiates the autobiographical pact as defined by Philippe Lejeune, foregrounding the interplay between lived experience and narrative performance. Abram, as an internal element of the narrative, initially appears as an internal focalizer, complementing reality with his own perspective and refining the world through his perception. Yet, it soon becomes evident that this anthropocentric focalization is inadequate, as he recognizes himself to be acting within a zone of reciprocity and alliance. His perception is continually influenced, reshaped, and exchanged with both individual beings and the encompassing power of the Earth itself, experienced as a living and fully agentive presence. He situates himself in a world not composed of isolated, determinate objects over which he might exercise a perceptual dominance, but in one that unfolds as an extension of his own corporeality, where all participants are bound together by the tensions and rhythms of a wider life.

Attending to Abram's use of metaphor – which explains the abstract through the physical – allows us to approach language as an open organism that, in line with the conceptual metaphor theory, reveals our carnal rootedness in the surrounding environment. The bodily dimension of metaphor enables the reader to step beyond linguistic seclusion and encounter the pre-articulated world in which they are physically situated. The role of metaphor in *Becoming Animal* has been largely overlooked by critics (Kimmerer, 2011; Hartley, 2011; Bright, 2013), who typically describe the work as aiming to connect the reader with the world. Their analyses emphasize the process of becoming as a unifying force, yet they fail to recognize that Abram's abundant use of metaphor constitutes another crucial mode of unification – one that binds mind and sign to the flesh of the world. The aim, then, is to demonstrate that the first crucial step is to recognize and affirm language as embodied. Such recognition enables a shift from the linguistic sign to the body itself, allowing us to re-live and re-experience our situation as a movement and gesture.

Abram's text aligns with the New Materialists by inviting the reader into the realm of the "more than human world," a term he himself coined, and by highlighting the potential for interconnection between humans and the agentive world.² The question remains, however, of how to cultivate genuine care and engagement, since it is often difficult to will oneself intellectually into a relational stance with, for example, a tree. It is crucial to emphasize that in *Becoming Animal*, the impulse to restore the alliance begins at the level of language, which Abram does not treat as a looping path from sign to sign within a system, producing meaning solely through

² New Materialism is a cross-disciplinary area of study established at the start of the millennium which attempts to challenge the anthropocentric and constructivist direction of much of 20th-century theory by arguing that matter is as alive, active, creative and agentive as humans (Bennett, 2010).

Saussurean relational structures. Instead, his language does not separate observer from the world; the embodied nature of the author's intensely lived experience is deeply interwoven into the fabric of his figurative speech, linking personal experience with the vitality of the living world. The first step, then, is to highlight the metaphorical expressions in *Becoming Animal* as a primary lens through which readers can perceive and experience the connection between abstract concepts and the physical world. This paper focuses specifically on synaesthetic metaphors – expressions habitually understood as verbal simulations of potentially genuine perceptual experience. My intention, however, is to demonstrate that the selected metaphors need not be confined to the framework of linguistic synaesthesia which rests on the assumption of separable senses. Read non-metaphorically, these expressions reveal sensory qualities as embodied actions rather than static objects and transform synaesthesia from a mysterious phenomenon into another mode of engaging with the world.

My analysis of *Becoming Animal*, therefore, does not proceed from the perspective of environmental disciplines, rather, it employs conceptual metaphor theory to offer a novel approach to understanding reciprocity and interrelatedness.

CRITICAL RECEPTION OF *BECOMING ANIMAL*: CHALLENGES AND COUNTERPOINTS

Let us consider critical approaches that address potential limitations in Abram's work. Theologian Sam Mickey (2012) adopts an urgent tone, arguing that the essential task for humans today is “to become fully human, which requires becoming animal, enacting the reciprocal participation of our animal bodies in the earthly cosmos” (Mickey, 2012, p. 100). He observes, however, that Abram's approach to this task exhibits certain weaknesses, including a tendency to idealize indigenous cultures and a preference for pre-reflective modes of engaging with the world over those characteristic of literate modernity. The first of these objections appears only partially persuasive, as Abram (2005) notes that he spent many years living among indigenous peoples, familiarising himself with their cultures including oral storytelling. It follows that his observations and insights are grounded not only in thorough knowledge but also in direct experience. From an eco-critical perspective, Mickey contends that Abram's privileging of perceptual immediacy over writing is inevitably compromised by the act of expressing it in language; the more he seeks to elucidate his thinking, the more he depends on linguistic mediation. Mickey concludes that Abram, despite his strong opposition to dualism, inadvertently engages in it when privileging “felt experience over “representation” (Mickey, 2012, p. 101).

