International Affairs in the National Party's Political Thought (1928–1939)

Preliminary remarks

Issues related to the international policy of the Polish State generated interest among the leading members of the National Party, including especially Roman Dmowski, Jędrzej Giertych, Stanisław Kozicki, Joachim Bartoszewicz, Zygmunt Berezowski, Jerzy Drobnik and Zygmunt Wojciechowski. Roman Dmowski, generally viewed as a talented authority in the field of international policies, held a prominent position among the specialists dealing with international affairs. It is worth noting that, back in 1923, Dmowski held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in Wincenty Witos's Government. A significant role among international policy experts was also assigned to Stanislaw Kozicki, who devoted much attention especially to the European international relations, and to Polish-German relations.

1. Concepts of external security

According to the National Party, foreign policies formed part of the measures taken by nation-states in the international arena, with postulates of the “classic” National Democracy (ND) political thought acting as the starting point. References were made, in particular, to the views expressed by Jan Ludwik Popławski, which were further developed by Roman Dmowski, and presented in his famous work entitled Germany, Russia and the Polish issue (Polish: Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska) dated 1908. The creators of the National Party’s political thought were convinced that the State’s foreign policy was closely

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connected with its internal policy. The National Party’s programme dated 1928 stipulated that the Polish policy should “reflect a conscious and creative effort for the benefit of Poland, rather than any foreign endeavours”3. A political pamphlet dated 1938 included the following statement. “The political situation in Poland and the world requires exceptional effort for an organised nation, because only such a nation can be powerful, and Poland can be either powerful or non-existent!”4.

It was believed that the international policy implemented by the State must be sovereign. This opinion was shared by Roman Rybarski, who claimed “The nation must autonomously decide about its policy, and have the government which it wants to have, and which serves its interests best”5. The underlying postulate of the National Party was to put the Polish State in a leading position within the international system. It was said that only a strong nation-state would be able to maintain its sovereignty and independence, being situated between two powerful and extremely dangerous neighbours – Germany and Russia6.

As already mentioned, representatives of the young generation clearly grew in importance in the 1930s. Their views on the international standing of Poland differed from previous opinions, and the idea of a great and powerful Poland was brought forward. Members of the “youth” circles believed that German revisionism should be markedly opposed by an offensive western programme, and that demands should be made to bring Gdańsk, the remaining areas of Upper Silesia, and the Masuria Region, back into Poland. Their postulates were supplemented with the symbol “Chrobry’s Sword”7.

The idea of a powerful, strong, and grand Poland prevailed among the National Party’s ideologists. One of the contemporary researchers claimed that national thought presented a vision of Poland characterised not so much by powerfulness as by alter-powerfulness. Krzysztof Stępnik clarified “Alter-powerfulness, understood essentially as a ‘di-ametric’ horoscope, referring to the ability of attaining or losing its ultimate value, reaching its top or losing it irretrievably, is a test of the paradox of a powerful state (power out of nothingness). […] Alter-powerfulness is, therefore, a concern that the independent Poland’s ability should meet the challenge of such greatness”8. The objective of the pow-

3 Program SN z 1928 roku [The National Party’s programme dated 1928], Warsaw 1928, p. 6.
4 The Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Polish Academy of Learning, Kraków, Józef Zieliński’s Files, File No. 7820, mf. 1448, Pamphlet dated 1938, k. 153.
7 R. Wapiński, Historia polskiej myśli politycznej XIX i XX wieku [The history of Polish political thought in the 19th and 20th centuries], Gdańsk 1997, p. 183.
8 K. Stępnik, Altermocarstwowość [Alter-powership], [in:] Sen o potędze. Bezpieczeństwo, suwerenność, mocarstwowość [A dream about power. Security, sovereignty and powership], Rzeczpospolita Polska
erfulness policy of the Polish State was to attain a position as a recognised European decision-maker. The National Party ideologists advocated that the Polish State, both sovereign and stable in political and economic terms, as well as being able to implement an offensive policy, should play a crucial role among European policy-makers. This postulate was included in the Resolution of the Chief Council of the National Party dated 1938, which called for efforts to “reach a position in the international arena equal to that of the western superpowers”.

