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A Dog or a Wolf – The Role of Connotations in Animalistic Metaphors and the Process of Dehumanisation

Abstract. Animalistic metaphors have been used since the dawn of time to dehumanise members of outgroups and thereby deny them their rights. This paper examines the causes and symptoms of animalistic dehumanisation through the analysis of connotations of several terms used to conceptualise undesirable individuals and groups across various cultures, focusing on four source domains: *rat*, *cattle*, *wolf*, and *dog*.

Keywords: connotation, dehumanisation, metaphor, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, animal studies

1. Metaphors and dehumanisation

Conceptual Metaphor Theory was first introduced by Lakoff and Johnson in their influential book *Metaphors We Live By*, published in 1980, where the authors postulate an innovative view of a metaphor not simply as a rhetorical device, but rather as a mental process that enables us to interpret and verbalise complex abstract concepts through ones that are “highly structured and clearly delineated” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003, 61) in the process of metaphorical mapping (ibid. 246) between the source and target domains (ibid. 252–254). According to CMT, the way we experience reality is predominantly structured by our conceptual system which is in fact metaphorical in nature (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003: 3–4); this means that metaphors have the power to shape our perceptions of the world and can to some extent influence our actions. The fact that our conceptual system is not consciously acknowledged means that

the resulting behaviour is mostly automatic (ibid. 3). What follows is that consistently repeated and reinforced metaphors can potentially alter our worldview, and, consequently, our behaviour, without our awareness, which makes metaphors an important instrument in the construction and reproduction of ideology and propaganda. The persuasive ideological function of metaphor is often exploited while conceptualising the ‘enemy’ in the social construct that juxtaposes the ingroup and the outgroup (the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ scenario).

Since the publication of *Metaphors We Live By* CMT has stimulated extensive research concerning the influence of our conceptual and linguistic system on our perception of reality and, consequently, our actions. This paper is an attempt to investigate the highly conventionalised and structured PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor in the context of animalistic dehumanisation, which can be defined as a process that involves the denial of uniquely human (UH) traits to a person or an outgroup, resulting in a perceived asymmetry between those who possess human qualities and those who do not (Haslam 2006, 257). The target seen as lacking civility, refinement, moral sensibility, higher cognition, and maturity is automatically perceived as amoral, irrational, impulsive, and childlike (ibid. 258–259), which removes him from moral consideration and may justify inhumane treatment, as the person is no longer seen as a human, but rather as an animal. As demonstrated in subsequent sections, the metaphorical process of ascribing animal traits to humans is not as straightforward as simply calling somebody ‘an animal’, as multiple cultural and ethical factors come into play.

Traditionally, CMT studies tend to focus on the physical nature of source domains, due to the fact that their characteristic concreteness is typically associated with their embodied nature (Forceville 2009, 28). In other words, the theory assumes that human knowledge of the world stems largely from physical interaction with the surroundings, subsequently allowing us to map the knowledge structures onto abstract domains. However, as acknowledged by Lakoff and Turner (1989, 66), our understanding of source domains is informed by more than just our experience; it also heavily relies on the cultural connotations associated with the source entity. According to Renate Bartsch (2002, 52), the relevant similarity established between the target and the source “is due to relationships of objects and situations with emotional attitudes, desires, and behavioural dispositions of people”. This means that the major theme of a source domain that is most centrally associated with it within a particular culture may not stem solely from the source’s physical characteristics, but will, at least in some cases, arise from the cultural perceptions and connotations of an entity. What follows is that “a single, embodied correspondence between target and source is enough to trigger a wide range of further ‘cultural’ correspondences between target and source, and hence of inferences about the target” (Forceville et al. 2006, 107). This paper is an attempt to prove that, in the case of the dehumanising PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor, the cultural connotations related to the source domain are indeed more important for the mappings to the target than its embodied aspects. The linguistic examples presented in this paper have been selected from English language

corpora and historical sources to illustrate how the cultural connotations operate in the context of conceptual metaphor, and demonstrate their impact on the inferences about the target.

