The Problematic Nature of Conscious Decision-Making (Volitional) Acts

Abstract

The author begins the analysis of the problematic nature of conscious decision-making by discussing various conceptions of consciousness, will, and freedom. He ultimately adopts a view of consciousness as subjective experience, will as the capacity to form intentions, and freedom as the non-causal creation of decisions by consciousness. He then argues against the existence of freedom understood in this way by firstly, examining empirical studies (Libet; Haggard and Eimer; Haynes et al.) which suggest that decisions occur in the brain prior to the subject’s awareness of them, and then, secondly, by drawing on the works of Sam Harris, he claims that the subjective perspective also undermines freedom, since thoughts and decisions seem to appear in consciousness rather than being created by it. He concludes that conscious decision-making acts are better viewed as decisions that are consciously experienced. Their appearance in consciousness, however, exerts influence on subsequent thoughts and decisions. Thus, while consciousness can be viewed as a cause of thoughts and decisions, this cause is passive rather than active.