Verantwortung für falsche Überzeugungen und moralischer Relativismus

Olena Komar

Abstract


In diesem Artikel argumentiere ich zur Verteidigung der Verantwortung für falsche Überzeugungen aus der Perspektive der Glaubensethik und der Kognitionswissenschaft und präsentiere eine Klassifizierung von falschen Überzeugungen in drei Typen. Ich führe auch Argumente für den regulativen Wert der Wahrheit an. Moralischer metaethischer Relativismus verändert das Verständnis der grundlegenden Prämissen der Glaubensethik und bezweifelt die Idee der Wahrheit als grundlegendes epistemisches Gut. Der moralische Relativismus birgt potenzielle erkenntnistheoretische Fallstricke, wie etwa die Förderung falscher Überzeugungen, bei denen die Wahrheit zum Vorteil einer bestimmten Gruppe oder der Machthaber relativiert wird, wodurch das Konzept der Wahrheit selbst untergraben wird. Obwohl Cliffords klassisches Prinzip zu anspruchsvoll ist, ist die moralische Verantwortung für die Art und Weise, wie Überzeugungen erworben werden, von wesentlicher Bedeutung, da erkenntnistheoretisch fehlerhafte Überzeugungen, die unter ungünstigen sozialen Bedingungen entstehen, moralisch und erkenntnistheoretisch falsch sind.

Schlagworte


schlechte Überzeugungen; moralischer Relativismus; Ethik des Glaubens; epistemische Tugenden und Laster; Kognitionswissenschaft; Erkenntnistheorie

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/kw.2024.38.33-56
Date of publication: 2024-12-31 23:41:29
Date of submission: 2024-06-20 18:07:31


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