2. What or who is an animal?

As animals are concrete entities that are familiar to all humans, they are highly suitable as a source domain in the process of conceptualisation of more abstract ideas, such as human character and social status. While mapping the correspondences between the source and the target, we typically analyse the entities contained in the source domain, as well as their qualities and the way they interact with their environment (what they do and what can be done to or with them), before moving on to outlining the actual correlations between the elements of the source and target domains. This process is key in the analysis of structural metaphors such as the highly conventionalised PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor. Still, when we refer to somebody as a pig, we don't actually mean that they have a snout or are a source of nourishment. The PERSON IS A PIG metaphor conveys only certain traits of the source; in other words, we mean that the target possesses qualities that are implied by the term 'pig', such as filth, greed or sloppiness. The process where the speaker uses only certain aspects of the source domain in metaphorical mapping is referred to as *metaphorical utilisation* (cf. Kövecses 2010, 93–95). In the case of PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor the animal used as a source domain carries two distinct components of meaning: (1) denotation, specifying the actual referent (in the PEOPLE ARE PIGS metaphor it is the species known as *sus domesticus*), which conveys elements of meaning such as appearance, behavioural patterns, typical habitat, certain foods that it consumes; and (2) connotation, a meaning developed by a language community that does not in fact represent the definitional or literal qualities of the referent, but is rather a cultural or emotional association that the word carries. While both components of meaning may be shared with the target, it is mostly the cultural connotations of the source that are taken into account when pinpointing correspondences between the source and target domains in the process of animalistic dehumanisation. When it comes to animals used as sources, especially in highly conventional metaphors such as PEOPLE ARE PIGS, connotations largely stem from anthropomorphisation, a process in which we attribute certain human qualities (such as greed) to animals—entities which do not possess these qualities in a denotative sense. Consider these examples from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA):

(1) Non-Muslims' practicing takfir elicits chuckles from jihadists („Like a pig covered in feces giving hygiene advice to others,” one tweeted).

(2) Even then, he says, “it's a ‘putting lipstick on a pig’ kind of job, with no certainty that the U.N. commission will look at this with any credibility.

(3) Yoko, it appeared, at least according to Harry, was happier than a pig in a mud slide with her plant nursery and raising Lily, which left precious little time for Harry;

(4) He said he was “eating like a pig,” putting on weight, and could not remember when he'd felt so well.

(5) “Hijo de puta, pig motherfucker. I'll kill both your asses,” Hector shouted in a coarse, rage-filled voice.

(6) Meanwhile, several of her siblings begged her to leave Josh, even offering to buy her and her four children a plane ticket, and her brother Daniel blasted the 27-year-old firstborn Duggar on Facebook, saying, “I won't stop trying to get that pig out of our family.”

(7) OK. Listen. He is a pig, but regardless of him being a pig, you can not, in my mind, as a guy- you can not go back for seconds, like if he roughed her up the first time (...).

While in examples (1) and (2) the linguistic expression is largely based on what we know about pig behaviour and appearance, example (3) attributes the human emotion of happiness to the referent. In example (4) the pig is a symbol of greed and gluttony (something that is rather characteristic of humans). Examples (5)-(7) do not pinpoint any actual characteristics of the referent, but are based on what we infer about pigs being immoral, selfish and bad-mannered. As Adam Waytz, Nicholas Epley and John T. Cacioppo put it:

Anthropomorphism goes beyond providing purely behavioral or dispositional descriptions of observable actions (such as noting that a coyote is fast or aggressive); it involves attributing characteristics that people intuitively perceive to be uniquely human to nonhuman agents or events. (Waytz, Epley and Cacioppo 2010, 59)

