Pluralism and Relativism in Ethics Starting from W. K. Frankena

Abstract

This article connects pluralism and relativism in ethics through the path of a classic scholar of 20th century moral philosophy: W. K. Frankena. In normative ethics Frankena defends a pluralist perspective, because in his theory of obligation there is a plurality of basic moral principles (exactly two) that may conflict with one another and there is no strict order of priority for resolving conflicts between them. His attitude towards ethical relativism is, however, negative, because in his view all three version of relativism in the moral sphere (descriptive, metaethical, and normative) are questionable. The author explains the reasons for the plausibility of a pluralist model in normative ethics, but he shows more openness to relativism than Frankena. In particular, the author defends a moderate version of descriptive and metaethical relativism, allowing that conflicting moral evaluations of certain issues may be equally justified. Such a form of relativism, far from constituting a “bogeyman”, simply expresses the idea that the correct use of reason does not necessarily lead to a single outcome, but can yield a plurality of results (without thereby allowing every result).