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ANNALIS  
UNIVERSITATIS MARIAE CURIE-SKŁODOWSKA  
LUBLIN – POLONIA

VOL. XLVII, 4

SECTIO H

2013

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*Heuristic valuation and investment performance  
of individual investors*

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Wycena heurystyczna a efektywność inwestycji inwestorów indywidualnych

**Key words:** individual investor, valuation, behavioral finance

**Słowa kluczowe:** inwestor indywidualny, wycena, finanse behawioralne

## Introduction

The development of the financial market with increasing number of instruments traded, capitalization, and above all number and variety of market participants should lead to an increase in the degree of efficiency, according to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). The implications of EMH are very profound for investors. If the EMH is true, prices are fair and give the return investors deserve. Security prices are exactly what they should be, given what is known at the time. The fact that prices are constantly changing does not contradict this. Prices are simply reacting to new information and constantly being fine-tuned in order to stay up to date. In theory, markets with weak EMH mean that technical analysis is a waste of time. At best, clever fundamental analysis (i.e. examination of drivers of value such as profits, market share, growth etc.) might if accurate predictions could be made independent of past trends. This might be possible if there were talented investors able to convert new information into securities fair value before the rest of the market could do the same. However, if there is semi-strong EMH, even fundamental analysis would not be productive since share prices would reflect the latest available information. This

is because the “instantly up-dated” market – with thousands of decision-makers – will always be ahead of an individual analyst in trying to incorporate the impact of the latest news into securities prices. If this is the case, paying a portion of investment wealth to a fund manager does not make sense. Better to simply invest in a widely diversified fund (index fund) that tracks a market overall based on random and un-researched selections. The other option is beat the market with insider trading but this possibilities usually are not instant or even if non-public yet information is available ahead of the whole market using them is against the law. If insider trading fails in a long term strong EMH appears as all decision-makers are able to predict correctly even information that is confidential at the moment and incorporate into prices. That is rather uncommon as even developed markets dynamics usually puts them somewhere between semi-strong and strong EMH.

The financial market volatility and efficiency of its functions depends on the behavior of the market participants. With the current size of the financial markets and their growing international relationships an individual investor may obviously become less important, although to quite shallow and developing emerging markets individual investors may still play a significant role in pricing securities. Even if we assume that the market efficiency provides the same information at the same time to all (or almost all) decision-makers the way it is incorporated into market prices varies not only according to investment strategies, investment horizon but depends on pricing method, risk perception, timing and formal restrictions in potential decisions. In that case individual investors may act different than institutions and if they are a leading group of the market agents an informal and intuitive process of incorporating information into prices can end in speculative bubbles. That's why individual investors are called *quasi rational* or *irrational*. Financial market activity of irrational investors leads to an increase in market volatility. Empirical studies show that only one third of changes in stock prices is a result of changes in fundamental factors that can be considered as drivers of rational expectations. The remaining part of the volatility of stock prices is largely the result of the activity of irrational investors.

Even if strong EMH appears everyone wants to beat the market. To achieve this goal financial market participants are driven by different factors and tools for making financial decisions. None of the tools and methods of analysis, however, explain complexity of market volatility. Technical Analysis is based on past volatility only and it does not refer to the basic mechanisms of price discovering as a highly simplified approach. Fundamental factors cannot be considered as the only drivers of market volatility. Behavioral analysis shows that the market asset value often differs significantly from prices considered as fair but it is not a coherent approach although explaining market behavior by the behavior of its participants focuses more and more attention.

The modern theory of finance does not pay much attention to the irrationality of investors. It was assumed that they were an easy prey for other investors who were involved in arbitrage or carrying out speculative transactions focused on mean reversion. On the other hand waves of optimism due to increases of stock market indices

and the waves of pessimism due to their declines prevailing among individual investors can be a reason why stock prices diverge from the levels of their fundamental values. If irrational investors are convinced that shares should be bought or sold as soon as possible even against EMH, overestimated stock prices may still rise and underestimated keep falling. The described behaviors induce another kind of financial market risk, the risk of irrational investors that may be persistent. It is observed when even if mispricing of market asset prices appears values are not corrected quickly.