Anthropomorphisation goes beyond the observation of merely physical features, such as a human-like form, and involves the attribution of uniquely human mental capacities (conscious awareness, explicit intentions, secondary emotions) to animal entities (Waytz, Epley and Cacioppo 2010, 59). In other words, in the process anthropomorphism we tend to ascribe to animals those same uniquely human traits that we deny to humans in the process of animalistic dehumanisation. On the one hand, anthropomorphisation makes non-human entities such as animals worthy of moral consideration; on the other hand, it often leads to the animal being perceived as an agent capable of social influence (ibid. 60). As suggested by Heather M. Gray, Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, anthropomorphised agents are perceived as responsible for their own actions and consequently worthy of both punishment and reward (2007, 619). As a result, throughout human history and culture anthropomorphisation of animals gave

rise to multiple animal stereotypes that came to be reproduced in literature and art. These stereotypes are rooted in the belief that animal species possess distinct character traits, just as humans do, and facilitate the understanding of complex and often unexplored nature of animals. However, “each of the stereotypes responds more to human needs than the realities of animal nature” (Benson 1983, 80). Just as any other stereotype, the view of an animal species as representative of a certain trait removes a group from moral consideration and facilitates the reproduction of a possibly negative image. What is more, when used to justify the categorical rejection of a group, stereotypes might legitimise immoral conduct towards it. (cf. Allport 1954). To summarise: on the one hand, when we assign human traits to animals, anthropomorphisation leads to animals being perceived as moral agents and falling within the scope of our moral judgement; on the other hand, when these traits become established and reproduced in culture, the reverse process can be observed.

The connotations examined in this paper are obviously based on negative animal stereotypes. These often stem from the cultural stance of *misothery*, broadly defined as hatred and contempt towards animals, or a particular animal species. James B. Mason, who coined the term, states:

Misothery reduces the power/status/dignity of animals and nature thus supporting human supremacy and control over animals and the living world (...). Just as agrarian society invented beliefs to reduce women, it also invented beliefs or ideologies about animals that reduced them in their worldview. (Mason 2017, 140)

Mason argues that, while before the Agrarian Revolution 10,000 years ago men used to live alongside animals, the transition from forager to farmer abolished this sense of kinship and made it necessary to justify the shift in status of animals (2017, 136–137). This resulted in a worldview that places humans above animals in terms of power, rights and status, which coincides with the GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor proposed by George Lakoff and Mark Turner. The Great Chain is “defined by attributes and behaviour” and arranged as follows: humans (who possess “higher order attributes and behaviour”, such as thought or character) – animals (identified by instinctual attributes and behaviour) – plants (defined by solely biological attributes and behaviour) (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 170). As in the past, when the concept of the Great Chain of Being presumed straight evolutionary lineage from ‘lower’ to ‘higher’ species (Rigato and Minelli 2013), parts of a higher entity’s nature are assumed to be shared with the beings in lower categories; for instance, while humans are said to possess animal instincts, they are categorised differently because of ‘higher’ traits such as “capacities for abstract reasoning, aesthetics, morality, communication, highly developed consciousness” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 168). That means that the cultural GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor allows us to both relate to animals and detach ourselves from them. While the worldview implied by THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING has been widely acknowledged as part of our conceptual system, from an ethical standpoint the mental separation of

humans and all other animal species is not without controversy. In his influential book *In the Company of Animals* James Serpell argues:

(W)e have created an artificial distinction between us and them [animals], and have constructed a defensive screen of lies, myths, distortions and evasions, the sole purpose of which has been to reconcile or nullify the conflict between economic self-interest, on the one hand, and sympathy and affection on the other. (Serpell 1986, 210)

It can be argued that misothery helps reinforce the strict boundaries of categorisation in the GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor and emphasise dissimilarity through the attribution of negative human qualities to animals in order to justify their lowered status. However, as noted by John Rodman, who referred to misothery as *theriophobia*, “(t)he basic theriophobic stance is one of disgust at “brutish” “bestial” or “animalistic” traits that are suspiciously more frequently predicted of men than of beasts” (Rodman 1974, 20). These attributed traits will be key in the analysis of particular animalistic metaphors present in various cultures.

