Limitation period for initiating proceedings and grounds for refraining from imposing a fine under the SENT Act – commentary on the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 5 September 2024, II GSK 1280/21

Abstract

The commentary is of an approving nature and concerns the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 5 September 2024 (II GSK 1280/21), in which the Court made important interpretative findings regarding the application of the Act of 9 March 2017 on the Road and Rail Transport Monitoring System and the Trade in Heating Fuels (the SENT Act). The author approves of the Court’s position that Art. 165b § 1 of the Tax Ordinance does not apply in administrative proceedings aimed at imposing a fine for violations of the SENT Act. The Court rightly emphasized that the provisions of these statutes serve different purposes. The commentary also supports the interpretation of Art. 24(3) of the SENT Act, as presented by the Supreme Administrative Court, which sets out the grounds for refraining from imposing a financial penalty. The author highlights the soundness of the Court’s reasoning, which holds that these grounds should not be interpreted narrowly, solely through the lens of the economic hardship of the regulated entity or the anticipated revenue from fines. Their assessment must also take into account the purpose of the Act, the nature of the legal violation, the principle of proportionality of the measures applied, and all the factual circumstances of the case. This commentary is intended as a contribution to the ongoing discussion on the application of administrative fines under the SENT Act.