Rational investors follow the course of events assuming that since the fundamental value of stock follows random-walk process then stabilizing speculation even without irrational investors is risky as relationships between market prices and fundamental factors is not stable. The uncertainty of these compounds is an arena of irrational investors acting as noise traders than reacting to change in fundamentals (Focault, Sraer, Thesmar 2011).

The reason for such behavior may be a lack of tools that allow individual investors to formally estimate the fair value of instruments as a reference value when making investment decisions. That says individual investors do not have the appropriate decision-making tools. They rather use their intuition or simplified calculations due to a problem with obtaining proper information, its interpretation and the time restrictions. Hence, the common practice of their formal valuation method are simple but often unreliable multiples. In the absence of a reference point decision-making becomes emotional and similar to gambling rather than a planned investment. On the other hand formulating of comprehensive forecasts and expectations regarding the situation of issuers, predicting revenues, expenses, profits, cash flows etc. exceeds the capacity of most individual investors though is necessary when the most complete and reliable methods of valuation (DCF) are applied by institutional investors.

With all the above problems in mind the question arises whether it would be possible to combine both of these fundamental valuation methods, preserving the relative simplicity of multiples as well as complexity and consistency of discounted cash flows (DCF) to provide useful hybrid analytical tool even when individual investors follow behavioral heuristics and simplifications while making investment decisions.

The paper presents concept of such tool and tests its usefulness in application at still emerging Polish stock market over 2000–2013 period. The sample of 415 companies listed at the main market of the Warsaw Stock Exchange was the subject of experiments in three variants of the heuristic (simplified) valuation model. Simulations were provided to test whether the use of the heuristic pricing model would improve the performance (average returns on investment) of hypothetical individual investor's single-asset portfolio. Models were also tested on fundamental data derived from both stand-alone and consolidated financial statements. The concept of the model and its testing is preceded by the review of empirical studies on the investment behavior of individual investors.

## 1. Investment behaviors of individual investors

Empirical researches of investors' activities at the stock market highlight some specific behaviors of individual investors that can affect their portfolios performance. Numerous researches show inclination to follow heuristic thinking and cognitive or emotional biases when investing. The main areas of irrational behavior concern stochastic of price changes, pricing securities, portfolio management strategies and transaction practice (De Bondt 1998). Most individual investors follow a trend. The research provided among American Association of Individual Investors members show that 1% growth of stock market index in a week increases the difference between investors expecting index to continue rising the following week and investors expecting index to fall. Moreover, investors' sentiment depends on market performance in previous 100 days (De Bondt 1993) and trend or risk extrapolation for most of investors is only intuitive and naive (Andreassen 1988). Bull market makes investor more bullish, while bear market makes them more bearish.

Similar intuitive processes are observed in capital assets pricing. Only a few individual investors use formal pricing models, while using informal information from other investors or financial advisors that may cause availability and anchoring heuristics is a common practice. Individuals consider stocks that recently grew sharply or are highlighted in media as the best investment (Shiller 1990). They chose also overvalued companies with high price to book value ratio. Most of the individual investors do not use formal strategy rules and most of their decisions are random and often are not planned. Even if formal strategy exists it is commonly broken (Shefrin and Statman 1997) and average individual investor portfolio is usually weakly diversified (Shefrin 2001, Benartzi and Thaler 2005).

Combination of situational and individual approaches to risk propensity through consideration of individual responses to different risk domains is another interesting and promising stream of research. The work of Weber and Milliman (1997), and subsequent work by Weber et al. (2002) represents an important development in this field. Authors found that while the degree of risk perceived in a situation could vary according to the characteristics of the situation, attitude to perceived risk (the degree to which people find perceived risk attractive) remained stable across situations for a significant portion of their sample. Researches in this area (Fagley and Miller, 1997; Weber and Milliman 1997) show that it is possible to be risk seeking in some areas of one's life and risk averse in others while having a relatively consistent view of risk.