Poland’s external security was one of the more complex issues dealt with by the National Party ideologists. The permanent threat to the still “young” Polish State was placed at the centre. Poland’s security, including both its territorial integrity and its ability to implement independent policies, was conditional on its developing a successful system of alliances which would ensure protection against external aggression and prevent any attempts at frustrating the Treaty of Versailles. The country’s cooperation with other states interested in maintaining peace and territorial integrity in Europe was seen as a guarantee of security.

The sovereignty of the Polish State was determined by developing an international security system based on the careful selection of allies, rendering any forms of aggression from other countries impossible. The National Party’s programme dated 1928 included the following statement regarding this subject matter. “Armed forces deterring any hostile intentions, as well as alliances made with some countries, and relationships based on mutual kindness with others, are the principal means of Poland’s defending its peace”.

2. The national border as an element in security

A stable national border was viewed as an element in security. Based on the numerous accounts of the National Party’s political thought, an inference can be drawn that the State’s border security was seen as depending on a wide range of internal and external factors. The National Party’s ideologists and politicians did not doubt that the Polish lands should be united into a sovereign nation-state. The Polish national territory was

10 The Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Polish Academy of Learning, Kraków, Józef Zieliński’s Files, File No. 7820, mf. 1448, Political pamphlet, „4 Lista Narodowa” [4th National List], k. 198.
11 T. Koziello, Trudne sąsiedztwo... [A difficult neighbourhood], p. 23.
12 Program SN... s. 8; T. Koziello, Trudne sąsiedztwo... [A difficult neighbourhood], p 23.
13 The Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Polish Academy of Learning, Kraków, Zieliński’s Files, mf. 1453, File No. 7825, the Resolutions of the Chief Council from the 1st Meeting of the National Party in Toruń on 27 and 28 September 1930, p. 333.
analysed from several different angles, including especially cultural, historic and ethnic. In the ideological work of the National Party, references were made to statements made by Jan Ludwik Popławski, whose concept combined the vision of the Piast-Dynasty Poland in the west, and the Jagiellonian-Dynasty Poland in the east. Following the line of reasoning adopted by “the father of Polish nationalism,” the National Party politicians, when dealing with the issues of the territory and national borders of the Republic of Poland, placed much emphasis on the significance of such regions as Great Poland, Pomerania and Upper Silesia. In line with Popławski’s theory, the historically-shaped and inalienable right of Poland to “the Piast land” was stressed. Reference was made to the political achievements of Bolesław Chrobry, the first king in the Piast Dynasty, who was believed by national ideologists to constitute a symbol of a successful struggle against German expansionism, and the fulfilment of the objective of building an internally strong and consolidated state. As S. Rymar wrote, “[…] We need to continually build Poland in such a way so as not to let our enemies attack Poland, but to make it stronger, and to base it on granite foundations.”

The National Party’s political thought included principles related to Poland’s national border protection and sovereignty. This problem was analysed in close connection with the concept of the nation. It was claimed that territory formed an indispensable element in the idea of the nation. It was further commonly believed that the Polish State, situated between two expansion-driven neighbours, was not in a position to oppose them in military or economic terms. The international declarations regarding peace in Europe, therefore, met with scepticism.

3. Poland’s national territory
The National Party unfailingly stated that Poland was a representative of Western European civilisation and culture. Poland’s national territory, situated between two superpowers, Germany and Russia, provided grounds for National Democracy ideologists to develop a successful political strategy which would facilitate the retaining of the State and the nation’s sovereignty. Based on the conflict-oriented presentation of international relations, an assumption was made that the Polish nation, occupying the territory between Germany and Russia, should build a strong nation-state. The perception of Germany’s historical hostility to Poland, originally formulated by both Popławski and Dmowski, was refined by the subsequent generations of ND politicians.

The territory of the future Polish State was projected during World War I by Roman Dmowski. The National Party did not abandon the idea of taking back the lands which had not been successfully re-attached to Poland. National expansion was, therefore,
proposed in order to set the conditions to facilitate bringing those areas back to the Polish State. The younger generation of National Party members believed that German revisionism should be strongly opposed by an offensive western programme, and that demands should be made to bring Gdańsk, the remaining areas of Upper Silesia, and the Masuria Region, back to Poland.