3. The role of cultural connotations in metaphorical usage

All of the metaphors investigated in this section are highly conventionalised, and some of them may even be considered universal to a certain degree. As linguistic expressions become increasingly conventionalised through frequent usage and reproduction in the media, art, and literature, it is not surprising that their non-literal meanings can be found in lexicons or dictionaries. For the purpose of this paper I will refer to entries from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary on-line in order to illustrate the degree of conventionality these metaphors have achieved.

Before moving on to particular examples of conceptualisation of humans as specific animal species and the consequences experienced by the targets, it is worth noting that the term *animal* itself has become so ubiquitous in reference to humans that in fact one of the dictionary definitions of the word provided by Merriam-Webster reads: “a human being considered chiefly as physical or nonrational” and, in the entry for English language learners, “a person who behaves in a wild, aggressive, or unpleasant way”. This goes to show how common and well-established the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor has become.

The PEOPLE ARE RATS metaphor

The rat is undoubtedly one of the most frequently used source domains employed to represent undesirable groups as opposed to individuals. It is important to note that the PEOPLE ARE RATS metaphor employs the image of a gutter rat (an animal that is almost universally despised in Western culture), rather than a brown country rat or the

domestic white rat. In addition, in dehumanising contexts rats are always imagined as a swarm, which leads to the further neglect of the individuality of particular persons within the outgroup. Contempt for groups equated with rats can also be furthered by the *animal as a demon* stereotype, meaning that animals such as rats are regarded as “treacherous predators who compound their crimes of greed and destruction by resorting to methods of stealth and cruel surprise” (Benson 1983, 85–86). The stereotype presents rats as demonic beings that represent chaos and irrational forces, just waiting to take over the rational and organised human community. This fear of a surprise attack reverberates in media headlines in the context of the war on terror gathered by propaganda researchers Erin Steuter and Deborah Mills: “Raid Zaps Iraqi Rat”, “The Vermin Have Struck Again”, “Terrorists, like rats and cockroaches, skulk in the dark”, “Americans cleared out rat’s nest in Afghanistan”; “Hussein’s rat hole” (Steuter and Wills 2008, 69–99), as well as the famous (or infamous) speech given by George W. Bush after the 9–11 attacks: “We will find those who did it. We will smoke them out of their holes. We’ll get him running. And we’ll bring him to justice.” (Lind and Tamas 2007, 137). The PEOPLE ARE RATS metaphor is embedded in a metaphorical frame where the animals are hiding underground and lurk in the shadows just waiting to attack (Steuter and Wills 2008, 72), which coincides with two orientational metaphors, MORAL IS UP/ IMMORAL IS DOWN (Kövecses 2010, 246) and RATIONAL IS UP/ IRRATIONAL IS DOWN (ibid. 40), as well as MORALITY IS LIGHT/ IMMORALITY IS DARKNESS (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 311). What is more, rats are often seen as filthy (a view that has little to do with the actual animal, as all rat owners would surely attest), which would mean that the negative judgement of groups conceptualised in this way is also fuelled by the MORALITY IS CLEANLINESS metaphor (ibid. 307) and its negative counterpart IMMORALITY IS DIRTINESS. Rats are also perceived as carriers of disease, both in a biological and metaphorical sense (Musloff 2016, 110), as presented in perhaps the most infamous example of the usage of the dehumanising PEOPLE ARE RATS metaphor, the Nazi propaganda film *Der Ewige Jude* (*The Eternal Jew*):

(1) Wherever rats appear they bring ruin, by destroying mankind’s goods and foodstuffs. In this way, they spread disease, plague, leprosy, typhoid fever, cholera, dysentery, and so on. They are cunning, cowardly, and cruel, and are found mostly in large packs. Among the animals, they represent the rudiment of an insidious and underground destruction, just like the Jews among human beings. (*Der Ewige Jude* 1940, English subtitles provided on the website)