A similar critique is offered by the American philosopher Ted Toadvine (2005) in his analysis of Abram's earlier work, *The Spell of the Sensuous* (1997), which was deeply influenced by Merleau-Ponty's method of perception. Toadvine argues that, despite Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the continuity of perception, expression, and reflection, Abram falls into a body-mind dualism by prioritizing corporeal sensibility over reflective thought (Toadvine, 2005, p. 159). Allowing Abram to respond to this critique reveals that he does not polarize but rather connects, viewing reflection as a process that "unfolds not within me but rather between me and the world" (Abram, 2005, p. 172). His reflections, abundant in both texts, consistently incorporate the primordial interchange between body and world, framing verbal thought and sensorial perception as two complementary "forces." The interplay between body and concept – the continuity of perception, expression, and reflection – is further exemplified by the metaphors Abram employs throughout the text, as abstract concepts in the target domain emerge from and are elucidated by physical experience in the source domain.

MAPPING THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ANALYSING METAPHOR IN ABRAM'S *BECOMING ANIMAL*

Abram's poetic imagery is deeply shaped by a chiasmic, reciprocal interrelation with his surroundings, reflected in his rich use of metaphorical expressions. This emphasis has guided the decision to employ Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) as the primary analytical framework. While other embodied cognition theories – such as phenomenology or ecological psychology – also highlight the profoundly embodied character of cognitive processes, CMT was chosen here because metaphor constitutes the central focus of the present analysis.

To begin, let us outline the main concepts of CMT as formulated by cognitive researchers such as George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Zoltán Kövecses. Metaphor is not merely a linguistic ornament but a fundamental principle of thought, shaping both our relationship to reality and the structure of our knowledge and experience. The centrality of metaphor to cognition was also emphasized by the German philosopher Hannah Arendt, who observed that the language of thinking "is entirely metaphorical" and that its "conceptual framework depends entirely on the gift of the metaphor, which bridges the gulf between the visible and the invisible, the world of appearance and the thinking ego" (Arendt, 1971, p. 123). Arendt's perspective aligns more closely with the cognitive approach than with traditional linguistic theories, which tend to regard metaphor merely as decorative language substituting regular designations with more unusual ones.

This cognitive view was crystallized in *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), where the cognitive linguist George Lakoff and the philosopher Mark Johnson introduced an experientialist, rather than objectivist, understanding of metaphor. From this perspective, metaphor is not an ornamental flourish but a regular bearer of thought – a conceptual device that structures and constitutes reality, thereby enabling meaningful and coherent experience. The experiential or perceptual conceptual system is inherently embodied: concepts emerge from image schemata that arise in pre-conceptual experience and in our interactional, sensorimotor activities (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). A considerable number of conceptual metaphors originate from these image schemata which Kövecses defines as “abstract, pre-conceptual structures that emerge from our recurrent experiences of the world” (Kövecses, 2020, p. 9). These structures highlight that the imaginative patterns of comprehension are grounded in the body and its ongoing interaction with the environment. As Johnson underscores, our understanding “involves many pre-conceptual and non-propositional structures of experience (such as image schemata) that can be metaphorically projected and propositionally elaborated to constitute our network of meanings” (Johnson, 1987, p. xvi). In this sense, metaphors emerge as extensions of the body and possess the capacity to connect a sign system or a text to the natural world.

The theory of conceptual metaphor has been greatly refined, with important contributions from scholars such as Raymond W. Gibbs (2008) and Zoltán Kövecses (2010). While Lakoff and Johnson (1980) originally defined conceptual metaphor as a structure that determines one domain of experience (typically more abstract, the *target domain*, e.g. “life”) in terms of another (more physical, the *source domain*, e.g. “a journey”), Kövecses complements this view by emphasizing that metaphors consist of “a systematic set of correspondences between two domains of experience” (Kövecses, 2020, p. 2, 4). In order to render the world meaningful through metaphor, we conceptualize cognitively more complex or abstract domains by reference to simpler, more concrete ones. Crucially, this mapping process is not a random or fragmentary act but a highly organized form of mental activity in which the source domain provides a coherent structure that is projected (mapped) onto the target domain, which in turn becomes constituted as an organized field of experience.³ The pairing of a particular source and target domain is grounded not merely in superficial resemblance but in similarity or, more often, in recurring correlations within lived experience – for instance, the sensorimotor experiences that form the basis for primary metaphors.

