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An Enactive Account of Anger and Forgiveness
Abstract
Anger, according to many theorists, represents an act of wrongdoing. Forgiveness puts an end to anger, and it is often earned by repairing the harm done to the victim. However, it is hard to square this view of anger with the following facts: that successfully repairing the harm is neither necessary nor sufficient for earning forgiveness, and that it is necessary for the wrongdoer to demonstrate their future trustworthiness. I will present an explanation of the relationship between anger and forgiveness based on an enactive theory of emotion. On this view, an emotion is fitting if it prepares the agent to effectively perform a relevant class of actions. Anger mobilizes the victim’s mind and body to secure concessions from the wrongdoer. Forgiveness marks the moment when it is no longer fitting for the agent to prepare for aggressive action towards the wrongdoer.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/kw.2026.41.53-73
Date of publication: 2026-09-07 23:36:01
Date of submission: 2026-01-16 02:34:31
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