A metaphor does not necessarily have to be expressed through language. In *Der Ewige Jude* narration is accompanied by suggestive images of swarms of rats pouring out of the gutters and hiding in the walls; on American World War II propaganda posters it is the Japanese that are represented as rats trying to chew on the North American continent and about to be snapped by a mouse trap. There are countless examples in history when the PEOPLE ARE RATS metaphor was used to justify the extermination of the

enemy by presenting the act of killing as necessary for the protection of human health and property, including the portrayal of Native Americans during the American-Indian Wars in the seventeenth century, the portrayals of Armenians during Armenian genocide of 1915–16 (when the victims were murdered by clubbing or stabbing, as bullets were considered too valuable), Soviet depictions of Nazis and Fascists, and anti-Tutsi slogans during the Rwandan genocide such as “If you set out to kill a rat, you must also kill the pregnant rat” (Smith 2011, 164–165). More recent examples include the aforementioned press coverage of the war in Iraq and commentary on the issue of Muslim immigration, for instance the highly controversial cartoon by Stanley McMurtry published on the Daily Mail website on the 17th of November 2015, depicting hordes of armed Muslims accompanied by a swarm of rats entering Europe (McMurtry 2015).

The PEOPLE ARE CATTLE metaphor

The PEOPLE ARE CATTLE metaphor is yet another common way of conceptualising groups. The metaphor, although less conventionalised than PEOPLE ARE RATS, has made its way into the English lexicon, as the one of the dictionary definitions of *cattle* reads “human beings especially en masse” (Merriam-Webster 2017). As opposed to RAT, the negative connotations of the source domain CATTLE tend to stem from the *animal as machine* stereotype, rooted in the mechanisation and industrialisation of society, where the animal is assessed by its performance and cost-effectiveness (Benson 1983, 87–89). The fact that, according to the stereotype, cows are merely objects that play a specific role in the production process makes them unworthy of moral concern. Not surprisingly, the PEOPLE ARE CATTLE metaphor has been widely used to justify slavery, as both cows and groups likened to them were argued to be ‘slaves by nature’. The concept of *natural slavery* had already been introduced by Aristotle, who, drawing on the idea that it is our capacity to think rationally that constitutes the essence of humanness, claimed that the sole purpose of barbarians (that is, all nations apart from Greeks) was to serve their masters (Smith 2011, 42), which made slavery seem both just and beneficial to the enslaved. Interestingly, the common Greek term *andrapodon* (“slave”, literally: “man-footed creature”) was derived by analogy to the common term for cattle, *tetrapodon* (literally “four-footed creature”) (Bradley 2000, 110). The slave-cattle parallel was upheld in Ancient Rome, where the Lex Aquilia statute from the 3rd century BC stated, “If anyone shall have unlawfully killed a male or female slave belonging to another or a four-footed animal, whatever may be the highest value of that in that year, so much money is he to be condemned to give to the owner.” (Smith 2011, 122), equating the worth of human and animal life and setting the criterion for calculating the monetary value of both in terms of effectiveness in labour. In his treaty *De re rustica* the Roman scholar Marcus Terentius Varro categorised slaves as “class of instruments which is articulate”, as opposed to cattle, “the inarticulate”, and classified both as “aids to men without which they cannot cultivate” (Rodriguez 1997, 669). When it comes to ascribing human traits to cows, cattle are often considered ‘dumb’, ‘stupid’ and passive

(lacking both rationality and agency) – traits which were commonly attributed to African slaves in antebellum USA. The similarities did not end there: multiple accounts of former slaves confirm that the cattle-slave parallel was felt in almost all aspects of black people's lives¹. In other words, African slaves were not only conceptualised as cattle; they were actually treated as farm animals and 'enjoyed' the same status and freedoms.