In the National Party’s political thought, the basis for the Polish State’s independence was seen as taking back the territory, providing an opportunity to develop the prosperity of the nation and protecting it from internal and external threats. It was believed that Poland should cover such an area as would warrant its respectable position in ethnic and civilisational terms. Access to natural resources, fostering economic growth, was considered extremely important. Representatives of the National Party’s political thought were convinced of the existence of two types of Polish territorial area, i.e. the national territory and the State’s territory. The national territory corresponded to the land which the Poles could rightly claim, given their ethnical and cultural influence, as well as historical traditions. The State’s territory comprised the areas which, according to the national theorists, should be situated within the Polish national border, due to their significance for implementing autonomous policies. The problem of overestimating the State’s abilities was also present in the National Party’s political thought.

Based on the accounts of the National Party’s political thought, the nation-state’s territory encompassed the areas from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea, as well as from the Oder and Nysa Rivers to the Dniepr and Dźwina Rivers. However, individual Party leaders differed in their opinions. For instance, representatives of the “older” generation, including Joachim Bartoszewicz, believed that this issue was purely theoretical, given the political weakness of the Polish State.

The prevalent view in scientific literature is that the opinions expressed by “the elderly” regarding the shape of Poland’s western border were meant to provide a response to Germany’s revisionist demands, rather than an imperial conquest plan. This matter was seen differently by representatives of the “youth” circles, including in particular Jędrzej Giertych and Kazimierz Kowalski, who were convinced that Poland was capable of implementing a far-reaching national expansion plan. In line with the latter, a resolution of the National Party was drafted in 1939 which contained a provision that, in the event of a military conflict with Germany, “Poland’s victory must guarantee the restitution of the historically Polish land”. These views reflected the willingness to make Poland regain its status as a powerful and highly expansive country, and a lead-

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18 R. Wapiński, *Historia polskiej myśli politycznej... [The history of Polish political thought...]*, p. 184; T. Koziełło, *Trudne sąsiedztwo... [A difficult neighbourhood]*, p. 25.
ing position on the international arena. It is also worth noting that such a standpoint exposed the lack of awareness of the international position which the Polish State had actually attained by that time.

By the end of the 1930s, along with the growing significance of the Port of Gdynia, and the increased turnover of Polish overseas trade, much emphasis was put on Poland’s access to the sea, constituting an issue which had occupied a prominent place throughout the history of Polish political thought. With the myth of “a maritime Poland” being disseminated, justifications were provided for Poland’s right to Pomerania. The matter of the country’s access to the sea had a defensive and offensive component. The former was mainly focused on the deprecation of the so-called corridor propaganda, whereas the latter demanded that Gdańsk and the seaside area be re-attached to Poland. The National Party aimed at making the public aware of the negative consequences of the lack of wider access to the sea, along with Józef Piłsudski and his actions, referred to “a policy of easy triumphs”20, being blamed for that state of affairs.

The pro-Piłsudski circles were held responsible for the territorial losses in the east, with the National Party’s supporting the idea of the so-called Dmowski’s line. According to Giertych, it was a very-well-matched concept, reflecting Poland’s legitimate attempts and interests. In line with Dmowski’s concept, Giertych wrote that Poland should be a large, fully-autonomous and Baltic country, forming a major element in the European political system. Dmowski assumed that Poland should be brought back to its pre-partition shape, though somewhat smaller in territorial terms, having abandoned the regions which had become very distinct from Poland, i.e. the Kiev Land, Eastern Belarus, and the major part of Courland21.

Emphasis was put on the significance of the western provinces, which displayed higher productivity levels and a higher degree of civilisation development. The deliberations on the shape of the western border were closely connected with assessing the Versailles Treaty which was being criticised, especially by the “youth” circles. Kozicki, who was mentally a member of the younger representatives of the National Party, claimed that the Treaty frustrated the provisions of the 18th-century post-partition agreements, push-


21 J. Giertych, O wyjściu z kryzysu... [To overcome the crisis], p. 137; The Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Polish Academy of Learning, Kraków, Józef Zieliński’s Files, J. Giertych, Stronnictwo Narodowe. Kryzys dziesięciolecia 1938 roku. Relacja pamiętnikarska [The National Party. The 1938 history crisis. A diary], k. 2, a typescript.
ing the Reich’s border towards the east\textsuperscript{22}. Giertych indicated the inappropriateness of the Versailles Treaty provisions to the geo-political reality. He claimed “The Versailles border did not take into consideration any strategic postulates, giving rise to Poland’s territory’s being diffused across the map like an ink blot, and surrounded by a multitude of German peninsulas cutting into Poland. Such a border should only be allowed to exist between countries living in harmony and friendship (as with the United States and Canada, and Sweden and Norway). The Versailles border was the outcome of a compromise”\textsuperscript{23}.