³ The term “mapping” is explained in CMT “as a set of systematic correspondences between the source and the target” (Kövecses, 2010, p. 7).

The theory of conceptual metaphor (CMT) distinguishes between *conceptual metaphors*, which operate as general patterns of thought (e.g. EMOTIONS ARE FORCES), and *linguistic metaphors*, which are the specific expressions derived from those patterns (e.g. *She swept me off my feet*). In CMT discourse, conceptual metaphors are conventionally written in uppercase to indicate that “the particular wording does not occur in language as such, but it underlies conceptually all the metaphorical expressions listed underneath it” (Kövecses, 2010, p. 4).

Recent developments in CMT (Cameron, 2003; Gibbs and Cameron, 2008; Kövecses, 2010) emphasize not only the role of embodiment and culturally specific factors in the emergence of metaphors but also the influence of a wide array of contextual variables. Kövecses (2015, 2020) highlights the importance of context, arguing that metaphorical concepts do not rely solely on the symbolic representational system stored in long-term memory, but are largely shaped by situational and linguistic circumstances. In a similar vein, the external context of an intimate relationship with Nature, coupled with the principle of reversibility in Abram’s text, appear to play a central role in shaping his metaphorical creativity.

NEITHER SYNAESTHETIC NOR METAPHORS: CHALLENGING THE FIVE SENSE FRAMEWORK

Metaphors which thrust through the text so ferociously do not want to keep the reader outside of the world they are supposed to reflect on, but personify a passionate call to bring the reader to a halt and experience the dynamism of matter they are entangled with. The reader is enveloped by metaphors so excessively that s/he cannot help but be dazed by the enchanting realm of their awakened power to soften the dividing walls between representation and the word, animate and inanimate, subject and the other, letting the reader experience an intra-active becoming.

Mutual exchange, permeability, or reciprocity is very often presented in the text in the form of synaesthesia viewed as “the truth of perception” in which the body intermingles with every phenomenon it encounters. Synaesthesia is apparent in Abram’s visual perceptions in which visual descriptions are combined with inward sensations; he feels the movement of trees or sunflowers as a tension and loosening, sensing them as twists occurring inside his own body.⁴ Numerous synaesthetic metaphors in the text portray the way in which Abram perceives the objects and the terrain around him as objects which actively draw his attention and unify his

⁴ This type of synaesthesia demonstrates the connection between kinetics and vision (see the various synaesthesia types listed at <http://www.daysyn.com/Types-of-Syn.html>).

senses. His body becomes the point at which all sensual modalities meet and inform each other, defining the very structure of his perception.

Other synaesthetic metaphors in the text provide examples of unexpected cross-modal correspondences, submerging the reader in the colourful network of multimodal reality. On a trip to a lake, Abram describes his intense preoccupation with “the *aromatic dark* of the soil [...] and *high-pitched scent* of the green needles” (Abram, 2010, pp. 14–15). In the far distance he hears “*darkly laughing scent* of cool water lapping up against the shore” (p. 15). On another occasion, the light at sunrise allows him to “*taste the spreading ecstasy* of the leaves” (p. 52); while walking through a forest, his “*gaze opens outward to touch* the needled shadows and the sky above” (p. 97). As the day draws to a close, “a soaring crowd of *voices lights* the late-afternoon air” (p. 185).

The precise definition of the phenomenon of synaesthesia is still a matter of considerable scientific debate. The condition is often explained as the “merging of the senses [...] or cross-sensory experience in which sensory/perceptual stimuli triggers unusual sensory/perceptual experiences” (Simmer, 2012, p. 5). As the British neuropsychologist Julia Simmer argues, any attempt to define synaesthesia as a purely sensory-perceptual condition can capture only a fragment of its multi-variant character since it can be “triggered by, or give rise to, higher-order cognitive constructs, such as language, personality, and other abstract notions” (p. 23).⁵ Her expanded definition therefore includes not only sensory-perceptual experiences but also cognitive constructs.