M. Kaustia and S. Knupfer proved that there was a dependence between previous IPO success in Finland and the interest in participating another initial offer. That is an obvious evidence of mental accounting heuristic known as *house-money effect*. Authors stress that although there is still a some empirical evidence of how investors acquire knowledge and capture experience it was discovered that experienced investors usually fall in less behavioral traps than inexperienced stock market beginners (Kaustia and Knupfer 2008).

G. Chen, K.A. Kim, J.R. Nofsinger and O.M. Rui analyzing data provided by Chinese brokerage companies found quite a low effectiveness of Chinese investors' decisions. Authors proved that investors followed three basic heuristics: disposition effect, overconfidence and representativeness. Moreover, effects of disposition and overconfidence were stronger than compared to American investors and experienced investors were as susceptible to follow heuristics as beginners (Chen et al. 2007).

W.B. Elliott, F.D. Hodge and K.E. Jackson examined how individual investors' experience may influence not only portfolio management techniques but also the way information is analyzed and processed. On the one hand they proved that experience in financial investment had positive effect on portfolio returns but it wasn't clear if it influenced relationship between the set of information considered as important and portfolio performance. Authors noticed that methods of obtaining, analyzing and integrating information differ with professional and individual investors (Elliott et al. 2008).

Finally, research provided by T.L. Liao analyzing 36 investment strategies at Taipei and Shanghai stock exchanges proved that market overreactiveness is a feature of markets with a relatively short history. The younger the market the lower risk of publishing unexpected negative information and in consequence the more emotional is investors' reaction as well as market volatility. On the other hand, market development covering at least a few cycles of economy experiences investors and causes the level of overreactiveness to be significantly lower (Liao 2002).

## **2. Heuristic valuation – from discounted cash flows to multiples**

Methods of using multiples as well as discounted cash flows to estimate fair value of stocks are widely documented in both literature and practice of the financial markets. For institutional investors or investment recommendations they are common performing evaluative functions, being a subject of negotiations in M&A transactions and rational reference to formal investment strategy. The use of both methods at the same time is justified as they may present different values due to different underlying factors and procedures of valuation.

DCF valuation has the most solid fundamentals in theory of finance and furthermore all other methods of valuation origin from the analysis of discounted cash flows. The advantage in using DCF valuation comes from the fact that it is the only method by which it is possible to estimate economic value of the company based only on potential cash flows that are expected to appear in a long term and by this it forces long term forecasting of all investment ventures. At the same time a long perspective of forecasts incorporates quite a significant amount of risk that forecasts are incorrect. Moreover, often a large part of the value is accounted as residual value that is quite sensitive to changes of parameters.

Multiples should be considered as a supplement of DCF valuation and represent a relative value that should be achieved by security if all important factors (Earnings, Book Value, EBIT, EBITDA or other) were incorporated in its price to the extent the market does it with public companies operating with a as similar as possible business model. Reflecting current sentiment of the market is the biggest advantage of this method as well as computational simplicity even to individual investors. Selection of comparable public listed companies may be a serious problem though. It may be impossible to achieve particularly at the very stage of market development when cross-country comparison is not justified. The method doesn't include different profiles of risk and growth rate of company and its current value is estimated based only on history or short term forecast. Nevertheless, this is the most common procedure for simple valuation.

In mergers and acquisitions (M&A), sellers and buyers normally base their price calculations on multiples of EBITDA, a figure often used by investors to analyze a company's value. EBITDA is extremely important in M&A transactions strongly determining purchase price. However, like all other estimation tools, EBITDA has inherent limitations and dangers (Kicia 2009).

The term is not formally defined by general accounting standards. While the theory behind multiples based on EBITDA may be sound, in practice reliance on these by sellers and buyers alike is often quite flawed. Additionally, the use of EBITDA in estimating values of small or family-owned businesses creates difficulties in the negotiation process because of limited availability and quality of financial statements' information.

EBITDA is used in M&A transactions, in both binding and non-binding offers, in order to determine the purchase price that will be paid. In non-binding offers the use of EBITDA does not present a problem since the purchase price included is not enforceable against the parties in an eventual disagreement. However, in binding offers, EBITDA can be problematic for either side of the transaction when the EBITDA of the company is higher or lower than expected.