This opinion was shared by Tadeusz Gluziński who questioned the moral basis of the Versailles Treaty, claiming that “At the outset of the World War, which was started by unscrupulous interest groups, two coalitions stood against each other, neither of which was based on sufficiently strong moral foundations. […] Wilson’s slogans, constituting a gallant bow towards ethical principles in international and even internal policy […] were only partially implemented in peace treaties, acting as an element in the political game right from the start, without the attendance of the advocate himself”\textsuperscript{24}.

A different standpoint was presented by Wojciech Wasiutyński, who was convinced of the need to defend the Versailles Treaty, seen as providing a territorial guarantee. “The Versailles Treaty reflected a victory of the national ideal, both inside and outside Europe. But perhaps it was not as important for any other country as it was for us, since we had once been controlled by three European superpowers […] To defend the Versailles Treaty, the Polish nation would even be ready to take up arms, because it makes us independent, provides us with access to the sea, and gives us Silesia”\textsuperscript{25}, he wrote. According to Wasiutyński, the Versailles Treaty was a guarantee of the Polish western border.

The issue of Poland’s territory was very significant for the National Party ideologists. Ensuring stable national borders and nationally integrated territory were considered of utmost importance. According to the National Party ideologists, the lands of Poland, as shaped in the first years after regaining independence, should form the inviolable territory of the Polish nation. In June 1939, i.e. a few months before the outbreak of World War II, the National Party pointed out the necessity of providing Poland with wider access to the sea and of eliminating the western Prussian enclave. The \textit{Myśl Narodowa} [National Thought] magazine presented the National Party’s standpoint in the following way: “[…] the Polish State must be based on the Baltic Sea. […] The outcome of a war, once started, must provide Poland with a guarantee of the restitution of the

\textsuperscript{22} S. Kozicki, \textit{Niemcy a Polska [Germany vs. Poland]}, „Myśl Narodowa” [National Thought] 28 December 1930, No. 54, pp. 813–814.


\textsuperscript{25} W. Wasiutyński, \textit{W dziesiątą rocznicę [At the 10th anniversary]}, „Szczerbiec” 1 July 1929, No. 13, p. 2.
historically Polish land, wider access to the sea, and control over the whole of Upper Silesia and Eastern Prussia”26.

As regards the concept of Poland’s western border, the views expressed by the elder generation of the National Party members were rather moderate, and merely served as a response to Germany’s revisionist demands. It was postulated that the border should run along the Oder River27. It was commonly held that the German claims to the Polish territory constituted the principal element in the international policy of that country. In 1930 Stanisław Stroński became convinced that Germany would aim at settling the border issue by force. “The underlying issue of Germany’s policy towards Poland is the demand to change the Polish-German border, and the situation has never appeared as tense as it does at present […] The style of German utterances against the Polish border is very consistent. They always begin with loud and rather vague slogans: borders are intolerable; the whole German nation sees them as a bleeding wound; this must change. […] In reality, the country seeks to change the Polish-German border in the only possible way, i.e. by force. […] Germany sees its western border as inviolable, whereas the eastern one is much less so”28.

The vision of national border security became a factor which clearly differentiated the “youth” generation. Such differences became apparent in 1938, i.e. during the so-called Czechoslovak crisis, which fully exposed the internal conflict in the National Party, arising from conflicting concepts. The circles supporting Kazimierz Kowalski, with Giertych expressing his marked sympathy, claimed that the Polish-Czechoslovak alliance could be politically beneficial to Poland. It was believed that the expansive policy of Adolf Hitler could be stopped. Therefore, Kowalski strongly criticised the activities of “the pro-Piłsudski group.”