The PEOPLE ARE WOLVES metaphor

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines wolf as "a fierce, rapacious, or destructive person"; unsurprisingly, the PEOPLE ARE WOLVES metaphor entails the conceptualisation of the enemy as a bloodthirsty, vicious, and cruel creature. As in the case of rats, this anthropomorphic image of *canis lupus* seems to be driven by the *animal-as-demon* stereotype. Through centuries of lore and misrepresentation in arts and literature (most notably stories for children, such as *Little Red Riding Hood* or *Three Little Pigs*) wolves became a near-universal symbol of the evil that knocks on the gate of civilisation with the intent to burst through whenever the opportunity arises and devour innocent humans (Serpell 1986, 198). Unfortunately, the stereotype has little to do with reality, and the flawed portrayal of wolves' nature and behaviour led to the species being almost completely wiped out in Europe and the US through mass shootings and traps, or worse—torture, setting on fire, poisoning and mutilation (ibid. 199). The fate of those conceptualised as wolves through the PEOPLE ARE WOLVES metaphor was no different; in one of the most gruesome instances of outgroup violence it was the Apache tribe who were the target of the metaphor. As Karl Jacoby states in his work on the Apache genocide:

If the stated goal of the mid-nineteenth century civilian campaigns was to preempt the Apaches' attempted extermination of the territory's Euro-Americans, the unstated goal was to call the Apaches' very humanity into question, often through acts designed to emphasise the Indians' animal-like qualities. (Jacoby 2008, 254)

The Apache were most commonly conceptualised as wolves, which by that time had already achieved the status of "evil-doers... [who] deserve[d] to be destroyed," animals whose "crimes" justified the "natural right of man to exterminate" them' (ibid. 255) and become the target of state-sanctioned annihilation. Jacoby goes on to describe the metaphorical conceptualisations of the tribe:

Expeditions became in many military dispatches "hunts"; the Apache inevitably "wolves." The 1867 report of the U.S. Secretary of War, for example, referred to fighting Apaches as

¹ For a detailed analysis of the *slaves-as-cattle* identity in accounts of former slaves see Clifton and Van de Mieroop 2016, 72–82.

“more like hunting wild animals than any kind of regular warfare” and noted that the Apaches “like wolves... are ever wandering.” As the U.S. Army officer Davis Britton, posted to Arizona a decade later put it, “[W]e hunted [Apaches] and killed them as we hunted and killed wolves.” (ibid. 258)

This dehumanising strategy proved successful; perhaps the best example is the one recalled by a newly arrived settler who witnessed the decapitation of five Apache corpses with the intent of using the brains to tan deer hide (ibid. 254). The case of Apache genocide is not the only instance when the PEOPLE ARE WOLVES metaphor was employed to justify and encourage the annihilation of the ‘enemy’. The PEOPLE ARE WOLVES metaphor is part of another larger metaphorical frame observed by Steuter and Wills, which presents the enemy as a hunted animal through usage of hunt-related linguistic expressions (Steuter and Wills 2008, 72). Examples of such framing in the context of war on terror include headlines “As British close on Basra, Iraqis scurry away”, “Terror Hunt Snares Twenty-five”, “Net closing around Bin Laden”, or “Pakistanis Give up on Lair of Osama” (Steuter and Wills 2008, 73–74).

Visual realisations of the metaphor are abundant among posters from the WWII period. Both the Nazis and the communists were depicted as (mostly black) wolves: hidden under sheep’s skin, attacking humans, or mutilated and defeated. The image of the wolf reflects its alleged ravenous nature, with grinning fangs covered in blood and sharp claws reaching for its victim. This goes to show just how suggestive this metaphor can be: when faced with a ruthless killer, the only possible solution seems to be killing the enemy.