Given the transgressive nature of the synaesthetic experience itself, let us examine to what extent we can consider the metaphors in Abram’s text to be synaesthetic metaphors. In the first metaphor “the *aromatic dark* of the soil”, the concept of VISION (dark – in the position of the target domain) is structured metaphorically by SMELL (aromatic – in the position of the source domain) to form the conceptual metaphor SEEING IS SMELLING. While an investigation of the conceptual structure of individual sense modalities as a structured whole and a discussion of which part of a particular sense is mapped onto the target of another sense would certainly be fruitful, it lies beyond the scope of this study and would distract us from the main aim of the writing. What then is the intended meaning of the metaphors listed above? The expression *aromatic* envelops the otherwise humble soil in the haze of something warm and inviting, noteworthy and pleasurable. The conceptual metaphor theory emphasizes that if the structure of one domain (in this case

⁵ Simmer demonstrates that 88% of synaesthesia cases were activated by language units, e.g. phonemes, graphemes, or words. This is illustrated by letter-colour synaesthesia in which the colour of the letter emerges on the basis of the category of the letter, not from its perceptual feature (Simmer, 2012).

a sensory modality) can be mapped onto another distinct domain (a second sense modality), a metaphorical connection has been made. On this basis, it is possible to assert that the examples can be defined as metaphors.

The expression “*high-pitched scent* of the green needles” involves the mapping of a sharp, intense auditive content onto the target domain of SMELL. The use of the adjective *high-pitched* may indicate the stinging and acute quality of the olfactory experience accentuated by the shape of the needles. In another metaphor we are presented with the “*darkly laughing scent* of cool water” which is a combination of three sensory modalities in which SMELL is conceptualized as AUDITION, and AUDITION is conceptualized as VISION. We might detect something sinister or even threatening in the composition *darkly laughing*, which perhaps suggests that the unexpected contact with cold water can be uncomfortable, displeasing, destructive, potentially leading to a life-threatening situation.

The slightly more complex metaphor “*taste the spreading ecstasy* of the leaves” in which the target domain EMOTION (ecstasy) is commonly explained as the source domain ENTITY (see metaphor index), therefore allowing the possibility that *ecstasy* might be “tasted.” EMOTION is synaesthetically connected with GUSTATION and highlights the evident abundance of greenery which awaits the hedonist who wants to give himself up to its gustatory delights or to be swallowed up and devoured by its mouth. Another metaphor “*gaze opens outward to touch* the needled shadows” presents a very regular primary metaphor frequently used in the form of VISION IS PHYSICAL CONTACT (Grady 1997) which depicts the urge to eliminate the distance between the seer and the seen, seeking out the pleasure of touch, the sense of coming into bodily contact with the enigma of another flesh. The last expression “a soaring crowd of *voices lights* the late-afternoon air” combines the auditory quality with vision; the *voices* here have the potential to activate, excite and awake the languid aspect of the late afternoon. At first sight, then, all of the expressions seem to meet the criteria of synaesthetic metaphors; nevertheless, a deeper examination can offer a surprisingly different perspective on the issue.

The British cognitive linguist Bodo Winter (2019) has suggested that synaesthetic metaphors may be neither synaesthetic nor metaphorical, pointing out the need “to distinguish between a neuropsychological and a linguistic phenomenon” (Winter, 2019, p. 111).⁶ Indeed, it is open to discussion whether Abram’s metaphors are examples of linguistic synaesthesia or “a linguistic phenomenon that directly relates to extra-linguistic perceptual processes” (Winter, 2019, p. 111). Either way, Abram is using synaesthesia to accentuate the existence of sensory reciprocity and

⁶ Linguistic synaesthesia is defined as “a verbal simulation of synaesthetic perception or of a linguistic creation of cross-modality illusions” (Holz, 2007, p. 193).

communion and to reveal that this cross-talk between brain functions allows us to enter into a specific otherness more intensely (Abram, 2010, p. 252). On this basis, it seems somewhat irrelevant to discuss whether he himself applies a verbal simulation or actual perceptual imagery in light of the fact that synaesthesia is a scientifically recognized phenomenon. As Abram explains, however, synaesthetic experiences are so commonplace that they form the very structure of perception, a fact which perhaps leads to the conclusion that Abram's synaesthetic descriptions have a neurological basis in any case (Abram, 2010, p. 252).