Different views regarding this matter were expressed by Bielecki’s group, whose members believed that the National Party should adopt a “wait and see” approach. According to Jędrzej Giertych, the group led by Bielecki and Sacha neglected Poland’s internal standing. He advocated that “The Czechoslovak crisis arose when Dmowski was still alive but he no longer managed the Party’s affairs. However, within the internal national circle’s management system, a decisive role has come to be played by an inert group of people with the mentality of personal secretaries, merely waiting for orders. No forces have materialised yet within the management structure, which would

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26 Stanowisko Stronnictwa Narodowego [The National Party’s standpoint], „Myśl Narodowa” [National Thought] 9 July 1939, No. 29, p. 429.
27 K. Kowalski, Polska wobec Niemiec [Polish stance on Germany], Warsaw 1939, p. 11, J. Giertych, Regiony polskie w Niemczech [The Polish regions in Germany], „Polityka Narodowa” [National Policy], 1939, No. 4–6, pp. 234–235; J. Giertych, O wyjściu z kryzysu… [To overcome the crisis], p. 287.
28 S. Stroński, Artykuł 19-ty czy wojna? [Article 19 or war?], „Myśl Narodowa” [National Thought], 7 December 1930, No. 50, p. 766.
be ready to neglect the opinions of this inert group and fiercely follow their own way, making what they believe in come true; I’m saying this out of sadness and culpability.”

The clash of these two orientations occurred in 1938 during the Czechoslovak crisis, with the group led by Kazimierz Kowalski and Jędrzej Giertych’s advocating that the Polish-Czechoslovak alliance could inhibit Hitler’s expansive policy. Fierce criticism was targeted at the Sanation camp, and plans were made to organise, *inter alia*, mass demonstrations to force the Government to support Czechoslovakia in its conflict with Germany. Those plans, however, were thwarted by Bielecki’s group, whose members believed that the National Party had better adopt a “wait and see” approach under those circumstances.

4. Enemies and allies in international relations

The issue of a permanent threat to the Polish State was at the centre of the National Party politicians’ attention. The Party ideologists did not doubt that the Polish nation faced several internal and external threats. The potential “adversaries,” divided into external and internal categories, included certain national minorities, State bodies, representatives of selected religious and philosophical systems, cultural trends, selected organisational entities, and ideological trends.

Dmowski claimed “The better protection the nation can provide against hostile external factors, and the more efficiently it can secure its interests and its independence of other nations, the more favourable conditions it has for internal development; and the more it develops internally, [...] the more efficient it becomes in defending itself against its enemies.” The mythologised image of the enemy in the National Party’s political thought was far from uniform. Enemies were usually presented in a schematic, yet emotional, manner, with the prevailing view that any messages sent by the enemies threatened the identity of the Polish nation.

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The German issue was extremely important to the political thought of both the Popular National Union and the National Party. Along with the Jewish issue, the attitude to Poland's western neighbour formed a key self-identification factor for the followers of the national ideology. Attention was paid to the never-ending hostilities between Poland and Germany, as brought to light by Jan Ludwik Popławski. The conviction of Poland's being threatened by Germany, with the latter aiming to take control of Polish land, restrain the Polish State politically and economically, and weaken its position in the international arena, formed a major element in the National Party's political thought. The programme documents implied “once German demands are carried through, our independence will end”.

The German problem was reflected in the political programme of the National Party, as well as in the journalistic writing and theoretical works by the leading Party ideologists. It covered: (1) territorial issues, (2) German revisionism, (3) the political system in Germany, (4) German expansionism, and (5) the threat of war.

The idea of the existence of two major enemies formed the starting point in deliberations for all the political camps in Poland, which differed in terms of the importance attached to which one of them was the more dangerous. Based on the conflict-oriented presentation of international relations, the assumption was made that the Polish nation, occupying territory between Germany and Russia, should build a strong nation-state. As already mentioned, the allegation of Germany's historical hostility to Poland was first made by Jan Ludwik Popławski, and then developed by Roman Dmowski.

The National Party's foreign policy was based on the perception of Germany as Poland's main and historically-sworn enemy, with which no agreement was possible. This was due to several factors, including (1) the conviction regarding the significant civilisation, military and political advantage of Germany; (2) the fear of any direct confrontation with the western neighbour displaying a much bigger potential; (3) the conviction regarding the continual attempts being made by the Third Reich to pursue expansion in the east and to reaffirm its hegemony over the region; and (4) the conviction of the invariable and long-lasting intent of Germany to destroy the Polish nation and state.