The PEOPLE ARE DOGS metaphor

The dehumanising role of the PEOPLE ARE DOGS metaphor is an interesting case. While in European tradition dogs are considered pets and appreciated for their fidelity and reliability, in parts of Asia they are bred and killed for their meat (see Chase 2002), and thus considered food for nourishment, and in the Muslim tradition they are sometimes considered impure and therefore “a source of moral danger” (El Fadl 2008, 499). This fact carries two important implications; first, while the source domain of the PEOPLE ARE DOGS metaphor remains the same, because of the different cultural connotations that come into play in the process of metaphorical mapping, the metaphor itself will express a different worldview, depending on the conceptualiser (a linguistic community), and consequently carry diverse implications for the target. Second, it should be stated that conceptual metaphors are generally cultural concepts, even though some of them may indeed be shared by unrelated linguistic communities; the conceptualisations of the target will thus vary across cultures and languages. However, even within the mostly uniform European culture the term *dog* may carry negative connotations, mostly due to the human tendency to delineate boundaries between people and other animals, mentally placing the latter below humans in the Great Chain of Being. The

Merriam-Webster definition for the metaphorical usage of dog reads “a worthless or contemptible person”, and, in its adjectival form, “having an inferior or inauthentic quality”, which shows that despite their usefulness to humans, the species is still considered inferior to humans. The most prominent instances of usage of the PEOPLE ARE DOGS metaphor reflect both the cultural variety in conceptualisation and the low status of the source. First, let us consider the usage of the metaphor in central religious documents of Islam, Judaism and Christianity:

(8) And if We had willed, we could have elevated him thereby, but he adhered [instead] to the earth and followed his own desire. So his example is like that of the dog: if you chase him, he pants, or if you leave him, he [still] pants. That is the example of the people who denied Our signs. So relate the stories that perhaps they will give thought. (Quran 7:176)

(9) Hazeel said, “How could your servant, a mere dog, accomplish such a feat?” “The LORD has shown me that you will become king of Aram,” answered Elisha. (New International Version, 2 Kings 18:13)

(10) Watch out for those dogs, those evildoers, those mutilators of the flesh. (New International Version, Phil. 3.2)

In the verse of the Quran, the man who chose to follow his worldly needs rather than the teachings of God is likened to a dog, an irrational animal that cannot control its urges. In the Old Testament, the conceptualisation of the servant as a dog emphasizes his low status and unimportance. In the New Testament, Paul warns the people of Philippi of false teachers, who pose a spiritual threat to Christians. It is important to note, that at the time when the Old and New Testament documents were written, dogs in Israel were largely undomesticated and lived in large packs, posing an actual threat to humans. This suggests that, on the one hand, the meaning of the metaphor may have changed over time, as did the attitudes towards the source; on the other hand, the fear of dogs as aggressive animals who live and hunt in packs could be traced forward to present day expressions. More recent instances of usage of the PEOPLE ARE DOGS metaphor include the portrayal of Yana Indians as “dirty, saddle-colored dogs” during the 1846–1973 California Genocide (Madley 2013, 43). Black natives were also conceptualised as dogs by German colonisers during the Herero and Nama genocide of 1904–1907. One testimony recalls Germans burning 25 detainees alive with the comment “We should burn all these dogs and baboons in this fashion.” (Schaller 2013, 106). World War II propaganda also made use of the metaphor: while the Soviets described both Nazis and fascists as dogs (Smith 2011, 32), the Japanese referred to Americans as Mei-ri-ken, meaning “misguided dog” (Dower 1986, 241). The most infamous usage of the PEOPLE ARE DOGS metaphor can undoubtedly be found in accounts of prisoners from Abu Ghraib in Iraq. U.S. soldiers were reported to have not only referred to detainees as dogs, but also forced them to walk on all fours, bark and

participate in ‘doggy dances’, where they were terrorised by actual dogs; as Geoffrey D. Miller, the U.S. Army Major General in command of Abu Ghraib, explained: “You have to treat the prisoners like dogs. [...] If you treat them differently or if they believe that they’re any different than dogs, you have effectively lost control of your interrogation (...)” (Steuter and Wills 2008, 86–87).

