German Diplomacy in the View of a Problem of the General Disarmament after Locarno (1925/1926)

Abstract

The article deals with an issue of granting equal rights (“Gleichberechtigung”) to Germany in the militarisation process. During the conference in Locarno (the 5th-16th of October 1925) the German diplomacy demanded, in vain, that the level of armed forces and militarisation of the countries which were members of the League of Nations would be significantly reduced and proportional to the level decided by Germany in the Fifth part of the Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless, on the 12th of December 1925 Germany was invited to participate in the works of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, gaining at the same time an opportunity for undertaking direct actions for the purpose of equilibrating the military status of Germany with that of other countries.  The article analyses the German preparations for the proceeding of the 1st session of the Preparatory Commission. They were conducted, supervised and coordinated by the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs (the Second Department and the Report of the League of Nations), which cooperated in this regard with the Ministry of Defence, Naval Commission, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Commerce.  In the instructions mapped out for the German delegation the promotion of the general disarmament was recommended for the purpose of propaganda and tactics. The German delegation was to emphasise the dependence between Germany’s disarmament and the general disarmament, pointing at the 8th article of the treaty of the League of Nations, an introduction to the Fifth part of the Treaty of Versailles and a note of Georges Clemenceau from the 16th of June 1919. Enforcing the treaty’s limitations regarding the militarisation of other countries was regarded as a minimal positive goal. Berlin expected that the pressure from the United States and the Great Britain would force France and its allies to reduce armies and the conditions of armament. It was assumed that Germany would simultaneously gain a possibility for a partial rearmament. In case of a fiasco of the disarmament negotiations, the German diplomacy would gain a basis for the formal request to remilitarise Germany.  The diplomats from the Wilhelmstrasse managed to convince the military men from the Bendlerstrasse that due to the political and propagandistic reasons, until Germany’s accession to the League of Nations, it was necessary to act according to tactics. Most of all, to avoid the situation, in which the German requests (both of disarmament and remilitarisation) could be considered as a reason for the failure of the disarmament negotiations. The German diplomacy was also planning to use the discussion about defining the records of the 16th article of the treaty of the League of Nations to balance the military status between Germany and the neighbouring countries.  Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund (DLfV) played a significant role in Germany’s preparations for the first session of the Preparatory Commission. The disarmament commission of the DLfV led by Max von Montgelas mapped out a plan for the disarmament by assuming a reorganisation of the European countries’ armies and defining the level of army in relation to the number of the inhabitants. The realization of Montgelas’ plan assumed that the German army would be doubled and hence equal to the French army.  The German diplomacy avoided a public specification of the postulate of “equal rights” in the disarmament. Therefore, Mongelas’ demobilisation plan, published by DLfV, is treated as an instrument of the propaganda of the German authorities and regarded as an expression of opinions of the German official factors. Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the chairman of DLfV, known in the pro-league circles associated in the International Union of the Associations of the League of Nations (Union Internationale des Associations pour la Société des Nations), was chosen a chairman for the German delegation in the Preparatory Commission.