In geo-political terms, the more serious threat was posed by Germany, given especially that its willingness to revise the Versailles order was hardly in doubt. The thesis formulated by Popławski and Dmowski did not become outdated following the restitu-
tion of the Polish State. Russia, in turn, was not perceived as a major threat, due to its post-war weakening, and its shift of interest towards internal and Asian affairs.

The National Party politicians did not doubt that a military conflict would soon be initiated by Germany. Journalists of the Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy [Warsaw National Daily] magazine were under no illusion as to Germany’s real intentions. In August 1939 they wrote that “From the first day after being defeated in World War I, Germans were devising a plan of shattering down the coalition states’ victory and taking back what they had lost”\(^{38}\). Fears were expressed concerning the invasive attitude of Germany, and it was commonly believed that the Polish-German border would become a scene of military clashes. Its numerous allies and supporters made Germany – the main enemy of the Polish nation – even more dangerous. A view was disseminated that “[…] Berlin, hostile to Poland and willing to take the whole of it,” could act within the Polish State with the support of its numerous “helpers,” including (1) the German minority, (2) the Jewish minority, and (3) Ukrainian and Belarusian separatists\(^{39}\).

Much importance was attached to the Western Borderlands, and their potential seizure by Germany was perceived as the end of Poland’s independence. As it was very unlikely for Germany to abandon the idea of taking back the Western Polish Land, a military conflict was seen as unavoidable\(^{40}\).

The emergence of a national socialistic movement in Germany inspired much interest among the National Party journalists and ideologists. Jędrzej Giertych would utter his famous words “Our camp has emerged out of the fight against Germany”\(^{41}\). The successes made by the Nazi movement, as well as its origins and conceptual frameworks, were frequently and zealously analysed and interpreted by National Party ideologists, whose opinions, however, seemed to markedly differ. As already mentioned, the successes and dynamic growth of the Nazi movement were a source of fascination, especially for Kozicki, who viewed them as the logical crowning of the evolution in German political relations. While Kozicki made attempts at clarifying the essence of National Socialism, he was also aware of its dangerous consequences for Poland. At the outset of the 1930s more insightful views on the Nazi movement appeared in the National Democracy journalistic writing. This was when “the conspiracy theory of history” met with general acceptance among the ND leaders\(^{42}\).

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\(^{38}\) Niemieckie cele wojenne [German warfare targets], „Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy” [The Warsaw National Journal] 17 August 1939, No. 226 A, p. 3.

\(^{39}\) M. Rudnicki, Historia docet, „Myśl Narodowa” [National Thought] 4 January 1931, No. 1, p. 5.

\(^{40}\) M. Ryba, Polski obóz narodowo-demokratyczny w okresie międzywojennym wobec innych narodów. Podstawy ideowe [The stance of the Polish National-Democratic camp in the interwar period on other nations], [in:] Różne oblicza nacjonalizmów. Polityka-Religia-Etos [Different faces of nationalism, Politics-Religion-Ethos], ed. B. Grott, Kraków 2010, p. 112.

\(^{41}\) J. Giertych, O wyjści z kryzysu… [To overcome the crisis…], p. 290.

\(^{42}\) R. Wąpiński, Endecja wobec hitleryzmu i III Rzeszy [National Democracy’s stance on the Nazi movement and the Third Reich], [in:] Polska, Niemcy, Europa. Studia z dziejów myśli politycznej
The National Party’s political thought was based on the idea that an alliance with France should be a permanent orientation for Poland’s foreign policy. The choice of France as the optimal ally was dictated by the view that it enabled the creation of a strong and great Poland, while guaranteeing the inviolability of the post-war arrangement of political powers in Europe. It also implemented the most clear-cut anti-German policy of all the Western European countries originating from the Roman civilisation, and shared its national and political interests with Poland.