Forecast of EBITDA is also one of the crucial parameters in DCF valuation as discounted cash-flows usually begin in healthy and profitable operating results. The aforementioned disadvantage of DCF valuation for all investors is sensitivity to assumptions and forecasts. If DCF value is calculated on 20 years of forecast what is the quality of that forecast? Are we really able to estimate them correctly and if not maybe we should simplify the method and limit forecast up to forthcoming 2–3 years followed by estimated residual value. This approach would be promising for individual investors that are unable to discover future of valued companies due to lack of time, asymmetric information and computational problems.

Let us assume that we need a method that takes into consideration also behavioral nature of individual investors:

1. Representativeness and availability: investors predict next quarter results depending on information that is provided in last four quarterly financial

statements. Their predictions cover revenues, EBIT and EBITDA profitability, rotation cycles of inventories, short-term receivables and current liabilities.

2. Myopia: investors are not able to provide a long term prediction. Instead of that they can simply incorporate a growth rate of revenues observed by comparing last four quarters (from  $Q_{-1}$  to  $Q_{-4}$ ) to preceding four quarters (from  $Q_{-2}$  to  $Q_{-5}$ ) and with stable EBIT profitability.
3. Framing: investors estimate company (share) fair value depending on stand-alone financial statements (usually announced earlier) or consolidated financial statements (usually announced later). Anchoring may appear when investors stick to values obtained from stand-alone statements even if consolidated statement is announced.
4. Investors need a simple method of estimating residual value of the company as they understand that a short term forecast is not enough to justify its value. The residual value can be obtained by a simple multiple of the last observed cash-flow or balance sheet values.
5. Risk free rate is observed as government debt YTM and credit risk margin at current market level for similar companies.
6. All public companies are traded with the same beta equal to 1 as investors are not able to calculate their proper value. As a matter of fact in 90% of market reports and recommendations in Poland beta equal to 1 is assumed.
7. Investors are not able to estimate CAPEX and depreciation correctly without detailed information from the valued company so they assume that when CAPEX is done it will appear in company profitability or growth of revenues. Assuming CAPEX equal to depreciation simplifies procedure as in residual period.
8. Residual growth rate of cash flows ( $g$ ) is 0%.
9. Non-operating assets are equal to long-term investment assets and net debt is calculated depending on values observed in last announced financial statement (anchoring).

Assuming the above, three alternative expert models of equity value were tested:

**Model I. DCF proxy with simplified assumptions but still most complex calculations**

$$EV_{QT} = \sum_{i=1}^3 \frac{FCF_{QT} \cdot (1+er)}{(1+WACC)^i} + RV_{QT} + NOA_{QT-1} - ND_{QT-1}$$

$$RV_{QT} = \begin{cases} \frac{FCF_{QT-1} \cdot (1+er)}{(1+WACC)^3 \cdot WACC}, & \text{if } FCF_{QT-1} > 0 \\ 0,99 \cdot RV_{QT-1} + 0,01 \cdot \frac{FCF_{QT-1} \cdot (1+er)}{(1+WACC)^3 \cdot WACC}, & \text{if } FCF_{QT-1} \leq 0, \end{cases} \quad (1)$$



where:

$EV_{QT}$  – equity value forecasted for quarter T

$RV_{QT}$  – residual value forecasted for quarter T

$FCF_{QT-1}$  – free cash flow of the last quarter

$er$  – expected FCF growth rate (respecting assumption 2)

WACC – Waged Average Cost of Capital as in DCF (respecting assumptions 5–6)

$NOA_{QT-1}$  – Non-Operating Assets as in statement for quarter T–1

$ND_{QT-1}$  – Net debt as in statement for quarter T–1

**Model II. DCF proxy with simplified calculation of residual value**

$$EV_{QT} = \sum_{i=1}^3 \frac{FCF_{QT-1} \cdot (1+er)^i}{(1+WACC)^i} + RV_{QT}$$

$$RV_{QT} = \begin{cases} TFA_{QT-1} + CA_{QT-1} - LR_{QT-1}, & \text{if } FCF_{QT-1} > 0 \\ 0,99 \cdot RV_{QT-1} + 0,01 \cdot (TFA_{QT-1} + CA_{QT-1} - LR_{QT-1}), & \text{if } FCF_{QT-1} \leq 0, \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

where:

$EV_{QT}$  – equity value forecasted for quarter T

$RV_{QT}$  – residual value forecasted for quarter T

$FCF_{QT-1}$  – free cash flow of the last quarter

$er$  – expected FCF growth rate (respecting assumption 2)

$TFA_{QT-1}$  – Tangible Fixed Assets for quarter T–1

$CA_{QT-1}$  – Current Assets for quarter T–1

$LR_{QT-1}$  – Liabilities and Reserves for quarter T–1

WACC – Waged Average Cost of Capital as in DCF (respecting assumptions 5–6)

$NOA_{QT-1}$  – Non-Operating Assets as in statement for quarter T–1

$ND_{QT-1}$  – Net debt as in statement for quarter T–1

**Model III. EBITDA x10 multiple**

$$EV_{QT} = \max \{ 0; 10 \cdot EBITDA_{QT-1} + NOA_{QT-1} - ND_{QT-1} \}, \quad (3)$$

where:

$EV_{QT}$  – equity value forecasted for quarter T

$EBITDA_{QT-1}$  – EBITDA value observed for quarter T–1

$NOA_{QT-1}$  – Non-Operating Assets as in statement for quarter T–1

$ND_{QT-1}$  – Net debt as in statement for quarter T–1

All three proposed above heuristic valuation models were tested for improvement of potential investment results of hypothetical individual investors. First, for all but



financial companies listed at the Warsaw Stock Exchange’s main market valuation procedures were applied in all quarters when financial data was available. Financial data for the sample of 415 companies listed in 2000–2012 was provided by Notoria Service. Out of all tested companies only these with at least 12 quarterly valuations were qualified to the next step of testing procedure (e.g. having reference fundamental values according to Model I, II and III separately for at least 3 years). For all periods with reference values of all selected companies 500 hypothetical transaction (e.g. open and close dates) were randomly selected and annual return for each transaction calculated. The average annual return and standard deviation represented a distribution of possible returns for investors without fundamental reference value.

The same procedure was applied but another 500 transactions were accounted only if tested models advised that transaction would be profitable at the moment of testing. That said if market price was higher than a heuristic fair value shares were recognized as overvalued and hypothetical investor stayed passive. The average annual return and standard deviation represented a distribution of possible returns for investors with fundamental reference value provided by Model I, II and III respectively.

By cross-comparing the results of both samples (random and heuristic investments) for all companies it was analyzed whether investors using heuristic models could improve their results comparing to random investing. The same procedures were provided using stand-alone and consolidated financial statements.

3. Results and discussion

Results of experiments (see Table 3) indicate that the use of proposed valuation methods wouldn’t have an unequivocal impact on investment strategy. With rather low average improvements of annual returns (from 5.2% to 10.3%) for about a half of all analyzed companies (from 43% to almost 56%) it rather confirms at least semi-strong EMH of Polish stock market in 2000–2012.

Table 3. The results of testing procedures

Test number	I	II	III
	IV	V	VI
Financial statements	stand-alone	stand-alone	stand-alone
	consolidated	consolidated	consolidated
Initial sample of companies	415	415	415
	415	415	415

Applied model of valuation	I	II	III
	I	II	III
Companies qualified for step II	288	178	181
	238	226	172
Companies with improved results using model	52.0%	50.0%	43.0%
	54.2%	55.6%	44.9%
Average increase of returns (standard deviation)	5.3% (6.0%)	5.2% (5.1%)	8.5% (14.6%)
	10.3% (14.2%)	5.8% (6.5%)	7.2% (6.5%)
Average decrease of returns (standard deviation)	-9.5% (14.2%)	-7.2% (7.1%)	-15.2% (19.1%)
	-8.6% (13.8%)	-7.7% (12.8%)	-13.3% (19.0%)
No. of stocks with increased results (statistically significant difference in returns, $\alpha=0.05$ )	20	7	10
	24	10	11
Average increase of returns – only cases with statistically significant difference in returns	15.4%	11.3%	20.2%
	28.3%	15.5%	14.7%
No. of stocks with decreased results (difference in returns statistically significant, $\alpha=0.05$ )	33	7	31
	23	11	22
Average decrease of returns – only cases with statistically significant difference in returns	-26.6%	-14.1%	-32.8%
	-23.0%	-26.5%	-27.5%

