Russian hybrid aggression in Ukraine: lessons for Europe

Евген Магда

Abstract


The author analyzes components of Russian hybrid aggression, which were experienced by Ukraine and which might be experienced by some EU countries. Author analyzes the attitude of citizens of some European countries to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Many people in Europe still believe Russia is not implicated in the war in the Donbass, many do not see the danger in Russia for his country. Moreover, in case of danger for NATO ally 53% of French and 58% of German citizens voted against military assistance. The greatest danger the author sees in the loss of subjectivity. And this threat is currently important not only for Ukraine. No European political nation is monolithic. So, the Germans in the evaluation of the potential danger of the Russian Federation turned out to be divided by the line “east-west”. Accordingly, in the east there is less of those who see Russia as potential military enemy. Language differences is observed in the Baltic countries, e.g. only 7% of Russian-speaking Estonians and only 5% of Russian-speaking residents of Latvia are afraid of war with Russian Federation. Informational component is perhaps the most important in a structure of hybrid aggression. That is why the search for answers on this threat is most intense. At the end of June 2016, a Czech non-governmental organization The European Values published a document ‘Full-Scale Democratic Response to Hostile Disinformation Operations. 50 Measures to Oust Kremlin Hostile Disinformation Influence out of Europe’. This document recognizes the tough new realities and proposes some recommendations, which could be the basis for a response to new challenges. The main conclusion is that the world has become closer, especially European world. There is no longer any the country, which is not affected by what is happening in Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine and its experience are important and will remain so for a long time yet.

Keywords


hybrid aggression, information warfare, Ukraine, subjectivity

References


Монографии

Darczewska J., Żochowski P., Russophobia in the Kremlin’s strategy. A weapon of mass destruction, Warsaw 2015.

The Pattern of the Informational War of the Russian Federation, Autor: coordonatori: Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, București 2016.

Портнов А., Між «Центральною Європою» та «Русским миром». Сучасна Україна у просторі міжнародних інтелектуальних дискусій, Київ 2009.

Murray W., Mansoor P., eds., Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, New York 2012.

Snegovaya M., Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine. Soviet Origins Of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, Washington 2015.

Lucas E., P. Pomeranzev, Winning the Information War, Washington 2016.

Научные статьи

Himka J.-P., «The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine: A Тypology», Harvard Ukrainian Studies 2006.

Hrynevych V., «Gespaltene Erinnerung. Der Zweite Weltkrieg im ukrainischen Gedenken», Osteuropa 2005, № 4–5.

Интернет-ресурсы

«Bertelsmann Foundation», http://www.bfna.org/

«Mediasapiens», http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/

«To Inform is to Influence», https://toinformistoinfluence.com/

«Європейська правда», http://www.eurointegration.com.ua

«Президент України. Офіційне Інтернет-представництво», http://www.president.gov.ua/

«Центр Разумкова», http://www.razumkov.org.ua/




DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/we.2016.2.2.85
Date of publication: 2017-06-20 11:55:49
Date of submission: 2017-06-20 09:46:17


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