In the conceptual domain, a prominent place was held by the programme postulate referring to the need to seek an alliance with France. As already mentioned, Dmowski seemed convinced that Germany would not opt for starting a war with France. The National Democracy leader argued that France was a country with a very well-equipped army and substantial financial resources. In August 1931, in Gazeta Warszawska [The Warsaw Paper], Stanisław Kozicki wrote “We truly want France to be secure, as its strength is also ours, and the French-Polish alliance has now become a dogma of our policy.” This clearly reflected the views held by the National Party ideologists who were equally convinced that France should be the main pillar of the Polish political alliance. Stefan Dąbrowski, Deputy President of the National Party, strongly highlighted the merits of Marshal Ferdinand Foch. It was believed that France was equally interested in having Poland as its ally, with its attitude to Germany’s serving as an important criterion for assessing French policy. Representatives of the National Party were convinced that the common threat posed by Germany would bind the two countries together. The political and military alliance made between Poland and France in 1921 was seen by the National Party as “a milestone in Polish foreign policy.” Although the Locarno agreements weakened Poland’s trust in France, pro-French sympathies prevailed until 1939.

France was assigned the principal role in the National Party’s security system, given the fact that it was viewed as the greatest military and political power in Europe, and due to its shared interests with Poland. These interests included defending the

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43 The Raczyński Library in Poznań, a donation made by Bogdan Niemyt from London, the “Roman Dmowski” file.
45 Z. Berezowski, Polityka zagraniczna [Foreign policy], Warsaw 1927, p. 22.
46 S. Dąbrowski, Wielka wojna i formacje wojskowe [The Great War and military formations], „Myśl Narodowa” [National Thought], 15 December 1928, No. 28, p. 779; idem, Marszałek Foch. Człowiek i Wódz [Marshal Foch. A man and a leader], Kalisz 1929, p. 22.
Versailles system against the German threat, and frustrating any attempts to rebuild German power. The French-Polish alliance was meant to provide grounds for a political bloc ensuring the inviolability of national borders and political stability in Europe. Dmowski claimed that France acted as a major stabiliser of international relations in Europe. In 1926 he said that “maintaining harmony between Italy and France” was of utmost importance. In 1928 the creators of the National Party’s programme treated the French-Polish alliance as “the major protection for the Versailles system, based on cooperation of two neighbours of Germany”. The political committee of the National Party announced in 1934 that Poland’s alliance with France was “a milestone in Polish foreign policy” whereas in 1938 the Chief Council said it was a prerequisite to suppressing German imperialistic attempts. National Democracy postulated establishing a political bloc located between Germany and Russia, bound by an alliance with France.

Based on the Polish-French alliance, and the good-neighbour relationship with the USSR, the National Party sought to establish a system of connections between Poland, and the Central and Eastern European countries. Such alliances were expected to contribute to building and strengthening the political, economic and cultural impacts, as provided for in the idea of “a Great Poland”, which was treated as a means of expelling Germany’s impacts in that region of Europe. The concept of Intermarum was developed, concentrating on northern countries, starting with Finland, through to the Balkan countries, with the aim of guaranteeing the sovereignty of those States, and forcing them to cooperate in the face of threats posed by Germany and Russia.

The intermarum was to serve a two-fold function. Firstly, it was viewed as protecting countries in East-Central Europe against any aggressive attempts made by the two powerful neighbours of Poland. Secondly, it was expected to ensure a powerful position for Poland, which, given its territorial and demographic size, was meant to assume leadership in the newly-established political bloc, with Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia acting as other principal members. Czechoslovakia, similar to Poland, was threatened by Germany, which had sought to seize the Sudetes. Therefore, the National Party treated Czechoslovakia as a significant partner in the process of inhibiting German expansion to the east. Romania, which had been in conflict with the USSR for reasons related to controlling Bessarabia, was another major ally. The Polish-Romanian cooperation was expected to strengthen Poland’s position in relation to its eastern neighbour.

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50 Stronnictwo Narodowe o polityce zagranicznej [The National Party on foreign policy], „Gazeta Warszawska” [The Warsaw paper], 16 September 1934, No. 278, p. 2.
51 Położenie polityczne [Political standing], „Mysł Narodowa” [National Thought] 4 December 1938, No. 52, p. 798.
Concluding remarks

By the end of the 1930s numerous older-generation representatives of the National Party sought common ground with central anti-Sanation groupings, which brought them closer to Front Morges and Gen. Władysław Sikorski. This group was led by Marian Seyda, who was an extremely influential member of the Poznań-based National Democracy circles, and Prof. Roman Rybarski. Another group of activists – which, according to its leader, Jędrzej Giertych, was the youngest – was characterised by ideological radicalism and aversion to any alliances, either with the democratic opposition or with the Sanation camp. However, in the organisational structures, the elder and younger radicals were dominated by the third group, represented by Bielecki. As recollected by Wiesław Chrzanowski “Several factions already existed within the national movement by the end of the interwar period, i.e. the national-revolution faction, led by Giertych, Doboszyński and Matlachowski, the so-called professor group, with a conservatist and liberal character, with Rybarski, Głąbiński and Seyda in the lead, and the ‘ruling’ group established by Bielecki, including Trajdos and Sacha, which was less; revolutionary’ than Giertych’s group.”