Source: Author's own study

Experiments show that it is possible to improve results with additional information on fair price levels but if we consider individual investors with random strategy of selection securities over the analyzed period valuation itself will not separate stocks to exact winners and losers. Almost the same number of investors would improve their portfolio results as those who would face downgrading their effectiveness. Possible average decrease of average returns is in almost all cases higher than average increase for opposite securities. The one case is experiment IV with Model I and the use of financial information from consolidated statements.

In general, all the results indicate that simplifying valuation in for proposed methods may provide better results the less simplification if provided into the procedure valuation based on discounted cash flows. The more it is consistent with complex DCF the better market tracking it may provide as better net results were provided by Model I on consolidated statements than most simplified multiple-based Model III. This result is not surprising if we take in mind that individual investors usually are not the group influencing market prices due to their capital dispersion. They could impact market prices in a long time if a large enough group of individuals would

behave in the same way or would use the same analytical tools signaling buying or selling at almost the same moment. Herding effects that appear in those circumstances could cause waves of growth or decline to the market. Shallow markets with rather low turnover, illiquidity and lack of rational investors may be a good example confirming that it is easier to manipulate prices in that case. At the developed markets reality is different. Institutional investors both domestic and foreign with large capital allocated to the market induce trends or cease them and while fair price is defined by formal methods of valuation they may vary in assumptions of forecasts but usually represent comparable level of value. Individuals with their beliefs and intuitions have no other choice but accept the market level even if they were sure their method of simplified valuation as well as forecasts were correct. Extra returns are consequence of timing and quality of forecasts rather than methods of incorporating them into prices established by the market.

Although presented results of experiments do not seem optimistic for individual investors and their strategies for the market as a complex system are promising. Among others they confirm that the Polish stock market is effective in at least semi-strong level of EMH as other most developed markets.

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### **Heuristic valuation and investment performance of individual investors**

The paper presents a concept of simplified valuation models and tests their usefulness in application by individual investors at the Polish stock market over 2000–2013. It is discussed whether it would be rational to combine common fundamental valuation methods of multiples and DCF, preserving the relative simplicity of multiples as well as complexity and consistency of discounted cash flows to provide useful hybrid tool even when individual investors follow behavioral heuristics and simplifications while making investment decisions. Results of experiments indicate that use of proposed valuation methods wouldn't have an unequivocal impact on investment strategy of irrational individual investors with quite low average improvements of annual returns (from 5.2% to 10.3% extra return) only in about half of all 415 analyzed stocks.

### **Wycena heurystyczna a efektywność inwestycji inwestorów indywidualnych**

W artykule przedstawiono koncepcję modeli uproszczonej wyceny aktywów finansowych i sprawdzono możliwość ich wykorzystania w warunkach polskiego rynku giełdowego w latach 2000–2013. Dyskusji została poddana możliwość racjonalnego połączenia dwóch powszechnie wykorzystywanych podejść do wyceny akcji stosowanych w praktyce – metody mnożnikowej i metody DCF – w taki sposób, aby udało się zachować względną prostotę pierwszej z nich oraz jednocześnie spójność i złożoność drugiej, zapewniając wiarygodne wykorzystanie modeli nawet wtedy, gdy inwestorzy ulegają behawioralnym heurystykom i uproszczeniom przy podejmowaniu decyzji inwestycyjnych. Wyniki eksperymentów zaproponowanych modeli wskazują, że w zależności od wycenianego instrumentu możliwości wykorzystania modelu są różne, dając dodatkowo od 5,2% do 10,3% dodatkowego zwrotu dla połowy z 415 analizowanych spółek.