What all the dehumanising metaphors discussed in this section have in common is the fact that they appear to be fuelled by the same stereotype: the *animal as an alien*. According to Benson, this view of animals entails the *a priori* assumption that the entity “comes to us an intruder or a guest—in either case as one without widely acknowledged rights to freedom or the resources of the land” (1983, 81). This means that when an individual or group is conceptualised as an animal we not only tend to focus on the dissimilarity between “us” and “them”, but are more likely to deny them a sense of belonging to our physical or mental “territory”. What is more, Benson argues that the animal-alien is always suspected of the same greed and treachery we would expect from a human, which additionally inspires fear and mistrust, and fuels the desire to exert control over an animal’s behaviour in one of three ways: through assimilation, confinement or banishment (Benson 1983, 81). It can be assumed that the latter was also meant to include the most extreme form of aggression against the alien, mainly extermination². While Benson’s arguments hold true for animal entities, they may well be applied to humans, as illustrated by numerous examples in history; in fact, Benson himself observes the connection between dehumanising metaphor and our contempt for animals that serve as source domains: “Our repertory of metaphorical epithets reflects this distrust of animals. A human may be censured as a ‘snake’, ‘vulture’, ‘rat’, ‘pig’, ‘turkey’, ‘shark’, ‘leech’, and much more.” (Benson 1983, 81).

4. Conclusions

Throughout human history animal metaphors have played a crucial role in the representation of the enemy in times of war and conflict. Through coinage and subsequent reproduction in political and media discourse these mental representations of groups seen as undesirable or dangerous provides a necessary justification for the inhumane treatment of others and acts of cruelty that would otherwise be considered morally reprehensible. Within metaphorical frames constructed in the context of group conflict animals function as persistent and familiar symbols which offer quick access to a set of complex emotional and cultural connotations, and allow us to construct a mental image that is both intricate and unambiguous. When animals inspire negative responses such as contempt, fear and hatred, it is far easier to kill them without moral consideration and the feeling of guilt; consequently, the same applies to humans that are concep-

² Historically, *to exterminate* meant to banish or drive something away, as suggested by the Latin origin *exterminatus* (Merriam-Webster 2017).

tualised as these animals. In other words, our disregard for animal life and well-being is reflected in the way we treat other humans.

The tragic instances of usage of the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor illustrate the persuasive power of the its linguistic and non-linguistic realisations: metaphors are not just name-calling aimed at upsetting the opponent, but rather function as vivid descriptions that carry real implications for the target. The degree to which an animal used as source evokes negative connotations is reflected by the fate of the animal and, secondly, the fate of the human imagined as that animal. When we treat cattle as thoughtless and emotionless machines that serve the sole objective of production and judge them exclusively by their efficiency, it is relatively easy and morally acceptable to enslave human beings for that same purpose. When we attempt to exterminate a whole animal species for financial gain and justify it by false attribution of demonic traits and cruel intentions, it is not surprising that the groups conceptualised as that species will meet the same fate. While anthropomorphisation initially places animals within the scope of our moral concern, the escalation of trait attribution leads to the formation of animal stereotypes which do not reflect the truth but distort it according to our own intentions and goals. Stereotypes of animals and humans have one thing in common- they both impose a particular image and certain attitudes towards the target, exempting us from actually trying to understand the true nature of the being behind the stereotype, be it man or beast. As shown in this paper, the process of conceptual mapping extends far beyond the embodied, physical elements of the animal used as source, as would be expected in the traditional view of CMT. The conceptualisation of a person or out-group as a particular animal species triggers a set of cultural connotations, including expectations, emotional attitudes and biases that heavily influence (or, in some cases, distort) the perception of *both* the source and target. All in all, it is the degradation of animals and reproduction of negative stereotypes that misrepresent animal traits and behaviour that allow us to misrepresent and mistreat people the same ways in the process of dehumanisation.

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