The course of events on the international arena in 1939, i.e. the German army’s invading Czechoslovakia, disillusioned the National Party leaders as regards the actual endeavours of the Third Reich. The National Party’s standpoint became more consistent with the foreign policy shaped by the Polish Government at that time. Its objectives focused on several issues, i.e. (1) defending Poland’s position in Gdańsk; (2) ensuring uninhibited access to the sea; and (3) taking back the land seized by Germany. The role of France as Poland’s natural ally was also increasingly highlighted.

Deliberations regarding international affairs were driven by the German issue. Ideas taken from the Popular National Union appeared among the National Party’s concepts, along with views constituting the original input of the “youth” generation. Issues related to foreign policies and the nation constituted two inherently-connected problem areas. The concept of building a bloc of countries with similar political and national interests was supported by the idea of Poland’s bilateral alliances with France and Romania, as well as with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which had been previously developed in the National Democracy circles. It was believed that the sense of an external threat would foster the development and strengthening of national awareness.

Abstract: Issues related to the international policy of the Polish State generated interest among the leading members of the National Party, including especially Roman Dmowski, Jędrzej Giertych, Stanisław Kozicki, Joachim Bartoszewicz, Zygmunt Berezowski, Jerzy Drobnik and Zygmun Wojciechowski. Roman Dmowski, generally viewed as a talented authority in the field of international policies, held a prominent position among the specialists dealing with international affairs. It is worth noting that, back in 1923, Dmowski held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in Wincenty Witos’s Gov-
ernment. A significant role among international policy experts was also assigned to Stanisław Kozicki, who devoted much attention specially to the European international relations, and to Polish-German relations. By the end of the 1930s numerous older-generation representatives of the National Party sought common ground with central anti-Sanation groupings, which brought them closer to Front Morges and Gen. Władysław Sikorski. This group was led by Marian Seyda, who was an extremely influential member of the Poznań-based National Democracy circles, and Prof. Roman Rybarski. Another group of activists which, according to its leader, Jerdrzej Giertych, was the youngest was characterised by ideological radicalism and aversion to any alliances, either with the democratic opposition or with the Sanation camp.

Keywords: the National Party, political thought, nationalism

Sprawy międzynarodowe w myśli politycznej Stronnictwa Narodowego (1928–1939)


Słowa kluczowe: Stronnictwo Narodowe, myśl polityczna, nacjonalizm

Международные отношения в политической мысли Национальной партии (1928–1939)

Аннотация: Вопросы, связанные с международной политикой польского государства, вызвали интерес у ведущих активистов Национальной партии, в частности Романа Дмовского, Енджейа Гиртиха, Станислава Козицкого, Иоахима Бартосевича, Эдмунта Березовского, Ежи Дробника и Эдмунта Войцеховского. Особенное значение в группе специалистов по международным вопросам получил сам Роман Дмовский, признанный талантливым экспертом по вопросам внешней политики. Среди экспертов по международным делам важное место следует отвести С. Козицкому, который в своих размышлениях уделил много внимания особенностям европейских международных отношениям и польско-германским отношениям. В конце 30-х годов многие «старые» в Национальной партии пытавись договориться с центристскими антисанационными группировками, что приблизило их к Фронту Моржей и генералу Владиславу Сикорскому.
Лидерами этой группы были Мариан Сейда и профессор Роман Рыбарский. Другая группа активистов, по словам её лидера Енджея Гиртиха, самая молодая, характеризовалась радикальной идеологией и нежеланием вступать в альянсы, как с демократической оппозицией, так и с са
национальным лагерем. «Старые» и самые молодые радикалы доминировали в организационных структурах третьей тенденции, представленной Белецким.

**Ключевые слова:** национальная партия, политическая мысль, национализм

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