Winter also argues that the adjectives used in common expressions (e.g. *sweet melody*, *loud perfume*) do not depict synaesthetic qualities but instead serve an evaluative purpose which weakens the modality-specific perceptual content (Winter, 2019, p. 112). In Abram's case, the source domain *aromatic* used in the metaphor "the *aromatic dark* of the soil" is defined as "having the fragrant smell, and warm, slightly pungent, taste, of spice."⁷ This expression can evoke the feeling of both pleasure and disgust depending on its intensity, and in this case it can therefore be considered as evaluative. It is more challenging, however, to claim unequivocally that *aromatic* evaluates *dark*, since it is not immediately clear whether the colour of the soil is pleasing or displeasing. The soil could be interpreted as a neutral or lifeless material which is not worthy of notice, but it nonetheless can draw our attention despite its rather modest appearance. The adjectives employed in the metaphors "*high-pitched scent* of the green needles" and "*darkly laughing scent* of cool water" can be considered as evaluative, since "high-pitched" is often defined as loud and unpleasant, while "dark" often acquires negative associations in line with the primary metaphor BAD IS DARK (Grady, 1997). In summary, it is by no means a straightforward task to determine with certainty whether it is indeed the intention of the author to broaden the patchwork of synaesthetic perception or simply to evaluate the phenomena. Even if the act of evaluation weakens the modality-specific perceptual content, synaesthetic connective activity is still in effect in the background.⁸ On such a basis, it seems somewhat short-sighted to assert that evaluative expressions should not be treated as synaesthetic in nature (Winter, 2019, p. 105, 121).

Winter's final point, however, is perhaps the most interesting since he appears to contradict the traditional Aristotelian system of senses, thereby throwing into question the metaphorical work performed between domains in a synaesthetic metaphor. Referring to the studies of different researchers (Ortony, 1987; Spence

⁷ <https://www.oed.com/>

⁸ When exploring the evaluative function of adjectives in synaesthesia, it has been emphasized that sensory modalities have evaluative properties *in addition* to their descriptive functions (Lehrer, 2009).

and Bayne, 2015), he maintains that “sensory perception is highly multimodal, involving all of the senses simultaneously” and that the sensory modalities, i.e. taste and smell, or sound and touch, “share partially overlapping brain networks” (Winter, 2019, p. 115, 119). Turning his attention to cultural anthropology and neuropsychology, he asserts that the Aristotelian five senses model is a cultural construct which has come about through our tendency to think *about* language rather than actually use it (Winter, 2019, p. 117). Irrespective of the numerous studies revealing the existence of even more sense modalities and demonstrating the continuity of perception (Carlson, 2010), traditional linguistics categorizes this fluidity while still working with five modalities. This leads to the conclusion that if we accept this culturally inflicted model, we are confronted with a conceptual conflict between the two distinct sense modalities (or, in other words, conceptual domains) and would therefore be forced to concede that the above expressions are synaesthetic metaphors. As Winter suggests, however, synaesthetic metaphor is an apparent separator of the senses; as a result, it can be considered as a cultural construct and is therefore neither synaesthetic nor metaphorical (Winter, 2019, p. 122). Since the experience of sensation as a form of communion is strongly advocated throughout Abram’s text, we might accept the fact that different sense modalities within a metaphor do not count as conflicting mappings and therefore cannot be granted the status of a synaesthetic metaphor.

CONCLUSION: READING ACROSS THE SENSES

This paper supports Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the union of the senses – and our natural capacity to integrate concepts within a conceptual metaphor – rests on the holistic quality of embodiment, realized through intentional and interactive engagement with the world. Abram’s “darkly laughing scent of cool water,” like Merleau-Ponty’s “sight of sounds” or “hearing of colours,” does not depict magical synaesthetic images; rather, it reminds us that perception is inherently cross-modal. Sense modalities do not exist as separate channels but as variations of a single *embodied intentionality*. The sensing body manifests our human capacity to co-exist and to synchronize with the other, while remaining firmly rooted in itself as a “synergic totality.” The union of the senses becomes the very condition of our communion with the world – its manifestation is perceived as a unified presence resonating with the membrane of our synchronized senses.

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