Mixed Feelings Towards Values

Abstract

In this paper, I argue for Mitchell’s theory of emotions as “feelings towards value” as this applies to “genuinely” mixed feelings or emotions. In terms of Mitchell’s theory, I particularly use his notions of (1) the temporal and modal aspects of an emotion’s intentional object and (2) its “total environment” as these appropriately represent the object’s value. Such value prompts felt valenced attitudes of favor or disfavor. In terms of genuinely mixed feelings, I employ Zaborowski’s definition as feelings directed at the same object, at the same time. I also use his categories of genuinely mixed feelings i.e., moods, layered feelings, and meta-emotions. Finally, I ultimately contend that other traditional theories of emotion such as judgmentalism/cognitivism, perceptualism, and attitudinalism fall short in explaining both the phenomenology of mixed feelings, and the temporal and modal elements of emotional objects needed to apprehend mixed feelings in the first place.